Showing papers in "The Philosophical Quarterly in 2011"
TL;DR: The practice of unrestricted universal suffrage is unjust as discussed by the authors and should be replaced by a moderate epistocratic system, in which suffrage restriction is restricted to citizens of sufficient political competence.
Abstract: The practice of unrestricted universal suffrage is unjust. Citizens have a right that any political power held over them should be exercised by competent people in a competent way. Universal suffrage violates this right. To satisfy this right, universal suffrage in most cases must be replaced by a moderate epistocracy, in which suffrage is restricted to citizens of sufficient political competence. Epistocracy itself seems to fall foul of the qualified acceptability requirement, that political power must be distributed in ways against which there are no qualified objections. However, it is less intrinsically unjust than democracy with universal suffrage, and probably produces more just outcomes. Thus epistocracy is more just than democracy, even if not perfectly just.
90 citations
TL;DR: Reactive love as discussed by the authors is paradigmatically an affectionate attachment to another person, appropriately felt as a non-self-interested response to particular kinds of morally laudable features expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill and characteristic affective, desiderative and other motivational responses (including other-regarding concern and a desire to be with the beloved).
Abstract: One variety of love is familiar in everyday life and qualifies in every reasonable sense as a reactive attitude. ‘Reactive love’ is paradigmatically (a) an affectionate attachment to another person, (b) appropriately felt as a non-self-interested response to particular kinds of morally laudable features of character expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and (c) paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill and characteristic affective, desiderative and other motivational responses (including other-regarding concern and a desire to be with the beloved). ‘Virtues of intimacy’ as expressed in interaction with the lover are agent-relative reasons for reactive love, and like other reactive attitudes, reactive love generates reasons in its own right. Within a broad conception of the virtues, reactive love sheds light on the reactive attitudes more generally.
60 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out truth about truth, and that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence.
Abstract: Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth.
45 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than temporal parts: an object endures if its identity is determined at every moment at which it exists.
Abstract: The terms ‘endurance’ and ‘perdurance’ are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than temporal parts: an object endures if its identity is determined at every moment at which it exists. We make precise what it means for the identity of an object to be determined at a moment. We also discuss what role the endurance/perdurance distinction, so understood, should play in the debates about time, material objects and personal identity.
37 citations
TL;DR: This paper proposed an alternative explanation of the perceptual phenomenal difference in terms of perceptual awareness of language-specific but non-semantic features, arguing that auditory experiences do not resolve differences in meaning not marked by differences in sound.
Abstract: Listening to speech in a language you know differs phenomenologically from listening to speech in an unfamiliar language, a fact often exploited in debates about the phenomenology of thought and cognition. It is plausible that the difference is partly perceptual. Some contend that hearing familiar language involves auditory perceptual awareness of meanings or semantic properties of spoken utterances; but if this were so, there must be something distinctive it is like auditorily to perceptually experience specific meanings of spoken utterances. However, an argument from homophony shows that auditory experiences do not resolve differences in meaning not marked by differences in sound. I propose an alternative explanation of the perceptual phenomenal difference in terms of perceptual awareness of language-specific but non-semantic features.
35 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that conflict arises only from accepting a "zoetrope conception" of change experience, according to which change experience is analysed in terms of a series of very short-lived sensory atoms, each lacking in dynamic content.
Abstract: It is obvious both that some changes are too small for us to perceive and that we can perceive constant motion. Yet according to Fara, these two facts are in conflict, and one must be rejected. I show that conflict arises only from accepting a 'zoetrope conception' of change experience, according to which change experience is analysed in terms of a series of very short-lived sensory atoms, each lacking in dynamic content. On pain of denying the phenomenologically obvious, we must reject the zoetrope conception. I offer an alternative account, according to which the dynamic content of our experience at short timescales is metaphysically dependent on the content of experience over longer timescales. Moreover, at short timescales such content is purely determinable.
32 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that there is no characteristic artistic value distinct from aesthetic value, and they suggest a new way to think about aesthetic value as it is characteristically realized by works of art.
Abstract: Art works realize many values. According to tradition, not all of these values are characteristic of art: art works characteristically bear aesthetic value. Breaking with tradition, some now say that art works bear artistic value, as distinct from aesthetic value. I argue that there is no characteristic artistic value distinct from aesthetic value. The argument for this thesis suggests a new way to think about aesthetic value as it is characteristically realized by works of art.
