Showing papers in "Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1961"
TL;DR: The notion of "degrees of belief" was introduced by Knight as mentioned in this paper, who argued that people tend to behave "as though" they assigned numerical probabilities to events, or degrees of belief to the events impinging on their actions.
Abstract: Are there uncertainties that are not risks? There has always been a good deal of skepticism about the behavioral significance of Frank Knight's distinction between “measurable uncertainty” or “risk”, which may be represented by numerical probabilities, and “unmeasurable uncertainty” which cannot. Knight maintained that the latter “uncertainty” prevailed – and hence that numerical probabilities were inapplicable – in situations when the decision-maker was ignorant of the statistical frequencies of events relevant to his decision; or when a priori calculations were impossible; or when the relevant events were in some sense unique; or when an important, once-and-for-all decision was concerned. Yet the feeling has persisted that, even in these situations, people tend to behave “as though” they assigned numerical probabilities, or “degrees of belief,” to the events impinging on their actions. However, it is hard either to confirm or to deny such a proposition in the absence of precisely-defined procedures for measuring these alleged “degrees of belief.” What might it mean operationally, in terms of refutable predictions about observable phenomena, to say that someone behaves “as if” he assigned quantitative likelihoods to events: or to say that he does not? An intuitive answer may emerge if we consider an example proposed by Shackle, who takes an extreme form of the Knightian position that statistical information on frequencies within a large, repetitive class of events is strictly irrelevant to a decision whose outcome depends on a single trial.
7,005 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe a price system and a firm's decision mechanism, and the control of information and expectations of the price system, and conclude that the decision mechanism can be improved.
Abstract: I. The price system and the firm, 399. — II. The control of information, 402. — III. Information and expectations, 405. — IV. The division of knowledge, 411. — V. The firm's decision mechanism, 417. — VI. Conclusion, 420.
275 citations
241 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the question of rationality is addressed in the context of slanted probabilities and the correction factor is used to evaluate the accuracy of the slanted probability distribution, and two small experiments are conducted.
Abstract: I. Observation of slanted probabilities and computation of the correction factor, 670. — II. The question of rationality, 677. — III. Two small experiments, 686.
224 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the main argument is that the aggregation of inputs as well as outputs for the measurement of "efficiency" is not a good idea, and the treatment of "new products" in input and output indexes, 465.
Abstract: I. The main argument, 451. — II. Problems of time series including more than two years, 457. — III. The aggregation of inputs as well as outputs for the measurement of "efficiency," 459. — IV. The treatment of "new products" in input and output indexes, 465.
135 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the dual economy and the migrant labor system were discussed and the individual's offer of labor was analyzed. But the authors focused on the individual and not on the exchange economy as a whole.
Abstract: Introduction, 468. — I. The dual economy and the migrant labor system, 470. — II. The individual's offer of labor, 472. — III. The supply of labor to the exchange economy as a whole, 480; the level of village income and the supply of labor, 480; the rate of wages and the supply of labor in the exchange sector, 485. — IV. The supply of labor to the territory, 489. — V. Summary and conclusions, 491.
119 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a statistical estimation of the model, including the savings-income ratio, the capital output ratio, and the capital-labor ratio as a whole, and some remarks on the rate of interest.
Abstract: Introduction, 173. — Statistical estimation of the model, 174. — The savings-income ratio, 175. — The capital-output ratio, 178. — Labor's share, 180. — Velocity of circulation, 184. — The capital-labor ratio, 186. — The model as a whole, 188. — Some remarks on the rate of interest, 192. — The aggregate production function and factor substitution, 195. — Another possible great ratio, 197.
117 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare computer models with operations research simulations and econometric models, and present a review of the literature on computer models and the future of computer models.
Abstract: Introduction, 112. — Theory construction (model building), 113. — General characteristics of computer models, 115. — Comparison of computer models with operations research simulations and econometric models, 117. — Methodological problems of computer models, 119. — Review of the literature, 121. — Future of computer models, 126.
