Showing papers in "Sloan Management Review in 1999"

Managing Codified Knowledge

Abstract: Firms can derive significant benefits from consciously, proactively, and aggressively managing their explicit and explicable knowledge, which many consider the most important factor of production in the knowledge economy. Doing this in a coherent manner requires aligning a firm's organizational and technical resources and capabilities with its knowledge strategy. However, appropriately explicating tacit knowledge so it can be efficiently and meaningfully shared and reapplied ? especially outside the originating community ? is one of the least understood aspects of knowledge management. This suggests a more fundamental challenge, namely, determining which knowledge an organization should make explicit and which it should leave tacit ? a balance that can affect competitive performance. The management of explicit knowledge utilizes four primary resources that the author details: repositories of explicit knowledge; refineries for accumulating, refining, managing, and distributing the knowledge; organization roles to execute and manage the refining process; and information technologies to support the repositories and processes. On the basis of this concept of knowledge management architecture, a firm can segment knowledge processing into two broad classes: integrative and interactive ? each addressing different knowledge management objectives. Together, these approaches provide a broad set of knowledge-processing capabilities. They support well-structured repositories for managing explicit knowledge, while enabling interaction to integrate tacit knowledge. The author presents two case studies of managing explicit knowledge. One is an example of an integrative architecture for the electronic publishing of knowledge gleaned by industry research analysts. The second illustrates the effective use of an interactive architecture for discussion forums to support servicing customers. Zack also discusses several key issues about the broader organizational context for knowledge management, the design and management of knowledge-processing applications, and the benefits that must accrue to be successful. In summary, organizations that are managing knowledge effectively (1) understand their strategic knowledge requirements, (2) devise a knowledge strategy appropriate to their business strategy, and (3) implement an organizational and technical architecture appropriate to the firm's knowledge-processing needs.

Strategic outsourcing: leveraging knowledge capabilities

Abstract: Today's knowledge- and service-based economy offers companies a chance to increase profits through strategic outsourcing of intellectually based systems. As companies disaggregate intellectual activities internally and outsource more externally, they approach true virtual organization with knowledge centers interacting largely through mutual interest and electronic ? rather than authority ? systems. In this article, Quinn outlines an integrated knowledge and outsourcing strategy that can mitigate the risks and concerns associated with outsourcing. Companies with successful knowledge strategies follow these well-accepted principles: They concentrate on developing "best in world" capabilities that customers genuinely care about. An effective core competency strategy focuses on two to four cross-functional, intellectually based service activities or knowledge and skill sets that the company can build and maintain at best-in-world levels to provide a flexible platform for future innovations (at least one directly connected to understanding the customer). Such core competencies become "strategic blocks" that prevent a firm's suppliers from directly attacking its markets and increase the firm's bargaining power and security. They leverage the capabilities and investments of others by exploiting three areas of intellectual outsourcing: (1) traditional service or functional activities performed in-house (e.g., accounting, IT, or employee benefits); (2) complementary, integrative, or duplicative activities scattered throughout the company; and (3) disciplines, subsystems, or systems in which outsiders have greater expertise or capabilities for innovation. They innovate constantly. Links to outside knowledge sources that are able to assemble diverse expertise greatly affect the timing and amplitude of innovations. Sophisticated outsourcing supported by new electronic communications, modeling, and monitoring techniques enables companies to reduce innovation cycle times and costs by 60 percent to 90 percent and decrease investments and risks by equal amounts. They eliminate inflexibilities, such as fixed overhead, bureaucracy, and physical plant, by tapping the resources of the downstream customer chain and the upstream technology and supply chain. How can a company best manage risks and develop the full potential of intellectual outsourcing? Successful outsourcers carefully develop and implement certain crucial management controls that Quinn describes. Outsourcing also must become a top management issue because lower- to intermediate-level managers tend to be actively hostile to outsourcing ? fearing loss of jobs, prestige, or power.

A Study of Spirituality in the Workplace

Abstract: What do managers and executives believe and feel about workplace spirituality or assessments of its purported benefits? In this article, the authors present the results of a two-year empirical study based on face-to-face interviews and questionnaires. Participants differentiated strongly between religion and spirituality, viewing religion as a highly inappropriate form of expression and spirituality as a highly appropriate subject for the workplace. Most believed strongly that organizations must harness the immense spiritual energy within each person in order to produce world-class products and services. Meaning and purpose on the job are imparted by (ranked from highest to lowest in importance): (1) "the ability to realize my full potential as a person"; (2) being associated with a good organization or an ethical organization; (3) interesting work; (4) making money; (5) having good colleagues and serving humankind; (6) service to future generations; and (7) "service to my immediate community." Beyond a certain threshold, the authors point out, pay ceases to be the most important factor in work life, and higher needs prevail; the desire for "self-actualization" becomes paramount. The authors observed five basic designs or models in which organizations are religious or spiritual: The religious-based organization may be positive toward religion and spirituality or positive toward religion and negative toward spirituality. The evolutionary organization begins as strongly associated or identified with a particular religion and moves toward a more ecumenical position. The recovering organization adopts the principles of Alcoholics Anonymous as a way to foster spirituality. The socially responsible organization is led by someone guided by strong spiritual principles or values that are applied directly to the business for the betterment of society. The values-based organization is guided by general philosophical principles or values that are not aligned or associated with a particular religion or even with spirituality. Characterized by the underlying principle of hope, the models appear to have been precipitated by a critical event that caused intense difficulties for the company founders, heads, or the entire organization. All incorporate a principle or mechanism for limiting greed ? both the unlimited accumulation of money and the unrestrained pursuit of power. With a few notable exceptions, people who consider their organizations as being spiritual also see them as better than their less spiritual counterparts.