30 citations
TL;DR: The weak supplementation principle (WSP) is not prescribed by ordinary thinking about parthood, and it is not needed for a fairly strong formal characterization of the part-whole relation as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Mereological principles are sometimes used to support general claims about the structure and arrangement of objects in the world. I focus initially on one such mereological principle, the weak supplementation principle (WSP). It is not obvious that (WSP) is prescribed by ordinary thinking about parthood. Further, (WSP) is not needed for a fairly strong formal characterization of the part–whole relation. For these reasons, some arguments relying on (WSP) might be countered by simply denying (WSP). I argue more generally that there is no reason to assume that one core mereology functions as a common basis for all plausible metaphysical theories.
25 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the reasons why non-experts should defer to experts, and sketch a model for understanding cases where they fail to defer, using the controversy over the MMR vaccine.
Abstract: Using the controversy over the MMR vaccine, I consider the reasons why non-experts should defer to experts, and I sketch a model for understanding cases where they fail to defer. I first suggest that an intuitively plausible model of the expert/non-expert relationship is complicated by shifting epistemic standards. One possible moderate response to this challenge, based on a more complex notion of non-experts' relationship with experts, seems unappealing as an account of the MMR controversy. A more radical suggestion is that non-experts might have a political reason to defer to experts, when not doing so will involve ‘epistemological free-riding’. I investigate the implications.
24 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate various metaphysical frameworks which might be combined with the SaundersWallace semantics and conclude that the most appropriate metaphysics to underwrite the semantics renders Everettian quantum mechanics a theory of non-overlapping worlds.
Abstract: Simon Saunders and David Wallace have proposed an appealing candidate semantics for interpreting linguistic communities embedded in an Everettian multiverse. It provides a charitable interpretation of our ordinary talk about the future, and allows us to retain a principle of bivalence for propositions and to retain the Law of Excluded Middle in the logic of propositions about the future. But difficulties arise when it comes to providing an appropriate account of the metaphysics of macroscopic objects and events. In this paper, I evaluate various metaphysical frameworks which might be combined with the SaundersWallace semantics. I conclude that the most appropriate metaphysics to underwrite the semantics renders Everettian quantum mechanics a theory of non-overlapping worlds.
21 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that Gilbert's account of collective scientific belief does not provide a better explanation of scientific change than a non-collective alternative, and that a different defence of collective belief and knowledge is needed.
Abstract: If there is collective scientific knowledge, then at least some scientific groups have beliefs over and above the personal beliefs of their members. Gilbert's plural-subjects theory makes precise the notion of ‘over and above’ here. Some philosophers have used plural-subjects theory to argue that philosophical, historical and sociological studies of science should take account of collective beliefs of scientific groups. Their claims rest on the premise that our best explanations of scientific change include these collective beliefs. I argue that Gilbert's account of collective scientific belief does not provide a better explanation of scientific change than a non-collective alternative. A different defence of collective scientific belief and knowledge is needed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors have attributed constructivism to Kant at the first-order level; others cast him as a meta-ethical constructivist, and they distinguish between "atheistic" and "agnostic" versions regarding the existence of an independent moral order.
Abstract: Some commentators have attributed constructivism to Kant at the first-order level; others cast him as a meta-ethical constructivist. Among meta-ethical constructivist interpretations I distinguish between ‘atheistic’ and ‘agnostic’ versions regarding the existence of an independent moral order. Even though these two versions are incompatible, each is linked with central Kantian doctrines, revealing a tension within Kant's own view. Moreover, among interpretations that cast Kant as rejecting substantive realism but embracing procedural realism, some (i.e., those that are ‘constructivist’) face charges of indeterminacy or relativism, while others (practical reasoning views) face ‘daunting rationalism’ objections. I close with some objections to interpreting Kant as a meta-ethical constructivist.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that there is some friction within this theory when we consider that causal processes can be prevented and interfered with, and the above mentioned proviso is supposed to handle these case but, so they argue, it fails to do so.
Abstract: David Armstrong’s law-maker, nomological necessity (N), is a second order relational universal that holds between state of affairs types, e.g., N(F, G). With only a small proviso, nomological necessity is supposed to instantiate as the causation of its second relatum, G, whenever its first relatum, F, instantiates. — In this paper, I will show that there is some friction within this theory when we consider that causal processes can be prevented and interfered with. The above mentioned proviso is supposed to handle these case but, so I argue, it fails to do so. — The critique here presented generalises to any theory of lawhood that utilises a kind of necessitation as lawmaker. Thus, Armstrong’s case can serve as a sample for all such theories. — Plausible means of resolving the difficulties will be presented.
