Wenn uber die Zukunft der Kryptographie gesprochen wird, dann geht es haufig um ein Thema: Quantencomputer. Dabei liest oder hort man oft Aussagen wie: „Mit einem Quantencomputer kann jedes Verschlusselungsverfahren geknackt werden!“. Aber stimmt das so uberhaupt? Welche Bedrohung stellt ein Quantencomputer genau dar? Zum einen ist nach wie vor vollig unklar, ob uberhaupt jemals ein Quantencomputer gebaut werden kann, der eine Bedrohung fur kryptographische Algorithmen darstellt. Andererseits gibt es auch kryptographische Verfahren, die nach dem aktuellen Stand der Forschung resistent gegen Angriffe mittels Quantencomputern sind. Sind damit also alle Probleme der Zukunft der Kryptographie gelost? Leider nein, denn der fehlerhafte Einsatz von Kryptographie in der Praxis stellt bereits heute ein Problem dar.

Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '98

Die Zukunft der Kryptographie

Design a secure public key encryption scheme and its security proof are one of the main interests in cryptography In 2004, Canetti, Halevi and Katz [8] constructed a public key encryption (PKE) from a selective identity-based encryption scheme with a strong one-time signature scheme In 2005, Boneh and Katz [6] improved Canetti-Halevi-Katz construction by replacing a strong one-time signature with a message authentication code, but it is not publicly verifiable Later, Boyen, Mei and Waters [7] constructed PKE scheme directly from Waters' IBE scheme [17] , which is only secure against direct chosen-ciphertext attack and is not secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack In 2006, Tan [16] further improved the efficiency of Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) construction by directly from Boneh-Boyen identity based encryption (IBE) scheme [4] with a weak one-time signature In this paper, we construct an efficient public key encryption scheme without one-time signature, which preserves a publicly verifiable property and secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack The construction of the proposed scheme is based on Boneh-Boyen identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [2] and a trapdoor function We also show that the proposed scheme is more efficient than CHK construction.

Public-Key encryption from ID-Based encryption without one-time signature

In this paper, we first model the variants of OAEP and SAEP, and establish a systematic proof technique, the comprehensive event dividing tree, and apply the technique to prove the security of the (120) variants of OAEP and SAEP. Moreover, we point out the concrete attack procedures against all insecure schemes; we insist that the security proof failure leads to some attacks. From the security consideration, we find that one of them leads to a scheme without a redundancy; the scheme is not $\mathcal{PA}$ (plaintext aware) but IND-CCA2 secure. Finally, from the comparison of the variants, we conclude that some of them are practical in terms of security tightness and short bandwidth.

Taxonomic Consideration to OAEP Variants and Their Security

This paper presents a new coordinate system for elliptic curves that accelerates the elliptic curve addition and doubling over an optimal extension field (OEF). Many coordinate systems for elliptic curves have been proposed to accelerate elliptic curve cryptosystems. This paper is a natural extension of these papers and the new coordinates are much faster when the elliptic curve is defined over an OEF. This paper also shows that the total computational cost is reduced by 28% when the elliptic curve is defined over ${\mathbb F}_{q^m}$, q = 261−1 for m = 5 and the speed of a scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve becomes 41.9 μsec per operation on a 2.82-GHz Athlon 64 FX PC.

Compressed jacobian coordinates for OEF

This paper proposes a generic construction of GUC secure commitment against static corruptions in the KRK (Key Registration with Knowledge) model The GUC security is a generalized version of universally composable security which deals with global setup used by arbitrary many protocols at the same time The proposed construction is the first GUC secure protocol in which the commit phase is non-interactive (whereas the reveal phase is interactive) Thus, the proposed construction is suitable for applications where many values are committed to a few receivers within a short time period The proposed construction uses simple tools, a public key encryption (PKE) scheme, a Sigma protocol, a non-interactive authenticated key exchange (NI-AKE) scheme, a message authentication code (MAC), for which efficient constructions have been presented For the sake of simplicity of the proposed construction, which uses GUC secure authenticated communication (constructed from MAC and NI-AKE), we have not achieve full adaptive security because GUC secure authenticated communication in the KRK model is impossible

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-34117-5_16.pdf

Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '98

Citations

Die Zukunft der Kryptographie

Public-Key encryption from ID-Based encryption without one-time signature

Taxonomic Consideration to OAEP Variants and Their Security

Compressed jacobian coordinates for OEF

Generic Construction of GUC Secure Commitment in the KRK Model

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