Changing theories of change: strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement.

TLDR: Examination of a variety of motivated situational contexts finds that people's theories of change shifted in line with goals to protect self and liked others and to cast aspersions on disliked others, finding that people who were most threatened by a previously convicted child sex offender gravitated most to the entity view that others do not change.

Abstract: People differ in their implicit theories about the malleability of characteristics such as intelligence and personality. These relatively chronic theories can be experimentally altered, and can be affected by parent or teacher feedback. Little is known about whether people might selectively shift their implicit beliefs in response to salient situational goals. We predicted that, when motivated to reach a desired conclusion, people might subtly shift their implicit theories of change and stability to garner supporting evidence for their desired position. Any motivated context in which a particular lay theory would help people to reach a preferred directional conclusion could elicit shifts in theory endorsement. We examine a variety of motivated situational contexts across 7 studies, finding that people�s theories of change shifted in line with goals to protect self and liked others and to cast aspersions on disliked others. Studies 1�3 demonstrate how people regulate their implicit theories to manage self-view by more strongly endorsing an incremental theory after threatening performance feedback or memories of failure. Studies 4�6 revealed that people regulate the implicit theories they hold about favored and reviled political candidates, endorsing an incremental theory to forgive preferred candidates for past gaffes but leaning toward an entity theory to ensure past failings �stick� to opponents. Finally, in Study 7, people who were most threatened by a previously convicted child sex offender (i.e., parents reading about the offender moving to their neighborhood) gravitated most to the entity view that others do not change. Although chronic implicit theories are undoubtedly meaningful, this research reveals a previously unexplored source of fluidity by highlighting the active role people play in managing their implicit theories in response to goals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)

Figures

Figure 3. Candidate lay theory scores as a function of condition and political affiliation (Study 3). Higher numbers indicate more changeability (incremental theory). Means are adjusted for covariates.

Figure 8. Study 5. Implicit theory ratings post-scenario (adjusted for implicit theory premeasure), as a function of condition (negative vs. positive) and political affiliation (supporter vs. opponent vs. neutral). Higher numbers indicate the incremental perspective.

Figure 4. Study 3. Path analysis demonstrating that candidate lay theory partially mediates the effect of candidate (Harper or Ignatieff) by voter affiliation (Conservative or Liberal) on judgments of how much negative past quotes should affect a candidate’s current standing in the national election.

Figure 7. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that one’s lay theory of President Obama’s changeability partially mediates the effect of condition (positive or negative evaluation) by vote (Republican or Democrat) on judgments of how much Obama’s performance as Senator should affect his current standing in the national election.

Figure 5. Lay theories of Barack Obama as a function of condition and political affiliation (Study 4). Higher numbers indicate greater changeability (incremental theory). Means are adjusted for covariates.

Figure 1. Participant social intelligence implicit theory scores, as a function of feedback and legitimacy conditions (Study 1). Higher numbers indicate a more incremental implicit theory. Means are adjusted for covariates.

Full text

Wilfrid Laurier University Wilfrid Laurier University
Scholars Commons @ Laurier Scholars Commons @ Laurier
Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)
2015
Changing Theories of Change: Strategic Shifting in Implicit Theory Changing Theories of Change: Strategic Shifting in Implicit Theory
Endorsement Endorsement
Scott Leith
Wilfrid Laurier University
, scottford.leith@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd
Part of the Social Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
Leith, Scott, "Changing Theories of Change: Strategic Shifting in Implicit Theory Endorsement" (2015).
Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)
. 1743.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1743
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Running Head: Changing Theories of Change
Changing Theories of Change: Strategic Shifting in Implicit Theory Endorsement
by
Scott Andrew Leith
B.A. Western University, 2009
M.A. Wilfrid Laurier University, 2012
THESIS
Submitted to the Department/Faculty of Psychology
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Wilfrid Laurier University
©Scott Andrew Leith 2015

