Showing papers in "Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1975"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the relationship between Hicks-neutral productivity and capital intensity in cities of different sizes and found that the increase in productivity with city size increases with the size of the city.
Abstract: I. The increase in productivity with city size, 393. — II. The labor productivity of cities, 396. — III. The contributions of Hicks-neutral productivity and capital intensity, 401. — IV. The direction of causality, 406. — V. Conclusions, 410. — Appendix A: choice of the industries included in this study, 411. — Appendix B: evidence relating to the capital-labor ratio in cities of different size, 412.
494 citations
177 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the interstatus-income ratio compression effect and the inter-status total utility differentials and the utility cost of children were investigated. And the relationship between utility and utility cost relations was analyzed.
Abstract: I. Typical behavior versus critical marginal behavior, 2.—II. Development, occupational shifts, and status shifts, 4.—III. The interstatus-income ratio compression effect, 5.—IV. Status and other IMU goods, 7.—V. Intra-household distributions and commitment claim drift, 11.—VI. On the price inelasticity of status goods, 15.—VII. Interstatus total utility differentials and the utility cost of children, 18.—VIII. On the utility of children, 21.—IX. Combining utility and utility cost relations, 26.
174 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors prove the optimality of the N-period market equilibrium under uncertainty if suppliers are risk-neutral, and present an extended model with nonzero extraction costs.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 371. — II. The simple model, 372. — III. Market equilibrium in the simple model, 375. — IV. The extended model — optimal and equilibrium allocation with nonzero extraction costs, 377. — V. Equilibrium with uncertain future demand, 381. — VI. Monopoly behavior, 387. — VII. Summary and conclusion, 389. — Appendix: proof of the optimality of the N-period market equilibrium under uncertainty if suppliers are risk-neutral, 390.
144 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the determinants of speculative hedging behavior are discussed and a non-informative equilibrium is proposed, and a prior-trading optimum and compound consumptive gamble are provided.
Abstract: I. Price risk versus quantity risk, 520. — II. Noninformative equilibrium: simple consumptive gamble, 525. — III. Informative equilibrium: prior-trading optimum and compound consumptive gamble, 529. — IV. Conclusion: determinants of speculative-hedging behavior, 538. — V. Limitations and generalizations, 540.
126 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a group of individuals who must collectively choose one of several mutually exclusive alternatives, and the problem is to aggregate the preferences of individuals into a social preference relation where the aggregation procedure has certain desirable ethical and institutional properties.
Abstract: Consider a group of individuals who must collectively choose one of several mutually exclusive alternatives. Since, in general, there will be disagreement as to the desirability of the different alternatives, the group may find it easier first' to choose a method or procedure for aggregating their preferences. At least there may be a consensus as to what properties an aggregation procedure ought to have before the group would consider it ethically and institutionally acceptable. For example, one such ethical consideration is the requirement that the group preference be Pareto-efficient, i.e., if every member of society prefers a to /3, then society should prefer a to ,8. As an institutional requirement we might wish to restrict ourselves to methods of aggregation that can be implemented by voting rules. We shall suppose that the tastes or preferences of the individuals in society can be represented in one of two ways. Each person has an ordinal utility function, U, or a preference relation, P, over the set of alternatives. Individuals whose tastes are described by a utility function will be called rational. If he has a preference relation P, aP,8, is to be read "he prefers a to /8." Operationally we shall interpret this to mean that if offered the choice between a or /, he will choose a. We do not assume the converse. If someone chooses a over /3, then we can only infer that he does not prefer /8 to a. This is not a pedantic distinction; it is essential if one is to recognize that an individual who makes a unique choice out of every subset of alternatives may well have an incomplete even intransitive preference relation over the set of alternatives. Our problem is to aggregate the preferences of individuals into a social preference relation, where the aggregation procedure has certain desirable ethical and institutional properties. This is the
123 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the Hells Canyon project is used to illustrate the situation in which a decision to proceed with a project precludes the possibility of realizing other future benefits, while a decision not to proceed leaves the option for future development.
Abstract: The scarcity value of diminishing resources should be reflected in the discount rates on investments involving the public sector and environmental resources. Lowering the discount rate as a conservation measure may actually cause more rapid depletion of resources. Environmental resources, which provide recreational or other services at the site, differ from extractive resources in that use of extractive resources is only an intermediate good. In some instances, environmental resources are even more irreplaceable than extractive. The Hells Canyon project is used to illustrate the situation in which a decision to proceed with a project precludes the possibility of realizing other future benefits, while a decision not to proceed leaves the option for future development. (DCK)
110 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a summary of the main points of their paper: 1) National Optimum, 618; 2) International Transfer Payments, 624; 3) Bilateral monopoly power, 629; and 4) Appendix, 631.
Abstract: Introduction, 618. — National Optimum, 619. — International Optimum, 624. — International transfer payments, 627. — Bilateral monopoly power, 629. — Summary, 630. — Appendix, 631.
