Open AccessProceedings Article
Bidding Languages and Winner Determination for Mixed Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions.
TLDR
In this paper, a new type of combinatorial auction is introduced that allows agents to bid for goods to buy, for items to sell, and for transformations of goods, which can be seen as a step in a production process, so solving the auction requires choosing the sequence in which the accepted bids should be implemented.Abstract:
We introduce a new type of combinatorial auction that allows agents to bid for goods to buy, for goods to sell, and for transformations of goods. One such transformation can be seen as a step in a production process, so solving the auction requires choosing the sequence in which the accepted bids should be implemented. We introduce a bidding language for this type of auction and analyse the corresponding winner determination problem.read more
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References
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Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
TL;DR: A Solutions Manual, containing solutions to all end-of chapter questions for MICROECONOMic Theory by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, is released.
Journal ArticleDOI
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of determining the revenue maximizing set of nonconflicting bids can be solved for combinational auctions where the value of assets to a bidder depends on which other assets he or she wins.
Journal ArticleDOI
Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
TL;DR: The economic incentives facing participants in auction mechanisms are analyzed, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single- but not multi-unit bids.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations
TL;DR: A wider range of combinatorial market designs are studied: auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges, with one or multiple units of each item, with and without free disposal, and the complexity of finding a feasible, approximate, or optimal solution is modeled.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
TL;DR: It is found that producers can sometimes gain significantly by bidding strategically, however, when the available surplus is small relative to the consumers’ values, the producers’ strategic behavior may prevent the supply chain from forming at all, resulting in zero gains for all agents.
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