Changing Theories of Change I
Declaration of Previous Publication
This thesis includes Studies 2 through 6 of one original paper that has been previously
published in a peer reviewed journal:
Leith, S. A., Ward, C. L., Giacomin, M., Landau, E. S., Ehrlinger, J., & Wilson, A. E.
(2014). Changing theories of change: Strategic shifting in implicit theory
endorsement. Journal of personality and social psychology, 107(4), 597.
In all cases, the key ideas, primary contributions, experimental designs, data analysis and
interpretation, were performed by the author (in collaboration with his advisor). The
contributions of co-authors were through the provision of formatting review, study goals,
feedback on design, wording revision, and consultation regarding the greater implicit
theories literature. Studies 1 and 7 of the publication are omitted, as they are the primary
work of the co-authors.
I certify that I have obtained permission from the copyright owner(s) to include the above
published material in my thesis. I certify that the above material describes work
completed during my registration as graduate student at Wilfrid Laurier University.
I declare that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyone’s
copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or
any other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, published or
otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices.
I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as approved
by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been
submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution.

Changing Theories of Change II
Abstract
People differ in their implicit theories about the malleability of characteristics such as
intelligence and personality. These relatively chronic theories can be experimentally altered, and
can be affected by parent or teacher feedback. Little is known about whether people might
selectively shift their implicit beliefs in response to salient situational goals. We predicted that,
when motivated to reach a desired conclusion, people might subtly shift their implicit theories of
change and stability to garner supporting evidence for their desired position. Any motivated
context in which a particular lay theory would help people to reach a preferred directional
conclusion could elicit shifts in theory endorsement. We examine a variety of motivated
situational contexts across five studies, finding that people’s theories of change shifted in line
with goals to protect self and liked others and to cast aspersions on disliked others. Studies 1 and
2 demonstrate how people regulate their implicit theories to manage self-view by more strongly
endorsing an incremental theory after threatening performance feedback or memories of failure.
Studies 3-5 revealed that people regulate the implicit theories they hold about favored and
reviled political candidates; endorsing an incremental theory to forgive preferred candidates for
past gaffes but leaning toward an entity theory to ensure past failings “stick” to opponents.
Although chronic implicit theories are undoubtedly meaningful, this research reveals a
previously unexplored source of fluidity by highlighting the active role people play in managing
their implicit theories in response to goals.

Changing Theories of Change III
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, thank you to my advisor, Dr. Anne Wilson. Your mentorship and
understanding defined my journey through graduate school, and I doubt I would have made it
through two degrees under a different advisor. I stumbled into your lab largely by chance, and
can still hardly believe my luck. You routinely go above and beyond for your students, and I was
no exception. Any success I have enjoyed is yours – through your guidance (and patience) I have
grown immeasurably as a scholar and as a person over the last five years. Thank you, Anne.
Thank you to my committee members, Roger Buehler and Justin Cavallo, for the detailed
attention given to my dissertation, and the incisive feedback throughout this process and
throughout my tenure in graduate school. This thanks is extended to Christian Jordan and Pamela
Sadler, who have always been willing to help me, and whose enthusiasm for research (and
intimidating competency) both inspired and encouraged in equal measure.
Thank you to the psychology department administration, Rita Sharkey, Kim Susanna, and
Lucy Carreiro. Without your help I would likely never have made it through teaching my first
classes, let alone graduate with everything in order.
Thank you to Karen Hussey, my undergraduate thesis advisor, for being the first
professor to believe in me, and for sparking my passion for research and psychology. Your
supportive yet unflinchingly honest mentorship readied me for graduate school in a way I could
fully appreciate only after the fact, and taught me lessons I have not forgotten (“Never have any
ego about your work, Scott…someone’s going to tear it apart sooner or later.”).
Thank you to all of my colleagues and friends here at Wilfrid Laurier. Your help, whether
through advice, encouragement, statistical/methodological consultation, or stress relief, has made
graduate school a wonderful place to be.
Thank you to my mother, Sue Leith, for reading several books to me every day when I
was a child. I did not do as well as I could have in school as a boy, and you never gave up on me.
Your limitless help with every aspect of my schooling when I was younger set the stage for my
work as a man. I still vividly remember you helping me with my very first science project (which
won me my first award). You put a lot of work into me, and I hope I make you proud.
Thank you to my father, Sheldon Leith, for demonstrating and teaching a work ethic that
did not show itself until I was 27. Thank you again for convincing me to go to university in the
first place. I don’t know how things would have gone had I not accepted. They say that the son
must eventually surpass the father, but you stubbornly remain an example to which I aspire.
Thank you to Aaron Van Domelen, who knows why he gets an honourable mention.
And finally, thank you to my fiancée Renée Hunt, for your support and love. You enable
me to move from who I am, to who I hope to be.