87 citations
TL;DR: The economic foundations of fashion, the pursuit of rarity, 385, the factor of demonstrability, 387, fashion as demonstrated command over current factors of production, 390, some implications for economic fields, 393, value and welfare, 394, economic competition and organization, 395, economic development and cycles, 396 as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: I. Introduction: fashion and economics, 376. — II. The state of fashion theory, 380. — III. The economic foundations of fashion, 385; the pursuit of rarity, 385; factor of demonstrability, 387; fashion as demonstrated command over current factors of production, 390. — IV. Some implications for economic fields, 393; value and welfare, 393; economic competition and organization, 395; economic development and cycles, 396. — V. Conclusion, 398.
73 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the relationship between optimum plant size and various economic variables, and concluded that the optimum size in 89 American manufacturing industries was determined by four possible movements in the distribution of plants.
Abstract: I. The nature of optimum size, 569. — II. Problems in estimating optimum size, 570. — III. Previous techniques for the estimation of optimum size, 572. — IV. The survivor technique, 572. — V. Applying the technique, 574. — VI. An investigation of the relationship between optimum plant size and various economic variables, 582. — VII. Summary and conclusions, 596. — Appendix I. Optimum size in 89 American manufacturing industries, 598. — Appendix II. Four possible movements in the distribution of plants, 603. — Appendix III. Measurement of the independent variables, 605.
68 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the equilibrium of the competitive firm, the cost of uncertainty, 42; the economics of prediction, 46; prediction and profit, 48; prediction, supply, and demand, 51; and decentralization of prediction.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 41. — II. The equilibrium of the competitive firm, 42; the cost of uncertainty, 42; the economics of prediction, 46; prediction and profit, 48; prediction and supply, 51. — III. The equilibrium of the competitive industry, 54; prediction and profit in a closed industry, 55; prediction and economic equilibrium in an open industry, 58; prediction and price variation, 58; decentralization of prediction, 60. — IV. Conclusions, 61.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the early origins in railway rate theory: oligopoly, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, increasing returns, 534, the representative firm and dynamic problems, 538.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 515. — II. Early origins in railway rate theory: oligopoly, 517. — III. Process, structure and logic, 520. — IV. "Competing monopolists" and the literature of business, 524. — V. The attack on Marshall, 532; oligopoly, 533, increasing returns, 534, the representative firm and dynamic problems, 538. — VI. Marshall on monopolistic competition, 540.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare sizes and operating characteristics within industries among different types of establishments, and compare inter-industry differentials in multi-unit operations; multiunit operations and other industry characteristics.
Abstract: Introduction, 278. — I. Comparisons of sizes and operating characteristics within industries among different types of establishments, 279. — II. Inter-industry differentials in multi-unit operations; multi-unit operations and other industry characteristics, 283.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare cities by size classes and show that New York and Chicago are the two largest cities in the United States in terms of the number of people in each city.
Abstract: Introduction, 87. — I. Theoretical considerations, 88. — II. Statistical analysis: New York and Chicago, 90. — III. Comparison of cities by size classes, 91. — IV. Conclusion, 94.
TL;DR: In this article, the basic gold standard model introduced by Hume and the extension of the basic model by Ricardo are discussed. But the analysis of subsidy payments in both models is left open.
Abstract: I. Scope of paper, 292. — II. Basic gold standard model introduced by Hume, 293. — III. Extension of basic model by Ricardo, 294. — IV. Thornton's refinements of theory, 297. — V. Working of models under paper standard, 298. — VI. Analysis of subsidy payments in both models, 300. — VII. Conclusion, 301.
TL;DR: The authors argued that the Physiocratic theory of property is a theory of malleable property rights premised upon an utilitarian understanding of the social function of private property and necessarily involving the state in the continuing reconstitution of property rights.
Abstract: Economists have long interpreted the Physiocratic concept of the relation of the state to property as essentially the protection of private property. The thesis of this article is that the Physiocratic theory of property de facto valid, however doctrinal its advocacy of private property, is a theory of malleable property rights premised upon an utilitarian understanding of the social function of private property and necessarily involving the state in the continuing reconstitution of property rights.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the role of output and resources in the growth of the economy and the allocation of resources to meet the needs of the future. But they do not discuss future problems.