Portfolios of Buyer-Supplier Relationships

Abstract: A survey on supplier relationships administered to 447 managers from the major U.S. and Japanese automobile manufacturers showed that these firms do not manage primarily by strategic partnerships, but instead participate in various types of relationships. The author proposes and empirically validates a framework for managing a portfolio of relationships that will help senior managers answer two key questions: Which governance structure or relational design should a firm choose under certain external contingencies? What is the appropriate way to manage each type of relationship? The survey examined the specific investment of buyers and suppliers from both national samples in four types of relationships: strategic partnership, market exchange, captive buyer, and captive supplier. Interestingly, the level of investment made by either party in every type of relationship significantly correlated with practices commonly associated with strategic partnerships, such as long-term relationships, mutual trust, cooperation, and wide-scope relationships that include multiple components. No one type of buyer-supplier relationship ? not even the strategic partnership ? was inherently superior, which suggests that each can be well or poorly managed. Firms successfully manage supply chains by matching relationship type to specific product, market, and supplier conditions and by adopting an appropriate management approach for each type of relationship. Findings also countered the popular belief that Japanese firms tend to manage their suppliers using highly dedicated relationships or strategic partnerships. They appear to conduct business with a smaller ratio of strategic partnerships than is commonly believed (19 percent of the sample) and to extensively use market-exchange relationships (31 percent) ? a practice usually associated with Western manufacturers. The author provides a contextual profile of product and market conditions most conducive to each type of relationship and discusses the management features common to the best performers in each category. By consciously and systematically matching the design of each relationship to its external context, product executives can stifle the urge to join the sweeping fad of strategic partnerships and avoid underdesigning and overdesigning external relationships.

Toyota's Principles of Set-Based Concurrent Engineering

Abstract: Not well documented to date, the design and development system of Toyota Motor Corporation contributes greatly to the firm's remarkably consistent growth in market share and its enviable profit per vehicle. This article, which extends the authors' previous study of the Toyota product development system, reports on further data collection in Japan and at the Toyota Technical Center in Michigan. Findings substantiate the authors' previous claims about the product development system and lead them to conclude that Toyota is "set-based" in its approaches. Set-based concurrent engineering (SBCE) begins by broadly considering sets of possible solutions (in parallel and relatively independently) and gradually narrowing the set of possibilities to converge on a final solution. Gradually eliminating weaker solutions increases the likelihood of finding the best or better solutions. In this way, Toyota can move more quickly toward convergence and production than their traditional, "point-based" counterparts. The authors develop the SBCE idea by describing three principles that guide Toyota's decision making in design: (1) simultaneous mapping of the design space according to functional expertise, (2) "integration by intersection" of mutually acceptable functional refinements introduced by the design and manufacturing engineering groups, and (3) establishment of feasibility before commitment. The authors also present a conceptual framework tied to the Toyota development system and discuss why the SBCE principles lead to highly effective product development. Findings suggest that a change to a distributed, concurrent engineering environment should involve a corresponding change in design method to a set-based process. Product development organizations able to master and apply SBCE principles and Toyota's principles for integrating systems and cultivating organizational knowledge may be able to radically improve their design and development processes.

How a Firm's Capabilities Affect Boundary Decisions

Abstract: Determining which business activities to bring inside a firm and which to outsource is a critical strategic decision. Firms that bring in the wrong business activities risk losing strategic focus; those that fail to bring the right business activities within their boundaries risk losing their competitive advantage. A well-developed approach for determining a firm's boundary, called transactions cost economics, specifies the conditions for managing a particular economic exchange within an organizational boundary and the conditions for choosing outsourcing. A popular version of transactions cost economics requires managers to consider a single characteristic of an economic exchange ? its level of transaction-specific investment. Three concepts aid in understanding transactions cost economics as applied to firm boundary decisions: governance (the mechanism through which a firm manages an economic exchange), opportunism (taking unfair advantage of other parties to an exchange), and transaction-specific investment (any investment that is significantly more valuable in one particular exchange than in any alternative exchange). Firms can use governance mechanisms to mitigate the threat of opportunism. Traditional transactions cost economics does not focus on the capabilities of a firm or its potential partners, even though economic exchanges involve (1) cooperating with firms that possess critical capabilities, (2) developing capabilities independently, or (3) acquiring another firm that already possesses needed capabilities. The author describes the conditions under which a firm's decisions on managing its business activities should be affected by its capabilities and those of its partners. When these conditions hold ? conditions particularly common in rapidly evolving high-technology industries ? firms should make boundary decisions that differ significantly from what would be suggested by traditional transactions cost analysis.

Understanding Customer Delight and Outrage

Abstract: Evidence indicates that satisfied customers defect at a high rate in many industries. Because satisfaction alone does not translate linearly into outcomes such as loyalty in terms of purchases, businesses must strive for 100 percent, or total, customer satisfaction and even delight to achieve the kind of loyalty they desire. Current studies attribute a higher degree of emotionality to the dissatisfaction end of the satisfaction continuum than in the past. For example, customers who have experienced service failures feel annoyed or victimized. Although victimization is felt at a deeper emotional level than irritation, both can result in outrage. By focusing on more intense customer emotions, such as outrage and delight, the authors explore the dynamics of customer emotions and their effect on customer behavior and loyalty. Schneider and Bowen base their conceptualization on people's needs rather than the more conventional model that focuses on customer expectations about their interactions with a firm. The authors propose a complementary needs-based model for service businesses that assumes customer delight and outrage originate with the handling of three basic human needs ? security, justice, and self-esteem. By recasting a situation as one that has violated any of a customer's fundamental needs, the deeper emotional outcome (e.g., outrage) does not seem incongruous. The authors describe each need and offer specific managerial tactics for avoiding outrage and creating delight. Recent emphasis on relationship marketing ? that is, attracting, developing, and retaining customers ? is pertinent because building relationships requires that companies view customers as people first and consumers second. Service is an exchange relationship in which customers swap their money and loyalty for what Schneider and Bowen argue is need gratification ? a psychological contract with service firms to have their needs gratified. The authors discuss strategies that help firms gratify and, in some cases, delight customers, while avoiding the perception that they do not respect customer needs. Companies must manage how they show concern for customer needs in all actions, including the activities of the back office (e.g., billing, shipping), not just front-office personnel who directly contact the customer.