108 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a model to evaluate the relationship between public programs and changes in the value of a region's land value, and found that the relation between the two is not a simple one, and that in general the change in the land value does not equal the benefits of public programs.
Abstract: BENEFIT MEASUREMENTS FOR PUBLIC PROGRAMS AND THE PARTICULAR QUESTION OF WHETHER CHANGES IN LAND VALUES ACCURATELY MEASURE BENEFITS ARE DISCUSSED. THE MODEL DEVELOPED IN THIS PAPER WAS DESIGNED TO BE OF USE IN EVALUATING THE BENEFITS FROM A LARGE CLASS OF PROJECTS THAT AFFECT SPECIFIC PARCELS OF LAND, BUT THAT ARE NOT SO EXTENSIVE AS TO ALTER THE ECONOMIC AND SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF A REGION. THE RESULTS THAT ARE DERIVED SHOW THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BENEFITS OF THESE PROJECTS AND CHANGES IN LAND VALUES IS NOT A SIMPLE ONE, AND THAT IN GENERAL THE CHANGE IN THE VALUE OF LAND DOES NOT EQUAL THE BENEFITS EXCEPT IN THE CASE WHERE ALL PROFITS ARE ELIMINATED.
97 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a post-Keynesian model is proposed for the existence of nonexistence and a pre-Keynathan model is presented for the nonexistence of existence.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 32.—II. A post-Keynesian model, 32.—III. The pre-Keynesian argument, 35.—IV. Switching the models, 36.—V. A nonexistence theorem, 38.
95 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the use of physical analogues in the classical theory of value has been discussed, and a complementary approach has been proposed to deal with the problem of the rate of exploitation.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 543. — III. The use of physical analogues in the classical theory of value, 544. — III. The rate of exploitation, 550. — IV. A complementary approach, 555.
TL;DR: In this paper, the structure of the model, the short-run equilibrium, the real balance effect, and the real-balance effect, were discussed, as well as the short run equilibrium.
Abstract: I. Equilibrium and disequilibrium models, 56. — II. The structure of the model, 59. — III. The short-run equilibrium, 65. — IV. The real balance effect, 75.
TL;DR: A model of monopoly and wealth is proposed in this article, where the authors estimate the parameters of the model and conclude that the model is a good fit for the real world, and the empirical findings are similar to ours.
Abstract: A model of monopoly and wealth, 178. — Estimation of parameters, 182. — The empirical findings, 189. — Conclusions, 194.
TL;DR: The scope for additional use of labor in traditional agriculture was discussed in this paper, where conditions for the use of industrial inputs and conditions for future use of labour in agriculture were discussed.
Abstract: The scope for additional use of labor in traditional agriculture, 257.— Infrastructure and labor migration, 260. — Conditions for the use of industrial inputs, 262. — Prospects for the future, 264.
TL;DR: In this article, the payment mechanism for collection of speculative profits was taken into account and the paradox was resolved even when national economies are nearly independent, and the sample size necessary for the effect in question to influence empirical conclusions was investigated.
Abstract: In a recent article, Siegel has called attention to a paradox involving forward foreign exchange rates.' This paradox has been partially resolved in two comments by Roper and Boyer, who assume that national economies are highly interdependent. In the present paper by taking into account the payment mechanism for collection of speculative profits, we are able to resolve the paradox even when national economies are nearly independent. We then investigate the sample size necessary for the effect in question to influence empirical conclusions and find, using historical variances, that we would need hundreds of years of data. Siegel's paradox is based on the fact that for purely mathematical reasons, we cannot simultaneously have the forward dollar price of pounds dtf equal to the expected value E[dta] of the corresponding anticipated future spot rate and the forward pound price of dollars ctf= 1/dtf equal to the expected value E [Cta], even though Cta= 1/dta. As a consequence, there are always expected profit opportunities to speculation on future exchange rates. These profits arise from Jensen's inequality from probability theory and have no apparent economic cause. Roper2 points out that there are two relevant numeraires, dollars and pounds. Jensen's inequality does not guarantee that there will be a speculative strategy with positive expected profits in terms of both numeraires. In fact, if the forward rate lies within the bounds, (1) 1/E [Cta] < 1/Ctf
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define the group and define demand conditions for two-characteristics case, demand conditions and cost conditions for four or more characteristics, and the case of three characteristics, five76.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 569. — II. Definition of the group, 570. — III. Demand conditions — the two-characteristics case, 573. — IV. The case of three characteristics, 576. — V. Four or more characteristics. 581. — VI. Cost conditions, 584. — VII. Entry and equilibrium, 586. — VIII. Further implications, 587. — IX. Conclusion, 589.
TL;DR: In this paper, the nature of a pitfall and its consequences are discussed. And the deeper issue of nonsteady-state analysis of non-steady state analysis is discussed.
Abstract: Nature of a pitfall, 41.—Substantive vindication— 43.—Deeper issue of nonsteady-state analysis, 45.