Abstract: Introduction, 63. — I. Growth of output and resources, 64. — II. Resource allocation and income distribution, 76. — III. Future problems, 83.
TL;DR: In this article, economic theory and the goals of the firm are discussed, and a number of approaches to the study of economic intent, structure, and behavior are presented, including power, intent and policy.
Abstract: I. Economic theory and the goals of the firm, 345. — II. The corporate economy, 356. — III. Problems in the specification of goals, 360. — IV. Some recent approaches to the study of economic intent, structure, and behavior, 368. — V. Power, intent and policy, 374.
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of steel price determination in steel is discussed. And the crisis of 1959 and public policy is discussed in detail. But the focus is on steel prices.
Abstract: I Introduction, 16 — II "Administered prices," 18 — III The problem in steel, 20 — IV Interdependence of costs and prices, 21 — V Price determination in steel, 23 — VI The crisis of 1959, 29 — VII Public policy, 35 — Epilogue, 38
TL;DR: In this article, the authors make a comparison between the underdeveloped countries and Schumpeter's model as to the motive force of development and the goals of development (public good, not private gain).
Abstract: I. Introductory: statements by Wallich and others of the inapplicability to the underdeveloped countries of Schumpeter's theory of economic development, 422. — II. Criticism of the contrasts drawn between the underdeveloped countries and Schumpeter's model as to the motive force of development (governments, not private entrepreneurs) and the goals of development (public good, not private gain), 424. — III. And as to the method of development (assimilation, not innovation), 433. — IV. Consideration of the significance of the international demonstration effect, 438. — V. Criticism of Bonne's complaints of the limitations of Schumpeter's conception of economic development, 440. — VI. Account of the reasons for Schumpeter's self-imposed limitations, 445. — VII. Summary and conclusion, 447.
TL;DR: In this article, a simple model and a more complicated model are presented, and the importance of the assumptions of a closed economy and perfect competition is discussed. But they do not consider the tradeoff between the two models.
Abstract: Introduction, 1. — I. A simple model, 2. — II. A more complicated model, 9. — III. Significance of the assumptions of a closed economy and perfect competition, 14.
TL;DR: Schumpeter's and Monroe's interpretation of a non-metallist Aristotelian is discussed in this article, where evidence that Aristotle was a nonlinearist is presented.
Abstract: Schumpeter's and Monroe's interpretation of Aristotle, 608. — Evidence that Aristotle was a non-metallist, 610.
TL;DR: Introduction, 234, — The theory of the production decision, 235, and results of Model I, 244 and Model II, 247.
Abstract: Introduction, 234. — The theory of the production decision, 235. — The data, 243. — Results of Model I, 244. — Model II, 247. — Concluding remarks, 257.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a set of goals and instruments for economic growth, economic stability, price stability, and balance of payments, and co-ordination and organization.
Abstract: Introduction, 544. — Goals and instruments, 545. — High production and employment, 550. — Economic growth, 552. — National security and government services, 556. — Assurance of equity, 558. — Price stability, 558. — Strengthening competition, 560. — The balance of payments, 563. — Co-ordination and organization, 566.
TL;DR: In this article, the indeterminacy of purely market-determined pricing and the structure of the code-established price in pure oligopoly was discussed, as well as the shapes of demand and cost curves.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 199. — II. Market-determined and code-established prices, 201. — III. The market-determined price in pure oligopoly, 202. — IV. The code-established price in pure oligopoly, 205. — V. Price discrimination, 208. — VI. Differentiated oligopoly, 210. — VII. The demand curve as an analytic concept, 212. — VIII. Code-established prices in pure competition, 215. — IX. The indeterminacy of purely market-determined pricing, 218. — X. Monopolistic conspiracy versus cutthroat competition, 220. — XI. The shapes of demand and cost curves, 222. — XII. Excess capacity, 226. — XIII. The structure of the code-established price, 228. — XIV. Behavior codes, 230. — XV. Conclusion, 232.