Reflecting on the Strategy Process

Abstract: Viewing the evolution of strategic management as ten "schools" of practice, Mintzberg and Lampel explore whether these perspectives represent fundamentally different processes of strategy making or different parts of the same process. Unwilling to be constrained by either definition, the authors point out that some schools clearly are stages or aspects of the strategy formation process. Under certain circumstances, such as during start-up or under dynamic conditions when prediction seems impossible, the process may tilt toward the attributes of one school or another. Thus, identifiable stages and periods exist in making strategy ? not in any absolute sense, but as recognizable tendencies. Despite this, the inclination has been to favor the interpretation that the schools represent fundamentally different processes. In cautioning against adopting a pseudoscientific theory of change in strategy formation, Mintzberg and Lampel note with optimism that recent approaches to strategy formation cut across the various schools of practice in eclectic ways. Some of the greatest failings of strategic management, they say, occur when managers take one point of view too seriously. Ideas and practices that originate from collaborative contacts between organizations, from competition and confrontation, from recasting of the old, and from the sheer creativity of managers are driving the evolution of strategic management today. Mintzberg and Lampel advise scholars and consultants to get beyond the narrowness of the ten schools to learn how strategy formation ? which combines all ten schools and more ? really works. The goal is better practice, not neater theory.

Strategy, Value Innovation, and the Knowledge Economy

Abstract: Managers typically assess what competitors do and strive to do it better. Using this approach, companies expend tremendous effort and achieve only incremental improvement ? imitation, not innovation. By focusing on the competition, companies tend to be reactive, and their understanding of emerging mass markets and changing customer demands becomes hazy. During the past decade, Kim and Mauborgne have studied companies of sustained high growth and profits. All pursue a strategy, value innovation, that renders the competition irrelevant by offering new and superior buyer value in existing markets or by enabling the creation of new markets through quantum leaps in buyer value. Value innovation places equal emphasis on value and innovation, since innovation without value can be too strategic or wild, too technology-driven or futuristic. Hence, value innovation is not the same as value creation. Although value creation on an incremental scale creates some value, it is not sufficient for high performance. To value innovate, managers must ask two questions: "Is the firm offering customers radically superior value?" and "Is the firm's price level accessible to the mass of buyers in the target market?" A consequence of market insight gained from creative strategic thinking, value innovation focuses on redefining problems to shift the performance criteria that matter to customers. Kim and Mauborgne ask five key questions contrasting conventional competition-based logic with that of value innovation and describe the type of organization that best unlocks its employees' ideas and creativity. Rather than follow conventional practices for maximizing profits, successful value innovators use a different market approach that consists of (1) strategic pricing for demand creation and (2) target costing for profit creation. Value innovation as strategy creates a pattern of punctuated equilibrium, in which bursts of value innovation that reshape the industrial landscape are interspersed with periods of improvements, geographic and product-line extensions, and consolidation.

Global Sustainability and the Creative Destruction of Industries

Abstract: Most large corporations developed in an era of abundant raw materials, cheap energy, and limitless sinks for waste disposal. It has become increasingly clear that many technologies developed during this earlier period contribute to the destruction of the ecological systems on which the global economy depends. In the absence of dramatic change, few would dispute that the world is destined to devolve toward environmental degradation, social upheaval, and mass migration. Hart and Milstein argue that the emerging challenge of global sustainability will catalyze a new round of "creative destruction" that innovators and entrepreneurs will view as one of the biggest business opportunities in the history of commerce. In this article, the authors propose a framework to help managers look beyond continuous, incremental improvement of existing products and processes to see the business world differently and make sustainable opportunities more apparent. To better understand sustainability-driven creative destruction, managers must evaluate business opportunities on the basis of three types of markets or economies that exist in all countries or geographical regions: developed (nearly 1 billion global customers), emerging (estimated at roughly 2 billion people), and surviving (roughly half of humanity or 3 billion customers). The authors discuss the different strategies required to achieve sustainable development in each economy. To compete in the consumer economy, managers must focus on reducing the life-cycle ("cradle to grave") impacts ? that is, the "ecological footprint" of their firms' activities ? by reinventing their products and processes. The combination of large footprint and technological maturity widens the gap between price and life-cycle cost, producing the technological and environmental forces that drive creative destruction. Because it is unlikely that senior managers will commit resources without a clear understanding of how sustainability-driven creative destruction can improve a firm's economic payoff, the authors offer ideas for sustainability metrics tied to the three economies discussed and show how they relate to key business and financial payoffs. Managers who treat sustainable development as an opportunity will drive the creative destruction process and build the foundation to compete in the twenty-first century.

Strategy as Strategic Decision Making

Abstract: In high-velocity, intensely competitive markets, traditional approaches to strategy give way to "competing on the edge" ? creating a flow of temporary, shifting competitive advantages. The author's research on entrepreneurial and diversified businesses demonstrates that successful firms in these markets have fast, high-quality, and widely supported strategic decision-making processes. These firms use four approaches to create strategy: 1. Management teams build collective intuition through frequent meetings and real-time metrics that enhance their ability to see threats and opportunities early and accurately. Less successful teams rarely meet with their colleagues in a group and make fewer and larger strategic choices, relying on market analyses and future trend projections that are idiosyncratic to the decision. 2. Executives stimulate conflict by assembling diverse teams, challenging them through frame-breaking tactics, such as scenario planning and role playing, and stressing multiple alternatives to improve the quality of decision making. Less successful performers move quickly to a few alternatives, analyze the best ones, and make a speedy decision. 3. Effective decision makers focus on maintaining decision pace, not pushing decision speed. They sustain momentum through the methods of time pacing, prototyping, and consensus with qualification. Ineffective decision makers stress the rarity and significance of strategic choices. Because the decision then looms large, they oscillate between procrastination and "shotgun" strategic choices against deadlines. 4. Managers on successful teams take a negative view of politicking. Their perspective is collaborative, not competitive. These teams emphasize common goals, clear turf, and having fun. Less effective decision makers have a competitive orientation and lack a sense of teamwork. Together, these approaches direct executive attention toward strategic decision making as the cornerstone of effective strategy.

