Contemporary international cartels and developing countries: economic effects and implications for competition policy
TLDR
For example, the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Commission have investigated over forty international cartels for illegal price fixing in the United States and Europe, but prosecutions and civil litigation in those countries have been rare as discussed by the authors.Abstract:
During the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Commission prosecuted over forty international cartels for illegal price fixing in the United States and Europe. On the civil litigation front, almost all of the cases involving these cartels have been filed in the United States with its treble damages provisions. In many cases, these cartels sell to markets in developing countries, but prosecutions and civil litigation in those countries have been rare. Thus, in a sense, most antitrust litigation against such cartels has been attacking the symptoms of the problem rather than attacking this worldwide phenomenon across the international front where these companies work. Yet, if the international aspects of these cartels cannot be better addressed, we run the risk, as Justice Stewart explained, that “persons doing business both in this country and abroad might be tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expectation that the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at home.”1read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
What determines cartel success
TL;DR: The authors examined a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions: (1) Can cartels succeed? (2) If so, for how long? (3) What impact do cartels have? (4) What causes cartels to break up?
Book
How Do Cartels Operate
TL;DR: This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 1999-2004 and describes the properties of a collusive outcome, monitoring and punishment methods for enforcing it, the frequency of meetings, the organizational structure of cartels, and what preceded cartel formation.
Journal ArticleDOI
The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way, and explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence.
Journal ArticleDOI
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices*
TL;DR: In this paper, conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports, and properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.
Book ChapterDOI
The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path
Joe Chen,Joseph E. Harrington +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms' prices, and find that partial leniency programs can make collusion easier compared to offering no leniency.
References
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Global Price Fixing: Our Customers are the Enemy
John M. Connor,John M. Connor +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the economic effects of the Citric Acid Cartel on the world Lysine Industry and the business of fighting Cartels, and the Chicago Criminal Trial.
Posted Content
Export Cartels: A Developing Country Perspective
TL;DR: In this article, the authors review the treatment of export cartels in various jurisdictions and compile the limited empirical evidence that is available on their prevalence, efficiency justifications, and effects on international trade, concluding that most developing countries will be constrained by a lack of technical expertise and limited enforcement capacity.
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EXPORT CARTELS: A Developing Country Perspective
TL;DR: In this article, the authors review the treatment of export cartels in various jurisdictions and the limited empirical evidence that is available on their prevalence, efficiency justifications, and effects on international trade, and suggest criteria that could help to determine their validity and an importing country's best response.