TL;DR: In this paper, a hierarchical hierarchical work system is defined as a functional element in the hierarchical work systems, and discrimination is considered as a function of the hierarchical system, and a functional component of the hierarchy.
Abstract: I. Employer-generated discrimination, 216. — II. Discrimination as a functional element in the hierarchical work system, 220. — III. Conclusion, 228.
TL;DR: In this article, a simple schooling model is proposed, and an interpretation of actual and optimal schooling behavior is presented, along with a simple estimation of the optimal learning behavior of children.
Abstract: I. A simple schooling model, 605. — II. Estimation, 606. — III. An interpretation of actual and optimal schooling behavior, 615.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a comment on Siegel's analysis and compare it to other areas of economics, such as expected value analysis in other areas, and expected profits and the generalized mean.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 157. — II. Expected profits and the generalized mean, 159. — III. A comment on Siegel's analysis, 165. — IV. Expected value analysis in other areas of economics, 168.
TL;DR: In this article, an appropriate function of international capital flow is proposed and a re-appraisal of the assignment problem of Mundell's assignment problem is carried out, and the basic stability of the system is examined.
Abstract: I Introduction, 195 — II Formulation of an appropriate function of international capital flow, 197 — III Reappraisal of Mundell's assignment problem, 200 — IV Further look into the basic stability of the system, 207
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a simple empirical test for reswitching in a multisectoral economy, based on a two-sector model, which is based on the Sato technology frontier.
Abstract: I. Consistent aggregation of a multisectoral economy to a two-sector model, 106. — II. The Sato technology frontier, 110. — III. The neoclassical model, 111. — IV. Implications and extensions, 112. — Appendix: a simple empirical test for reswitching, 114.
TL;DR: In this article, a theoretical analysis of the problem of estimating the price of capital in the context of income distribution in the former Yugoslavia is presented, and the likelihood of a downward bias of the estimator of the price is analyzed.
Abstract: I. The theoretical statement of the problem, 432. — II. Income, capital intensity, and the estimated rent of capital in Yugoslavia, 433. — III. Other factors affecting income distribution, 436. — IV. The likelihood of a downward bias of our estimator of price of capital, 439. — V. Conclusions and suggested further research, 440. — Appendix, 441.
TL;DR: In this paper, an extension of the usual general equilibrium model of economic activity, broad enough to include as endogenous variables the social entities and personal capacities on which individual welfare is based, is sketched and developed using structural-functional theory.
Abstract: "Neoclassical Welfare Economics and Individual Development" proceeds in four logical stages. First, a methodological argument is offered as to the scope of welfare economics. A coherent welfare theory, I argue, must deal with the total impact of economic activity on the social bases of individual welfares. "Whenever economic activity . . . affects the social order, we are in the realm of welfare economics." I Second, certain minimal and necessary elements of a welfare theory adequate to this task are developed. These include (a) a specification of the welfare-relevant social entities ("unit objects") to which individuals relate or which they use instrumentally in pursuing their goals and which are affected by economic activity, and (b) a specification of individual capacities apposite to deriving well-being from given "bundles" of these social entities. Third, an extension of the usual general equilibrium model of economic activity, broad enough to include as endogenous variables the social entities and personal capacities on which individual welfare is based, is sketched and developed using structural-functional theory. Fourth, neoclassical welfare economics and the institutional mechanisms it recommends are criticized on the basis of the above model. In conclusion, I argue that my model poses many fruitful theoretical and empirical questions, but is unoperational in its present form, and is incorrect in adhering to a structural-functional framework. These deficiencies, I suggest, can be overcome only if positive theory is couched in a dialectical and historical framework, and the relation between positive and normative spheres is itself treated dialectically. Talcott Parsons' criticisms are directed almost exclusively toward the third stage of my argument (the extended structuralfunctional model) and my conclusion as to the inadequacy of structural-functional analysis in general. While his disapproval is quite general, I fail to discern even a minor substantive criticism of the other stages in my argument. Thus, I shall confine my remarks to
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the Lerner and McKinnon symmetry theorems, and the Imperfect Competition and the Lerner Symmetry Theorem, and present a set of rules for perfect competition.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 591. — II. The Lerner and McKinnon symmetry theorems, 591. — III. Imperfect competition and the Lerner Symmetry Theorem, 595.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model for the maximization problem in general equilibrium and general equilibrium, and conclude that general equilibrium is the optimal solution to the problem of general equilibrium.
Abstract: I. The model, 415. — II. The maximization problem, 417. — III. General equilibrium, 419. — IV. Comparative statics, 422. — V. Final comments, 430.
TL;DR: In this paper, Arrow's model and results are presented for public goods and public goods as produced commodities, and examples of examples are given. But they do not discuss the effect of public goods on the overall economy.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 138. — II. Outline of Arrow's model and results, 138. — III. Public goods, 139. — IV. Expenditures as produced commodities, 140. — V. Examples, 142. — VI. Conclusion, 144.