A Dynamic View of Strategy

Abstract: Choosing a distinctive strategic position involves making tough choices on three dimensions: who to target as customers, what products to offer, and how to undertake related activities efficiently. The most common source of strategic failure is the inability to make clear, explicit choices on these three dimensions. Unfortunately, not only will aggressive competitors imitate attractive positions, but, perhaps more importantly, new strategic positions will be emerging continually. In industry after industry, once formidable companies with seemingly unassailable strategic positions are humbled by relatively unknown companies that base their attacks on creating and exploiting new strategic positions. Markides describes incursions into established markets by strategic innovators such as Canon and the brokerage firm Edward Jones. The hallmark of their success is strategic innovation ? proactively establishing distinctive strategic positions that are critical to shifting market share or creating new markets. To prepare for the inevitable strategic innovation that will disrupt its market, an organization should: ? Identify turning points before a crisis occurs by regularly monitoring indicators of strategic rather than financial health in the market. ? Prevent cultural and structural inertia by creating a culture that welcomes change and is ready to accept new strategic innovation even if it disrupts the status quo. ? Develop processes that allow experimenting with new ideas to reveal the potential of a new innovation. ? Develop the required competencies and skills. ? Manage a transition to the new strategic position by clearly deciding whether to adopt the new position and by ensuring that old and new coexist harmoniously. Designing a successful strategy is a never-ending, dynamic process of identifying and colonizing a distinctive strategic position; excelling in this position while concurrently searching for, finding, and cultivating another viable strategic position; simultaneously managing both positions; slowly making a transition to the new position as the old one matures and declines; and starting the cycle again.

What Is a Chief Knowledge Officer

Abstract: To understand the role of chief knowledge officer (CKO) and the evolving practice of knowledge management (KM), the authors studied twenty CKOs in North America and Europe using face-to-face interviews, and a personality assessment questionnaire. All CKOs were first incumbents, most having been on the job less than two years. Appointed by CEOs more through intuition and instinct than through analysis or strategic logic, the CKOs had to discover and develop the CEO's implicit vision of how KM would make a difference. The CKOs agreed that knowledge is a necesssary and sustainable source of competitive advantage and that companies are not good at managing either explicit knowledge (expressed in words or numbers and shared as scientific formulas, codified procedures, or universal principles) or tacit knowledge (personal, experiential, context specific, and hard to formalize). CKOs have two principal design competencies: they are technologists (able to understand which technologies can contribute to capturing, storing, exploring, and sharing knowledge) and environmentalists (able to create social environments that stimulate and facilitate arranged and chance conversations or able to develop events and processes to encourage deliberate knowledge creation and exchange). As self-starters and risk takers, these CKOs are entrepreneurs who can strategize about transforming the corporation through KM and are driven by building something and seeing it through. By matching new ideas with the business needs of their constituencies, the CKOs are also consultants, trafficking in ideas that fit the corporation's knowledge vision. Breadth of career experience, familiarity with their organizations, and infectious enthusiasm for their mission are characteristic of these CKOs. The personality characteristics and competencies of these CKOs are unusual and distinctive. They need to be sociable and energetic yet tolerant and pragmatic. Finding the right person is at least as important as deciding to create the CKO role. Two critical success factors have emerged: the need for organizational slack time (for thinking, dreaming, talking, and selling) and high-level sponsorship beyond visible CEO support. The CKO must make senior executives and prominent line managers believe in KM ? a goal that is indivisible from winning and retaining personal trust.

Robust Adaptive Strategies

Abstract: Strategy development requires that managers predict the future in an inherently uncertain world. Many mistakenly do so on the basis of perceived historical patterns that, according to recent scientific understanding of complex systems, do not have great predictive value. Complex systems consisting of many dynamically interacting parts are difficult and often impossible to predict because they exhibit punctuated equilibrium (periods of relative quiescence interspersed with episodes of dramatic change) and path dependence (small, random changes at one point in time that lead to radically different outcomes later). What, then, is a strategist to do? Beinhocker recommends cultivating and managing populations of multiple strategies that evolve over time, because the forces of evolution acting on a population of strategies make them more robust and adaptive. Because both biological evolution and business evolution are complex adaptive systems, to better understand business strategy, managers can employ a tool that scientists use to better understand biological evolution. An imaginary grid called a fitness landscape is an aid to comprehending how evolution increases the odds of survival in nature. In general, the rules for success in fitness landscapes also apply to business problems, though their specific application differs significantly by company and situation. The lessons of fitness landscapes offer an untraditional picture of what a company needs to develop a successful strategy. Because shifting an organization to this way of thinking about strategy is not easy, a company can take six actions to reinforce the robust, adaptive mind-set: ? Invest in a diversity of strategies. ? Evaluate strategies as real options that may open future possibilities, and remove biases that undervalue experimentation and flexibility. ? Diversify strategies along three dimensions ? time frame, risk, and relatedness to current business. ? Ensure that the strategies include sufficiently diverse initiatives in promising areas. ? Check that selection pressures on the firm's population of strategies reflect those operating on the population of strategies in the marketplace. ? Use venture capital performance metrics.

