Open AccessJournal Article
Can parties police themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In fact, this paper argued that the teoria clasica electoral no funciente when el mismo partido controla el poder ejecutivo de la administración de las elecciones and the poder legislativo de the certificación of los resultados.Abstract:
Este estudio esboza la logica y consecuencias de la teoria clasica de gobernabilidad electoral. Al responsabilizar al poder ejecutivo de la administracion de las elecciones y al poder legislativo de la certificacion de los resultados, esta teoria presupone que los representantes del pueblo generan resultados electorales ampliamente aceptables. Este estudio argumenta que la teoria clasica no funciona cuando el mismo partido controla el poder ejecutivoy el poder legislativo. El desarrollo politico de varios sistemas presidenciales ofrecen apoyo tentativo a estas hipotesis. Solamente cuando los partidos delegan la gobernabilidad electoral a tribunales autonomos es cuando los conflictos en torno a los resultados electorales no provocan inestabilidad politica. Comparaciones entre los sistemas basados en la division de poderes de los Estados Unidos y America Latina tambien sugieren que el desarrollo politico entre el norte y el sur son mas parecidos de lo comunmente aceptado.read more
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990
Journal ArticleDOI
The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880–1910: Kousser, J. Morgan: (Yale Historical Publications Miscellany, No. 102): New Havcn, Conn.: Yale University Press, 319 pp., Publication Date: October 16, 1974
Dissertation
Partisan Manipulation of the Democratic Process and the Comparative Law of Democracy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for institutionally focused judicial oversight of the law of democracy in order to minimize partisan manipulation of the democratic process, and they trace the implications of the principal-agent problem for judicial review of the comparative law of democracies.
Journal ArticleDOI
Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Chile
Building democracy: de jure and de facto autonomy in electoral management bodies in latin america and africa
Trelles Yarza,Luis Alejandro +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the effect of electoral management bodies' de facto independence on the quality of elections and the mechanisms that allowed de facto autonomous EMBs to become de facto independent in third wave countries.
References
More filters
Book
Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy
TL;DR: The conditions associated with the existence and stability of democratic society have been a leading concern of political philosophy as discussed by the authors, and the problem is attacked from a sociological and behavioral standpoint, by presenting a number of hypotheses concerning some social requisites for democracy, and by discussing some of the data available to test these hypotheses.
MonographDOI
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the relationship between political regimes and economic growth in the United States and discuss the dynamics of political regimes, economic growth, political instability, and population.
Book
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
TL;DR: In this paper, strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems and multi-merge electoral systems is discussed. But the authors focus on the problem of coordination failures and dominant parties.
Book
Capitalist development and democracy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors find that the rise and persistence of democracy cannot be explained either by an overall structural correspondence between capitalism and democracy or by the role of the bourgeoisie as the agent of democratic reform.
Book
Elections as instruments of democracy : majoritarian and proportional visions
TL;DR: Powell as mentioned in this paper examines the differences between two great visions of democracy: the majoritarian vision, in which citizens use the election process to choose decisively between two competing teams of policymakers, providing the winner with the concentrated power to make public policy; and the proportional influence vision, where citizens use elections to choose political agents to represent their views in postelection bargaining, thereby dispersing power.