TL;DR: The authors defend a notion of ontological commitment as implicit commitment and argue that existentially quantified idioms in natural language are implicitly, but not explicitly, committing, and diagnose a flaw in a widely used argument to the effect that existential quantification is not ontologically committing.
Abstract: There are two different ways of understanding the notion of ‘ontological commitment’. A question about ‘what is said to be’ by a theory or ‘what a theory says there is’ deals with ‘explicit’ commitment; a question about the ontological costs or preconditions of the truth of a theory concerns ‘implicit’ commitment. I defend a conception of ontological commitment as implicit commitment, and argue that existentially quantified idioms in natural language are implicitly, but not explicitly, committing. I use the distinction between the two kinds of ontological commitment to diagnose a flaw in a widely used argument to the effect that existential quantification is not ontologically committing.
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown how Brunero's objection can be met by denying this claim, and independent arguments in favour of denying it are provided in the paper "The Scope of Rational Requirements".
Abstract: It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide-scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow-scopers’) that it violates narrow-scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter-example to narrow-scope views. But a narrow-scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim that we always violate conditional narrow-scope requirements when we do not comply with them. I show how Brunero's objection can be met by denying this claim, and I provide independent arguments in favour of denying it.
TL;DR: This article argued that the traditional essentialism of Kripke and Putnam is not a break at all, because the widespread interpretation of Putnam according to which he takes essences to be intrinsic is mistaken.
Abstract: Recently, several philosophers have defended what might be called ‘neo-essentialism’ about natural kinds. Their views purport to improve upon the traditional essentialism of Kripke and Putnam by rejecting the claim that essences must be comprised of intrinsic properties. I argue that this so-called break from traditional essentialism is not a break at all, because the widespread interpretation of Putnam according to which he takes essences to be intrinsic is mistaken. Putnam makes no claim to the effect that essences of natural kinds must be intrinsic, and offers at least one example of a natural kind whose essence is non-intrinsic. I conclude that his traditional essentialism has been misinterpreted, and consequently that neo-essentialism is not so ‘neo’ after all.
TL;DR: The authors use a response to MacBride's paper as a framework for developing a broadly holistic framework for these issues, and steer a middle course between reductive foundationalism and extreme naturalistic quietism.
Abstract: A paper in this journal by Fraser MacBride, ‘Can Ante Rem Structuralism Solve the Access Problem?’, raises important issues concerning the epistemological goals and burdens of contemporary philosophy of mathematics, and perhaps philosophy of science and other disciplines as well. I use a response to MacBride's paper as a framework for developing a broadly holistic framework for these issues, and I attempt to steer a middle course between reductive foundationalism and extreme naturalistic quietism. For this purpose the notion of entitlement is invoked along the way, suitably modified for the present anti-foundationalist setting.
TL;DR: Gustafsson and Espinoza as mentioned in this paper argued that the small-improvement argument against completeness as a rationality requirement for preference orderings is defective, and they claimed that the two...
Abstract: Gustafsson and Espinoza have recently argued that the 'small-improvement argument', against completeness as a rationality requirement for preference orderings, is defective. They claim that the two ...
TL;DR: The problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic pluralism worth investigating further, does not constitute an effective objection to it, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic pluralism worth investigating further, does not constitute an effective objection to it.
TL;DR: It is argued that all defenders of possible-worlds theory ought to accept amodalism, according to which certain true propositions are neither necessarily nor contingently true, but only true simpliciter.
Abstract: It is commonly assumed that all propositions have modal profiles and therefore bear their truth-values either contingently or necessarily. I argue against this commonly assumed view and in defence of amodalism, according to which certain true propositions are neither necessarily nor contingently true, but only true simpliciter. I consider three arguments against ‘possible-worlds theories’, which hold that modal concepts are to be analysed in terms of possible worlds. Although each of these arguments targets a different version of possible-worlds theory, these versions jointly exhaust the entire range of possible-worlds theories. After showing that each argument is naturally addressed by adopting amodalism, I argue that all defenders of possible-worlds theory ought to accept amodalism.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the idea that a desire's being internal matters in a normative, reasons-involving sense, and offer an explanation for this fact, which is Kantian in spirit.