A New Manifesto for Management

Abstract: The corporation has emerged as perhaps the most powerful social and economic institution of modern society. Yet, corporations and their managers suffer from a profound social ambivalence. Believing this to be symptomatic of the unrealistically pessimistic assumptions that underlie current management doctrine, Ghoshal et al. encourage managers to replace the narrow economic assumptions of the past and recognize that: ? Modern societies are not market economies; they are organizational economies in which companies are the chief actors in creating value and advancing economic progress. ? The growth of firms and, therefore, economies is primarily dependent on the quality of their management. ? The foundation of a firm's activity is a new "moral contract" with employees and society, replacing paternalistic exploitation and value appropriation with employability and value creation in a relationship of shared destiny. In the 1980s, managers concentrated on enhancing competitiveness by improving their operating efficiencies. They cut costs, eliminated waste, downsized, and outsourced. They extracted value ? as reflected in shareholder returns ? but at what price? In contrast, firms that seem to continuously proliferate new products and technologies (for example, HP, 3M, Disney, and Microsoft) have never accepted this logic of auto-dismemberment. They have escaped what the authors term "the deadly pincer of dominant theory and practice": an almost exclusive focus on appropriation and control. A different management model is now taking shape, based on a better understanding of individual and corporate motivation. As companies switch their focus from value appropriation to value creation, facilitating cooperation among people takes precedence over enforcing compliance, and initiative is valued more than obedience. The manager's primary tasks become embedding trust, leading change, and establishing a sense of purpose within the company that allows strategy to emerge from within the organization, from the energy and alignment created by that sense of purpose. The core of the managerial role gives way to the "three Ps": purpose, process, and people ? replacing the traditional "strategy-structure-systems" trilogy that worked for companies in the past.

Partnerships to Improve Supply Chains

Abstract: The more open exchange of information (e.g., sharing cost and demand data) and coordinated decision making typical of a long-term supply-chain partnership can reduce the inefficiencies inherent in less collaborative relationships, such as excess inventories and slow response. Different from strategic alliances or project-based partnerships, supply-chain partnerships are characterized by levels of investment that further improve the joint supply chain to mutual advantage. The authors describe two joint supply-chain improvement projects, one of which led to logistics benefits and helped reverse a traditionally adversarial relationship that, in turn, translated into commercial benefits. The second project held the potential to quickly deliver logistics benefits, yet did not yield the expected commercial value. Understanding the distinction between logistics and commercial success is critical, though often disregarded when assessing supply-chain partnerships, according to the authors. Logistics success is the degree of overall supply-chain improvement, regardless of how costs and benefits are allocated. Commercial success depends on how much more profitable trading with the partner becomes ? whether by getting a share of the logistics improvements or by obtaining better trading terms. The authors note that sacrificing some short-term logistics success may be worth achieving commercial benefits at a later stage. In contrasting the two projects, the authors identified key steps to take when beginning joint supply-chain improvement projects. They recommend a simple framework that consists of pragmatic steps often neglected in practice: Step 1. Establish mutually agreed on processes and objectives in advance. Step 2. Prepare thoroughly. Important factors are team selection, benefit-sharing agreements, analysis of opportunities, supply-chain mapping, setting of performance standards, and allocation of required resources. Step 3. Integrate the project within the respective organizations ? particularly within the purchasing group of the affiliated business. Especially in matrix organizations, benefits also must accrue to the departments that provide resources within both organizations. This tentative road map of a practical process allows firms not closely affiliated to improve supply-chain logistics and approach true partnership stature.

Developing profitable new products with target costing

Abstract: To survive today, firms must become adept at developing products that deliver the quality and functionality that customers demand while generating the desired profits. To ensure that products are sufficiently profitable when launched, many firms subject them to target costing, a profit management technique. The authors studied the mature, highly effective target costing systems of seven Japanese companies and documented their costing procedures. Although practices differ among these firms, the authors identified an underlying generic approach for implementing target costing systems. A highly disciplined process, effective target costing comprises the following facets that the authors discuss in detail: ? Market-driven costing consists of three companywide tasks ? setting the company's long-term sales and profit objectives, structuring product lines to achieve maximum profitability, and establishing a product's target selling price ? and two steps applicable to new products ? setting a target profit margin consistent with the company's long-term profit objectives and computing the product's allowable cost (by subtracting the target profit margin from the target selling price). ? Product-level target costing comprises setting a reasonably achievable product-level target cost, imposing discipline upon the development process to attain the target cost (whenever feasible), and achieving the cost goal without sacrificing functionality and quality (primarily through value engineering and other engineering-based cost reduction techniques). ? Component-level target costing includes decomposing the product-level target cost to the major functions or subassemblies (e.g., in a car, the engine, transmission, cooling system, air conditioning system, and audio system), setting component-level target costs, and managing suppliers (clearly conveying to them the competitive cost pressures facing the lean enterprise). The cardinal rule of the companies studied is: "Never exceed the target cost." They enforce this rule in three ways ? by offsetting design improvements that result in increased costs with savings elsewhere in the design, by not launching products that exceed the target cost, and by carefully managing the transition to manufacturing in order to achieve the target cost.

Strategic Supremacy through Disruption and Dominance

Abstract: Whereas companies once focused primarily on outplaying competitors at a fixed game, now their central focus is on understanding the relationship between an environment's turbulence and their choice of strategy. By doing so, managers can develop better strategies that lead to and maintain strategic supremacy. This process begins with analysis of a firm's current competitive environment, followed by an understanding of the rules of the game in that industry. If a firm lacks the capabilities to succeed in the environment or wishes to challenge the status quo to improve its position, it might consider changing the rules. The ability to establish the rules of the game to control evolution is one facet of strategic supremacy. The player with strategic supremacy shapes the field and basis of competition for its rivals. Studies of hypercompetitive environments provide insight into the inextricably intertwined relationships among disruption, patterns of turbulence, the rules of competition, and definition of the playing field. Why is changing the environment important? Some strategies may work well in one environment but not in another. For example, strategies that are successful in fairly stable environments may be a liability in unstable ones. Whereas profits previously depended on stability and lack of rivalry, profits in hypercompetitive environments like those of the 1990s result from increased rivalry that focuses on defining a new basis of competition for customers. Extending the insights gained from hypercompetitive markets, D'Aveni suggests that turbulence creates competitive environments characterized by distinct patterns of disruption determined by frequency and their competence-destroying or competence-enhancing nature. The four competitive environments (equilibrium, fluctuating equilibrium, punctuated equilibrium, and disequilibrium) require different strategies. The goal of incumbent leaders and challengers in each environment is to achieve strategic supremacy by controlling the degree and pattern of turbulence. But, because rivals and customers are never content with the status quo, the battle for strategic supremacy is continuous.

