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Discrimination as favoritism: The private benefits and social costs of in-group favoritism in an experimental labor market
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In this paper, the authors examine labor market favoritism in a unique laboratory experiment design that can shed light on both the private benefits and spillover costs of employer favoritism (or discrimination) and identify one potential micro-foundation of societal unrest that may link back to labor market opportunity.Abstract:
In this paper, we examine labor market favoritism in a unique laboratory experiment design that can shed light on both the private benefits and spillover costs of employer favoritism (or discrimination). Group identity is induced on subjects such that each laboratory « society » consists of eight individuals each belonging to one of two different identity groups. In some treatments randomly assigned employer-subjects give preference rankings of potential worker-subjects who would make effort choices that impact employer payoffs. Though it is common knowledge that group identity in this environment provides no special productivity information and cannot facilitate communication or otherwise lower costs for the employer, employers preferentially rank in-group members. In such instances, the unemployed workers are aware that an intentional preference ranking resulted in their unemployment. Unemployed workers are allowed to destroy resources in a final stage of the game, which is a simple measure of the spillover effects of favoritism in our design. Though we find evidence that favoritism may privately benefit a firm in terms of higher worker effort, the spillover costs that result highlight a reason to combat favoritism/discrimination. This result also identifies one potential micro-foundation of societal unrest that may link back to labor market opportunity. Key Words: Discrimination, Experimental Economics, Social identity, Conflictsread more
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References
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z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
TL;DR: This article showed that if a fraction of the people exhibit inequality aversion, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish, and they also showed that when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperations are maintained.
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ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.
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Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium, and that if payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutualmax and mutualmin outcomes; if payoff are large, fairness equilibrium are roughly a set of Nash equilibra.
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Social categorization and intergroup behaviour
TL;DR: In the second series of experiments, it was found that the maximum joint profit independent of group membership did not affect significantly the manner in which the subjects divided real pecuniary rewards; however, maximum profit for own group did affect the distribution of rewards; and the clearest effect on the subject's attempt to achieve a maximum difference between the ingroup and the outgroup even at the price of sacrificing other "objective" advantages.
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