Abstract: Harry Frankfurt has claimed that some of our desires are ‘internal’, i.e., our own in a special sense. I defend the idea that a desire's being internal matters in a normative, reasons-involving sense, and offer an explanation for this fact. The explanation is Kantian in spirit. We have reason to respect the desires of persons in so far as respecting them is a way to respect the persons who have them (in some cases, ourselves). But if desires matter normatively in so far as they belong to persons, then it matters whether they really do belong to the persons who have them. Thus Kantian considerations explain why identification (or internality) is a normatively relevant category. This account is superior to others, and does not lead to reasons bootstrapping or a self-centred conception of deliberation.
TL;DR: The fittingness objection of globalist attitudes is based on an inaccurate view of the person-assessments at the heart of the globalists' attitudes as mentioned in this paper, which is a problem for fitting-attitude theories of value.
Abstract: Some attitudes typically take whole persons as their objects. Shame, contempt, disgust and admiration have this feature, as do many tokens of love and hate. Objectors complain that these ‘globalist attitudes’ can never fit their targets and thus can never be all-things-considered appropriate. Those who dismiss all globalist attitudes in this way are misguided. The fittingness objection depends on an inaccurate view of the person-assessments at the heart of the globalist attitudes. Once we understand the nature of globalist attitudes and we recognize that we may legitimately treat some traits as more important than others in our overall evaluation of persons, we ought to conclude that our globalist attitudes can, in some cases, fit their targets and should not be summarily dismissed as unfitting. Our relationships contour the fittingness-conditions of globalist attitudes. This relational element poses a problem for fitting-attitude theories of value.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors draw on the discussion of Korsgaard to highlight a challenge facing constitutive arguments in general, namely, the difficulty of establishing the requirement that we will universally.
Abstract: Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements may be established by some version of this second argument, but the strategy does not seem promising when it comes to establishing the requirement that we will universally. I draw on the discussion of Korsgaard to highlight a challenge facing constitutive arguments in general.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content, and they defend an opposing view which they call "moderate separatism".
Abstract: The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object reflected in a mirror can possess the same spatial phenomenology while representing that object to occupy different spatial locations. So, contrary to the current consensus, the representation of spatial location is not fixed by an experience's sensory phenomenology.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the philosophical benefits of propositional attitudes and propose a refined account of the behaviour of proper names as well as of indefinite and definite descriptions in attitude reports.
Abstract: Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence. However, the reformulation does not extend to non-factive attitudes like belief. There, formulas with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, to be dubbed as attitudes de objecto: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified property - the same individual in each world (contrast with de dicto), while the individual need not exist actually (unlike with de re). We discuss the philosophical benefits of our analysis of propositional attitudes. We propose a refined account of the behaviour of proper names as well as of indefinite and definite descriptions in attitude reports. Some remarks about perception and the hallucination argument are also presented.
TL;DR: The causal refutation of external-world scepticism as discussed by the authors starts from our ability to make justified judgements about the order of our own experiences, and end with the claim that there must be perceptible external objects, some of whose states can be causally correlated with that order.
Abstract: Causal refutations of external-world scepticism start from our ability to make justified judgements about the order of our own experiences, and end with the claim that there must be perceptible external objects, some of whose states can be causally correlated with that order. In a recent paper, I made a series of objections to this broadly Kantian anti-sceptical strategy. Georges Dicker has provided substantive replies on behalf of a version of the causal refutation of idealism. Here I offer a few final remarks about issues at the heart of our disagreement.
TL;DR: Wittgenstein's Tractatus contains an insubstantial form of transcendental idealism as discussed by the authors, which rejects the substantial a priori priori knowledge of the subject.
Abstract: Wittgenstein's Tractatus contains an insubstantial form of transcendental idealism. It is insubstantial because it rejects the substantial a priori. Yet despite this, the Tractatus still contains two fundamental transcendental idealist insights, (a) the identity of form between thought and reality, and (b) the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue for (a) by connecting general themes in the Tractatus and in Kant, and for (b) by giving a detailed interpretation of Tractatus 5.6ff., where Wittgenstein talks about solipsism and the metaphysical subject. Tractarian solipsism, on this interpretation, is a special, insubstantial form of transcendental idealism.
TL;DR: In this paper, the most important criticisms made by Chignell of my ‘Kant's Refutation of Idealism' were addressed and a new consideration was introduced which brings out more fully the power of Kant's argument.
Abstract: I reply to the most important criticisms made by Chignell of my ‘Kant's Refutation of Idealism’. I also introduce a new consideration which brings out more fully the power of Kant's argument.