Journal ArticleDOI
A test for information sharing in Cournot oligopoly
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TLDR
In this paper, the average squared sales as a test for non-collusive information sharing in Cournot oligopoly is used. And the authors suggest that information sharing should be granted if it increases firms' average square sales.About:
This article is published in Information Economics and Policy.The article was published on 1996-03-01. It has received 16 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Cournot competition & Collusion.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Market Transparency and Market Structure: The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a theoretical study of the consequences of such transparency for the structure, conduct, and performance of the livestock industry, and conclude that the usefulness of the Mandatory Reporting Act to the industry may not be in the value of reported information to feeders, as the supporters of the Act claim.
Journal ArticleDOI
Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting: A Literature Review and Synthesis of Related Market Information Research
TL;DR: The mandatory pricing reporting system for livestock and meat was introduced by Congress in 1999 and implemented by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2001 as mentioned in this paper, but the implementation was problematic and there is little evidence upon which to evaluate the new system.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information pooling and collusion: an empirical analysis
TL;DR: Information pooling is found to be non-collusive in Nebraska and neutral in the rest of the regions, and one plausible explanation is the linkage between the structure of the cattle-feeding industry, frequency of cattle marketing, and availability of information before and after the Act.
Journal ArticleDOI
Market and Welfare Effects of the U.S. Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act
TL;DR: Njoroge et al. as discussed by the authors investigated the effect of mandatory reporting on the structure, conduct, and performance of livestock markets and found that the amount and type of information withheld increased the amount of uncertainty, measured by price dispersion.
Posted Content
Information Sharing in the Presence of Preemptive Incentives: Economic Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure
TL;DR: In this article, the welfare implications of a mandatory disclosure requirement in an oligopolistic market, in which firms can choose their output either before or after the resolution of demand uncertainty, are examined.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a two-stage oligopoly game where, first, there is simultaneous production, and second, after production levels are made public, there was price competition.
Journal ArticleDOI
Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that if the goods are substitutes (not) to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in Bertrand (Cournot) competition, then the market outcome is always optimal.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information Transmission—Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and the information structure.
Journal ArticleDOI
Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the oligopolists' expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the Bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing, and analyse the firms' decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data.