Showing papers in "The Philosophical Quarterly in 2015"
136 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form "if X then do Y then do X" and criticise Searle's claim that constitutive rules are fundamental building blocks for institutions, showing that such rules can be derived from regulative rules by introducing new institutional terms.
Abstract: Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rules or as equilibria of strategic games. We argue that these two approaches can be unified within an encompassing theory based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form ‘if X then do Y’. We then criticise Searle’s claim that constitutive rules of the form ‘X counts as Y in C’ are fundamental building blocks for institutions, showing that such rules can be derived from regulative rules by introducing new institutional terms. Institutional terms are introduced for economy of thought, but are not necessary for the creation of social reality.
54 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that Kant was not a naïve realist about perceptual experience, whereas naïve realism implies that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense.
Abstract: Against a view currently popular in the literature it is argued that Kant was not a naïve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper I develop in some detail an account of Kant’s theory of hallucination and explain why no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naïve realist sense. Kant’s theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes, and although it has been little studied, it is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature.
45 citations
40 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the standard process reliabilist analysis of defeat is the alternative Reliable Process Account (ARP), and that ARP proves untenable, since ARP fails to articulate either necessary or sufficient conditions on defeat.
Abstract: One attractive feature of process reliabilism is its reductive potential: it promises to explain justification in entirely non-epistemic terms. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of epistemic defeat poses a serious challenge for process reliabilism’s reductive ambitions. The standard process reliabilist analysis of defeat is the “Alternative Reliable Process Account” (ARP). According to ARP, whether S’s belief is defeated depends on whether S has certain reliable processes available to her which, if they had been used, would have resulted in S not holding the belief in question. Unfortunately, ARP proves untenable. I show, by way of counterexample, that ARP fails to articulate either necessary or sufficient conditions on defeat. Process reliabilists must either provide an alternative reductive account of defeat or renounce their reductive aspirations.
37 citations
34 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that if one adopts the "Powerful Qualities" account of properties developed by Martin and Heil, this argument can be resisted at the first premise: the claim that zombies are conceivable is false.
Abstract: One powerful argument for dualism is provided by Chalmers: the ‘zombie’ or conceivability argument. This paper aims to establish that if one adopts the ‘Powerful Qualities’ account of properties developed by Martin and Heil, this argument can be resisted at the first premise: the claim that zombies are conceivable is, by the lights of Chalmers’ own account of conceivability, false.
The Powerful Qualities account is outlined. Chalmers’ argument, and several distinctions which underlie it, are explained. It is argued that to make sense of the claim that zombies are conceivable, some account of properties must be given. The paper's central claim is presented and defended from potential responses: given the Powerful Qualities view, zombies are in fact inconceivable. Finally, an error theory is presented, which offers an explanation of why so many have taken the conceivability of zombies to be unproblematic, and the view is briefly contrasted with Russellian monism.
34 citations
27 citations
25 citations
TL;DR: In the mental causation debate, there is a common assumption that interactive dualism is false because of the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain this article, which is false.
Abstract: In the mental causation debate, there is a common assumption that interactive dualism is false because of the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. However, this paper argues that recent advances in metaphysics—more specifically, in the philosophy of causation—reveal a serious, general flaw in contemporary formulations of this principle.
22 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that Russellian monism faces problems with mental causation that parallel those of traditional dualism, and that the best it can hope for is that phenomenal properties are causally relevant, but not in virtue of their phenomenality.
Abstract: Russellian Monism, the view that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties serve as the categorical grounds of physical dispositions, has increasingly been thought to enjoy an advantage over traditional property dualism in that it avoids epiphenomenalism. This paper argues otherwise. Russellian Monism faces problems with mental causation that parallel those of traditional dualism. The best it can hope for is that phenomenal properties are causally relevant, but not in virtue of their phenomenality.
TL;DR: It is argued that Descartes explains physiology in terms of whole systems, with components selected from multiple levels of organisation, in order to construct more complete explanations than corpuscular mechanics alone would allow.
Abstract: I argue that Descartes explains physiology in terms of whole systems, and not in terms of the size, shape and motion of tiny corpuscles (corpuscular mechanics). It is a standard, entrenched view that Descartes’s proper means of explanation in the natural world is through strict reduction to corpuscular mechanics. This view is bolstered by a handful of corpuscular-mechanical explanations in Descartes’s physics, which have been taken to be representative of his treatment of all natural phenomena. However, Descartes’s explanations of the ‘principal parts’ of physiology do not follow the corpuscular–mechanical pattern. Des Chene (2001) has identified systems in Descartes’s account of physiology, but takes them ultimately to reduce down to the corpuscle level. I argue that they do not. Rather, Descartes maintains entire systems, with components selected from multiple levels of organisation, in order to construct more complete explanations than corpuscular mechanics alone would allow.
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TL;DR: This article showed that companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation, i.e., they are not different reasons.
Abstract: Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.
TL;DR: Vilhauer as mentioned in this paper discusses an asymmetry in the justification of praising and blaming behavior which free will theorists should acknowledge even if they do not follow Wolf and Nelkin in holding that praise and blame have different control conditions.
Abstract: Free Will and the Asymmetrical Justifiability of Holding Morally Responsible The Philosophical Quarterly, October 2015, Vol. 65, No. 261, pp. 772-789. Benjamin Vilhauer, City College of New York Abstract This paper is about an asymmetry in the justification of praising and blaming behavior which free will theorists should acknowledge even if they do not follow Wolf and Nelkin in holding that praise and blame have different control conditions. That is, even if praise and blame have the same control condition, we must have stronger reasons for believing that it is satisfied to treat someone as blameworthy than we require to treat someone as praiseworthy. Blaming behavior which involves serious harm can only be justified if the claim that the target of blame acted freely cannot be reasonably doubted. But harmless praise can be justified so long as the claim that the candidate for praise did not act freely can be reasonably doubted. Anyone who thinks a debate about whether someone acted freely is truth-conducive has to acknowledge that reasonable doubt is possible in both these cases.
TL;DR: In this article, Schnieder and other philosophers have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source, and the main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists.
Abstract: Ascriptions of truth give rise to an explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we accept ? is true because Rex is barking? but reject ?Rex is barking because is true?. Benjamin Schnieder and other philosophers have recently proposed a fresh explanation of this asymmetry: they have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source. The main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists. I offer a pair of objections to the proposal and defend them from counter-objections. To conclude, I discuss how else to explain the asymmetry, and set out the implications for deflationism and correspondence theories of truth.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that there are not enough appropriate mental states around to animate all of the bodily movements we intuitively count as intentional actions, and they suggest that these bodily movements that constitute our intentional actions are themselves to be thought of as cognitive events.
Abstract: According to current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action, intentional actions consist in intrinsically mindless bodily movements that stand in causal relations to appropriate mental states. This paper challenges this approach to intentional action, by arguing that there are not enough appropriate mental states around to ‘animate’ all of the bodily movements we intuitively count as intentional actions. In the alternative picture I suggest, the bodily movements that constitute our intentional actions are themselves to be thought of as cognitive events, embodying our grasp of ways of acting.