The Delta Model: Adaptive Management for a Changing World

Abstract: Existing management frameworks do not describe all the ways that companies are competing successfully today. When queried, senior executives concurred that conventional theories and business practices do not provide the necessary guidance and support for decision making in a world of change, complexity, and uncertainty. The authors' research on more than 100 companies is the basis of their Delta model which (1) defines strategic positions that reflect fundamentally new sources of profitability, (2) aligns these strategic options with a firm's activities and provides congruency between strategic direction and execution, and (3) introduces adaptive processes capable of continually responding to an uncertain environment. They describe three strategic options having three distinct economic perspectives ? best product, customer solutions, and system lock-in. These strategic options provide a mechanism for defining the vision of a business. Outstanding real-life business successes achieved through strikingly different strategies and drawn from fundamentally different sources of profitability illustrate the nature of these strategic positions. The Delta model links strategy with execution by selecting a distinctive strategic position and then integrating it with a company's collective processes. The authors identify three fundamental processes that are always present and are the repository of key strategic tasks: operational effectiveness, customer targeting, and innovation. Strategy must adapt continuously, and implementation must respond to market changes and to greater understanding of the market that becomes apparent only during implementation. A firm's actions must be aligned with its strategic position, and the results must give feedback for adapting the strategy. The authors outline common responsive mechanisms for obtaining feedback from the adaptive processes and suggest metrics that are essential to adaptation. To anticipate the future, it is necessary to track performance against the adaptive processes, which are the initiatives enabling the strategy. The Delta model provides a rich overall framework that integrates a firm's options and activities without running the risk of oversimplifying the context in which it makes decisions.

Creating a Market-Driven Organization

Abstract: Even the best-intentioned senior managers may find it difficult to translate aspirations into action, when molding a more market-driven company. Although the underlying principles and prescription of generic change programs offer valuable guidance, a firm must tailor its own change program to the particular challenges it faces in understanding, attracting, and keeping its valuable customers. In this article, Day discusses six conditions that ensure change-process success. He uses the experiences of four corporate change programs (Fidelity Investments; Sears, Roebuck and Co.; Eurotunnel; and Owens Corning) and post-audits of some failed change initiatives to illustrate this change model and explain the necessary conditions for a firm's durable shift to a market orientation. Two pressures initiate a firm's change process: (1) its inclination to focus inwardly and become remote from its customers and unresponsive to competitive challenges; and (2) external market, technology, and competitive forces that pull the business out of alignment with its present market. The interplay of these forces leads to one or more of the following triggers for change: market disruptions that threaten a firm's business model, continuing erosion of market alignment that results in a market disadvantage, strategic necessity, or intolerable opportunity costs. Successful change programs have six overlapping stages: 1. Demonstrating leadership commitment. A leader owns and champions the change, invests time and resources, and creates a sense of urgency. 2. Understanding the need for change. Key implementers understand market responsiveness, know the changes needed, and see the benefits of the initiative. 3. Shaping the vision. All employees know what they are trying to accomplish and understand how to create superior value. 4. Mobilizing commitment at all levels. Those responsible have credibility and know how to form a coalition of supporters to overcome resistance. 5. Aligning structures, systems, and incentives. Key implementers have the resources they need to create a credible plan for alignment. 6. Reinforcing the change. Those responsible know how to start the program and keep attention focused on the change and benchmark measures. Any program to create a market-driven organization must begin quickly but be sustained over many years. Fidelity's approach, which took five years to reach 60 percent completion, resulted in increased customer-retention rates and a doubling of "share of wallet" ? two results that would justify and sustain any firm's change efforts.

Brand Management Prognostications

Abstract: The role of brands and the ways of managing brands are changing. The authors review how brands aid the buyer and seller and, by focusing on the customer-oriented functions of brands, offer insight into how brand management is evolving. Factors propelling changes in brand management include: 1. Information technology. By simplifying customer search and by enabling retailers to collect real-time information about individual shoppers, IT shifts power away from consumer goods manufacturers and their brand managers. 2. Maturing consumer values. Changing demographics ensure that future markets will consist of experienced buyers. Skeptical of superficial blandishments, they seek to understand the relationship between quality and price, aided in their search by technology. 3. Brand mimicry and brand extension. An abundance of copycat or extension products degrade the brand as a marketing tool, confounding a consumer's attempts to differentiate among products. 4. Autonomy of retailers. Trade concentration, exemplified by supermarket retailing, is shifting the "center of marketing gravity" to retailers who are managing for product category profitability. The authors propose three scenarios for the future of brand management: In Scenario 1, current trends continue. Copycat and brand-extension products diminish as pressure on all but the leading brands increases due to restricted shelf space. Companies emphasize "umbrella" branding at the corporate and product-family levels; brand managers begin working on cross-functional teams organized around categories or processes. Scenario 2 is at least partially in place in some companies. Simplified brand and organizational structures focus on trade customers with whom manufacturers develop joint strategies. Scenario 3 differs radically from the past. By using increasingly economical, IT-based techniques, firms identify customers individually, enabling them to organize and manage customers rather than brands or products. The key lesson is that managers should focus on the dynamically evolving functional patterns of brands rather than on the brands themselves.

Competing Today While Preparing for Tomorrow

Abstract: High-performing companies employ dual strategies: they maximize today's capabilities and simultaneously develop new capabilities for the future. In the past, most organizations could run and change their businesses using a single strategy; even today, most companies do not clearly discriminate between present and future. A single-strategy approach, however, cannot meet the challenges created by accelerating competition and change. Strategies for today ensure that functional and supply-chain partner activities are aligned with company strategy and harmonized with organizational structures, processes, culture, incentives, and people. They clarify segment, positioning, and resource deployment choices. Strategies for tomorrow involve decisions about how to define and position the future business. They start with visions of the future ? for example, market territory and forces that might reshape it; competitive moves; strategy options and choices; needed competencies and resources; and knowledge of how to get "there" from "here." Achieving the right balance between a present and a future orientation depends on the situation. During times of rapid or extreme change, the future component claims more attention; during more stable times, the present component predominates. In any situation, however, both components must always be addressed in parallel. Institutionalizing dual strategies requires that companies clearly define leadership responsibilities, balance organizational structures and processes, develop systems for managing duality, and redesign control mechanisms. Implementation must begin at the top. Leaders at all levels of the enterprise must promote the need for dual thinking and communicate the two agendas and their significance to people in every organizational nook and cranny. Dual strategies succeed only if those who need to implement today and change for tomorrow understand the reasons behind each.