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What are the contributions in "Changing theories of change: strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement" ?

The authors examine a variety of motivated situational contexts across five studies, finding that people ’ s theories of change shifted in line with goals to protect self and liked others and to cast aspersions on disliked others. Although chronic implicit theories are undoubtedly meaningful, this research reveals a previously unexplored source of fluidity by highlighting the active role people play in managing their implicit theories in response to goals. 

Q2. What future works have the authors mentioned in the paper "Changing theories of change: strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement" ?

Indeed, the authors focus primarily on shifting implicit theories as the mechanism by which people successfully support the conclusions they wish to reach. Future research into this issue could pre-select a large number of incremental and entity theorists at the outset to systematically examine where the shifting takes place. This initial step into examining the change in people 's theories of change enables re-interpretations of past research, and present several new avenues of future research. Future research should more fully explore the links between theory chronicity and flexibility, and how their knowledge of one informs and modifies their understanding of the other. 

Q3. What did the authors do to predict the extent to which participants would shift their implicit theory?

The authors predicted that after experiencing a failure (in the legitimate condition), participants who shifted toward a more incremental theory would have a more optimistic outlook on their future potential, and would thus be more likely to express interest in re-taking the test. 

Q4. What is the effect of failurefeedback on the participants?

the authors see that only when a test (and its feedback) is perceived as legitimate, failurefeedback induces participants to shift their implicit theory to a more incremental perspective relative to success feedback. 

Q5. What is the effect of the interaction on the perceived relevance of Obama’s Senatorial performance?

Bootstrapping (1000 samples, 95% confidence intervals) revealed a significant indirect effect, CI [-.27, -.02], p < .05, suggesting that some of the effect of the interaction on the perceived relevance of Obama’s Senatorial performance occurs through judgments of Obama’s changeability. 

Q6. What did the authors expect if someone was given failure feedback?

The authors expected that if someone was given failure feedback, they would shift toward a more incremental theory to lessen the failure’s impact. 

Q7. Why did the authors control for date of the reported event?

Because people mightperceive more change over long time spans, the authors controlled for date of the reported event in all analyses however results were the same with or without this covariate. 

Q8. What is the definition of thin-slice social perceptiveness?

Thin-slice social perceptiveness is a key aspect of social intelligence and personality, predictive of a wide range of measures of life success. 

Q9. What did the authors predict when people read damaging quotes attributed to their favored candidate?

The authors predicted that when people read damaging quotes attributed to their favored candidate, they would shift their dominant implicit theory of the candidate in the incremental direction. 

Q10. What is the hypothesis that people would shift their theories to lessen the impact of a failure?

The authors expected that if someone was given failure feedback, they would shift toward a more incremental theory to lessen the failure’s impact. 

Q11. Why did the authors remove participants who ‘failed’ the manipulation check?

The authors chose to remove participants who ‘failed’ the manipulation check for two reasons:(1) It is possible that participants did not read or process the information for some reason (e.g., lack of attention), meaning they should be removed as they would be with any other attention check, and (2) it is possible that participants engaged in (unmeasured) motivated reasoning immediately and dismissed the committee’s feedback as useless or biased, thus eliminating any threat and any motivation. 

Q12. What was the first test of the Dweck (1999) general person implicit theory scale?

As in Study 3, participants then completed a modified version of the Dweck (1999) general person implicit theory scale, which asked participants to indicate the degree to which they felt Barack Obama was changeable or stable.