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The Influence of the Responsibility to Protect on the UN Security
Council during the Arab Spring
Hehir, A.
This is a copy of the final author version of an article published in Cooperation and
Conflict Published online before print November 18, 2015, doi:
10.1177/0010836715612849, November 18, 2015, 0010836715612849
The final definitive version is available online at:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010836715612849
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Assessing the Influence of the Responsibility to Protect on the UN
Security Council during the Arab Spring
Abstract
This article challenges those perspectives which assert first, that the Security Council’s
engagement with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) during the Arab Spring evidences a
generally positive trend, and second, that the response to the Arab Spring, particularly Syria,
highlights the need for veto restraint. With respects to the first point, the evidence presented in
this article suggests that the manner in which R2P has been employed by the Security Council
during this period evidences three key trends; first, a willingness to invoke R2P only in the
context of Pillar I; second, a pronounced lack of consensus surrounding Pillar III; and third,
the persistent prioritisation of national interests over humanitarian concerns. With respect to
veto restraint, this article argues that there is no evidence that this idea will have any significant
impact on decision-making at the Security Council; the Council’s response to the Arab Spring
suggests that national interests continue to trump humanitarian need.
Keywords
Libya, Syria, Security Council, Responsibility to Protect, NGOs
Introduction
This article challenges two perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which have
emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. First, the view that the Security Council’s engagement
with R2P during the Arab Spring evidences a positive trend; these arguments – discussed in
detail later – assert that the Security Council – though at times falling short of the ideal – has
passed an increasing number of Resolutions which include references to R2P. This is held to
constitute evidence that the R2P “norm” has influenced the Council and ‘begun to change the
world’ (Bellamy, 2015:111). As Jess Gifkins argues in her article in this special issue, there is
a perception that increased references to R2P by the Security Council during the Arab Spring
demonstrates that, ‘Language on R2P has become less contentious in the Security Council over
time’ (2015: ?). This is presented as an axiomatically positive development with long-term
implications. The second perspective holds that the Arab Spring, and the response to Syria in
particular, demonstrates the need for veto restraint; this has manifested in the “Restrain the
Veto” campaign which is vaunted as a means by which R2P can exercise greater leverage
against the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5) and mitigate the influence of
national interests on decision-making at the Council.
After initially outlining the centrality of the Security Council to the application of R2P,
this article argues first, that references to R2P by the Security Council have been comparatively
rare and, more importantly, that these references evidence a definite trend; the manner in which
the Security Council has employed R2P demonstrates a willingness only to refer to the host
state’s responsibility and a marked reluctance to engage with Pillar III of R2P.
i
Thus, the
increased use of R2P does not necessarily constitute a positive development. Second, I analyse
the strategy behind the “restrain the veto” campaign and argue that the Security Council’s
response to Libya, Bahrain and especially Syria, demonstrates that national interests continue
to determine the P5’s response to intra-state crises.
The Security Council’s Powers and R2P
In their 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect, the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) recognised the primacy of the Security Council
and, cautioning against seeking alternatives, suggested that the key task was ‘to make the
Security Council work better’ (2001: xii). The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document also
stated that action to halt or prevent the four crimes under R2P’s purview – genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity – was permissible only if sanctioned
‘through the Security Council in accordance with the Charter’. The centrality of the Security
Council has also been reiterated during subsequent key junctures in the evolution of R2P, such
as the 2009 General Assembly debate on R2P (Hehir, 2013b), and the six reports published by
UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Ki-Moon since 2009. R2P, therefore, has not altered the
laws governing the use of force or the powers of those – namely the Security Council – with
the authority to sanction remedial action (Bellamy, 2015: 13; Stahn, 2007; Focarelli, 2008).
As Jennifer Welsh, UN Special Adviser on R2P, notes, ‘No new legal obligations were created
when R2P was endorsed in 2005’ (2013).
Despite the lack of legal or institutional reform, R2P constituted, according to Gareth
Evans, ‘… a brand new international norm of really quite fundamental importance and
novelty…that is unquestionably a major breakthrough’ (2009: 16). The efficacy of R2P stems
from the fact, supporters claim, that it acts as a means by which pressure is coordinated, focused
and exerted on states, and the P5 in particular, by those concerned with the fate of people
overseas (Luck, 2010; Evans, 2008: 241; Power, 2009: x; Glanville, 2011: 471). By virtue of
R2P’s official recognition in 2005 – and subsequently by the General Assembly – states can be
held to account on the basis of their own commitments (Evans, 2009: 16; Slaughter, 2011).
Thus Evans called on ‘civil society organizations and activists…to ensure that decision makers
continue to have no excuses when it comes to knowledge of R2P situations’ (2008: 227).
To this end a number of think-tanks and NGOs specifically focused on using R2P to
influence state behaviour – such as the Global Centre for R2P, the International Coalition for
RtoP, and the Asia-Pacific Centre for R2P – have been established. Indicative of the rationale
underlying the strategy of these NGOs, Simon Adams Director of the Global Center for R2P
notes ‘…[R2P] does not seek to impose new legal obligations…R2P is an established
international norm [that] can act as a political framework for mobilising action to protect those
who are otherwise marked for death’ (Konigs, Nozawa and Teeuwen, 2013). Thus, while the
powers of the Security Council remain unchanged, the environment in which the Council
makes decisions, and the “norms”
ii
which, post-R2P, now influence their behaviour, are
ostensibly radically different.
R2P as a Commonly Referenced “Norm”
The reflections of those supportive of R2P on the efficacy of the concept during the Arab Spring
have asserted that while the international response was far from ideal, the Security Council
demonstrated an increased engagement with R2P and willingness to employ the concept in
official statements, particularly Security Council Resolutions (Bellamy and Williams, 2012;
Evans, 2013). Indicatively, Thomas Weiss defended R2P against claims that the post-
intervention chaos in Libya had sounded its death knell, by arguing ‘[The Security Council]
has invoked the norm three times more frequently in the three years after Libya than in the six
before’ (2012: 10). Former UN Special Adviser on R2P Ed Luck similarly stated, ‘measured
on the basis of the frequency of references in Security Council resolutions and statements, the
quest for broad acceptance of R2P has progressed impressively over the past five or six years’
(2015: 3). Likewise, Bellamy suggests the Security Council’s record in the past five years
demonstrates ‘a newly found determination to act on the responsibility to protect’ (Bellamy,
2015: 10). In this special issue Gifkins has made similar claims arguing, ‘The regular inclusion
of R2P language in Council resolutions speaks to gradual normative change over time in the
way the Council frames its responses to mass atrocity crimes’ (2015: ?).
Thus, despite the international community’s mixed response to the Arab Spring, R2P
has ostensibly solidified its status as a “norm” through its increased use in high-level political
discourse, even when states have disagreed on how to act (Dunne and Gelber, 2014). In March
2015 the Global Center for R2P published a list of every Security Council Resolution which
mentioned R2P, declaring that as the figures show an increase in usage of the term, R2P’s
status as a norm has grown (2015a).
Whether referring to R2P, or any term, at the Security Council is significant is a
contested issue; many claim that what the Security Council says, particularly with respects to