Strategy as Options on the Future

Abstract: Traditional strategic planning draws from forecasts of parameters like market growth, prices, exchange rates, and input costs that managers are unable to predict five or ten years in advance with any accuracy. Nevertheless, some firms meticulously construct strategic plans on the basis of forecasting that, in all probability, will be wrong. These companies tend to overinvest in building assets and capabilities that are highly specific to a particular strategy, relative to what would be optimal if planning explicitly acknowledged that forecasts would likely be off the mark. While companies may focus on executing a single strategy at any particular time, they must also build and maintain a portfolio of strategic options on the future. They must invest in developing new capabilities and learning about new, potential markets. By establishing a set of strategic options, a company can reposition itself faster than competitors that have focused on "doing more of the same." Williamson discusses a strategy that embodies a coherent portfolio of options, sketches a process managers can use to develop this kind of strategy, and explains how planning and management opportunism can reinforce each other. Creating a portfolio of future options involves: ? Uncovering the hidden constraints on a company's future ? both capability constraints and market-knowledge constraints. ? Establishing processes to minimize the costs of building and maintaining the portfolio. ? Optimizing the portfolio by considering (1) alternative capabilities that could profitably meet customer needs and (2) future markets or new customer behaviors. ? Combining planning and opportunism, both of which are essential to the proactive creation of strategic options. Williamson cautions that a company must keep tactical opportunism within the bounds of its overall direction, ruling out options that might cause it to deviate from its long-term mission. Short-term opportunism must determine which precise option a company chooses to exercise.

Trade Promotion: Essential to Selling through Resellers

Abstract: Some industry observers claim that the steady increase in trade promotion expenditures in the packaged goods industry is symptomatic of a shift in power toward retailers and away from manufacturers. As firms sell more goods on deal, managers complain that promotions are eroding the power of brands. More preferable, they say, are "everyday low prices" (EDLP) rather than strategies that involve price discounts and other allowances. Trade promotion is a prime cause of the "bullwhip effect" in channels, and EDLP is perceived as a solution. However, the authors point out that EDLP may cause its own unexpected side effects. Because certain incentives and trade deals may perform important functions, managers must consider the second- and third-order effects of discontinuing them. The same logic applies to channels, so managers must assess how channel members are likely to react to various pricing strategies. In this article, the authors discuss the underappreciated role of well-designed trade promotions. Using the example of a single manufacturer selling to and through a retailer, they show how certain promotions increase total channel profits and the manufacturer's share of those profits beyond levels achievable with a single price and without promotions. Furthermore, they believe that firms can implement these promotions in ways that avoid many issues associated with retailer forward-buying and gray markets. In fact, certain trade promotions may benefit the manufacturer as much as the retailer ? if not more. Although some trade promotions create more problems than they solve, not all forms of trade promotion are bad. Manufacturers can effectively influence a retailer's selling activity and coordinate the distribution channel by using price-up and deal-down strategies that link manufacturer prices to the price featured by the retailer. However, manufacturers and retailers must set margins in a sustainable way, which requires a combination of margin and volume that produces acceptable profits for both channel partners.

An Incremental Process for Software Implementation

Abstract: Innovation researchers and software experts have long advocated incremental approaches to technology implementation. Fichman and Moses offer a strategy for guiding the implementation of advanced software technologies based on the principle of results-driven incrementalism (RDI), or self-contained implementation sequences ? each of which achieves a specific business result. The authors present an explicit process model and describe their experiences using the RDI strategy at Herman Miller, a large manufacturer of office furniture systems, which implemented supply-chain planning and scheduling software at six sites on time and within budget. No longer only a tool to automate or speed up ways of working, advanced software enables fundamentally new policies and work organizations. As a result, implementing technological process innovations involves learning and adjustment costs, which may exceed the raw purchase cost of the technology itself. The RDI approach benefits firms by promoting organizational learning via multiple, short-horizon goals; maintaining implementation focus and momentum by providing recurring visible results; and negating the common tendency to overengineer technology solutions ? all of which speed the realization of business results and reduce the risk of implementation failure. Consultants using the RDI approach found that some managers do not understand the benefits of self-contained implementation sequences and may consider such a process marginally valuable or impossible to use in their contexts. The authors cite five reasons for resistance and discuss ways to overcome it. The three critical success factors of the RDI approach are technology divisibility, technology and methodology fit, and technology and organization fit. Determining the most effective delivery process for a particular software technology requires ongoing R&D by someone. The authors advocate that technology vendors view effective implementation processes as crucial to success and worthy of their R&D efforts.

Winning in Smart Markets

Abstract: "Smart" markets, or markets defined by frequent turnover in the general stock of knowledge or information embodied in products and possessed by competitors and consumers, are based on new kinds of products, competitors, and customers. As a result, companies seek to understand the degree to which their own capabilities and motivations as information-processing "organisms" are crucial in enabling them to extract maximum value from their customer information assets. Firms that have gained a significant competitive advantage are distinguished by their ability to see beyond their IT infrastructure and view information itself as the core asset and the management of information as the company's main priority. Understanding how consumers are adapting their behavior to the demands of an increasingly information-intensive environment has been a starting point for companies that have achieved success in smart markets. By observing the activities of these firms across industries, it is possible to identify generic strategies and develop a preliminary taxonomy, or categorization scheme, that can be used to compare and contrast them. The placement of individual strategies within a conceptual framework guides managers in making customer-management decisions. The organizing tool, or asset around which the full range of strategies is based, is the customer information file (CIF) ? a single virtual database that captures all relevant information about a firm's customers. Underlying the notion of the CIF as the key asset is the assumption that the firm's operational goal is to maximize communication with its customers ? to look for every opportunity to "talk" with them. After all, the data collected from these interactions are the raw material from which companies craft their information-intensive strategies. A company thus sets as its main objective the maximizing of returns to the CIF. It then chooses any one of several strategies to accomplish that objective. This approach represents a shift in performance goals. In particular, concepts such as profitability or market share per product are being replaced with concepts such as profitability per customer (sometimes referred to as "lifetime value of a customer") or customer share (the total share of a customer's purchases in a broadly defined product category).

Transforming Internal Governance: The Challenge for Multinationals

Abstract: Competitive discontinuities demand changes in how diversified multinational corporations create wealth. While executives agree that changes in the last decade are qualitatively different from those in the past, many fail to take action or they apply old solutions, such as cost cutting, to new problems. The challenge for companies is to move from the zone of comfort -- the familiar -- to the zone of opportunity -- the unfamiliar. Sources of discontinuity include more powerful, better informed consumers; the breakup of traditional channel structures; deregulation, privatization, and globalization; the convergence of traditional and new technologies; changing competitive boundaries; the evolution to new standards; shorter product life cycles; and the greater involvement of business in ecological and social issues. In this environment, managers must develop new capabilities. They need to think and act globally, regionally, and locally; adapt to a different pace and rhythm in all aspects of a firm's activities; integrate new technological knowledge with old and reconfigure that knowledge into new business opportunities; develop consensus-building skills; form alliances; and allocate resources under conditions of ambiguity. At the same time, they must ensure the profitability of current business. The obstacles to transformation are formidable. Many senior managers have little knowledge of, or experience with, alternate models of managing and responding to new customer expectations. They seek administrative clarity at the expense of strategic clarity and sometimes lack the stamina needed to sustain high performance. Transformation requires interrelated systemwide changes. The effort must be driven by a new concept of opportunity and involve the entire organization. The first step is to create a transformation agenda to mobilize the organization. Managers must then fight inertia, align the organization with the new direction, undertake projects that provide the basis for experimenting and learning, and evaluate failure and success. Innovations in how firms manage must precede innovations in how they compete and create wealth.

Target Costing as a Strategic Tool

Abstract: Faced with increasing global competition, many firms are finding that price-based or target costing is emerging as a key strategic tool. The target cost is a financial goal for the full cost of a product, derived from estimates of selling price and desired profit (which top management sets on the basis of firm strategy and financial goals). Product selling price is constrained by the marketplace and is determined by analysis along the entire industry value chain and across all functions in a firm. Common to most target-cost applications is a belief that large-scale cost planning and reduction must occur early in the product life cycle. However, Shank and Fisher believe there is no conceptual reason the methodology cannot be a value-added exercise applied to existing products during manufacturing. They posit that if managers were to believe that, during manufacturing, only incremental (i.e., slight) change is possible (through kaizen costing or controlling costs with standard-cost systems), firms would likely miss significant strategic opportunities. Shank and Fisher present a case study that demonstrates the relevance of target-costing techniques for a process-industry plant built in the 1890s that had been making largely the same products for fifty years. The firm's managers, who had used a standard-cost system for many years, might have concluded that kaizen costing was most appropriate for this plant. However, competitive realities necessi-tated a major strategic change that employed target costing as an important ingredient in cost-reduction efforts leading to strategic revitalization. At the beginning of this field study, plant managers focused too much attention on standard cost versus actual cost. There was heavy pressure to move standard cost toward actual cost in order to minimize unfavorable variances for public financial reporting. Managers focused too little attention on ideal manufacturing cost, and target costing received no attention. At the end of the field study, the most useful cost-management tool focused on ideal manufacturing cost versus target cost in relation to actual cost. The standard cost concept essentially dropped out of the picture. Target costing forced managers to rewrite the rules of the game by changing the way the mill delivered value to the customer. Because standard costing accepts the existing game rules and the existing value chain, the authors believe that fundamental cost breakthroughs are much more probable when using target costing.

Manage Consolidation in the Distribution Channel

Abstract: In almost every business-to-business industry, companies face increasingly powerful intermediaries in their distribution channels. As this handful of national, professionally managed distributors prunes its supply base, manufacturers no longer have guaranteed market access. In this article, Fein and Jap discuss the strategic implications for manufacturers of the fragmentation-to-consolidation transition in the distribution channel, the dynamics of consolidation, and the indicators that signal impending consolidation. Consolidators in wholesale distribution follow a standard strategy. They build a national network, leverage buying power with manufacturers, and reinvest profits to meet the emerging requirements of larger customers and manufacturers. In fact, consolidation among downstream customers often triggers distribution consolidators to embark on growth-by-acquisition strategies to react quickly to changes in customer purchasing patterns. They try to minimize their purchasing costs by reducing the supplier base, shrinking internal purchasing staffs, and applying supply-chain management technologies, such as EDI, to reduce inventory. The efficiency with which a product moves through the channel has become as valuable as the features and benefits of the product itself. A manufacturer facing a potentially consolidated channel has four basic strategic options: 1. Partner with the winners and motivate distributor investments in support of the firm's products. 2. Invest in fragmentation by designing a channel that meets the challenges of consolidation and integrated supply, and develop relationships with horizontal alliances of smaller independents that can bid for national or multiregional contracts. 3. Build an alternative route to market by bringing the functions of an independent distributor in-house or by using the Internet as an alternate channel. 4. Create new channel equity to ensure that products are more attractive to the channel. The authors look at postconsolidation conditions ? in particular, vendor consolidation and increased service requirements, which present particular challenges to manufacturers. Fein and Jap conclude by posing a few strategic questions for manufacturers and illustrate how companies use the strategic options they outline.