Q2. What are the future works in this paper?
Studying such extensions is an interesting avenue for future research.
Efficiency and Information Transmission in Bilateral Trading
Robert Shimer,Iván Werning +1 more
TLDR
In this paper, the authors study pairwise trading in the presence of one-sided or two-sided private information and limited commitment, and show that when one trader's information is relevant for the other trader's value of the asset, optimal trading arrangements may necessarily conceal the traders' information.About:
This article is published in Review of Economic Dynamics.The article was published on 2019-07-01 and is currently open access. It has received 3 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Trading turret & Electronic trading.read more
Figures
Figure 1: Regions of the parameter space in which different types of veto incentive compatible mechanisms are trade-maximizing. The details of the mechanisms are given in Proposition 7. 
Figure 2: Trading Probability with α = 3/4. The solid line shows the trading probability under the trade-maximizing veto incentive compatible mechanism, the solution to problem (7). The dashed line imposes the additional constraint that the mechanism is fully-revealing, the solution to problem (9). 
Figure 3: The set of feasible payoffs with 2-sided private information. The figure assumes the payoff structure in Section 5.1 with α = 0.6 and γ = 0.2. The lightest shaded area is the set of payoffs obtainable using a fully revealing veto incentive compatible mechanism. The intermediate shaded area is the set of payoffs that can additional be obtained using an arbitrary veto incentive compatible mechanism. The darkest area shows the set of payoffs that can additionally be obtained using an interim mechanism.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Adverse selection with heterogeneously informed agents
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of over-the-counter markets is proposed, where some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high quality assets, and heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with.
Journal ArticleDOI
Research on High-Frequency Information-Transmission Method of Smart Grid Based on CNN-LSTM Model
TL;DR: A research method of high-frequency information transmission in smart grids based on the CNN-LSTM model is proposed, which effectively combines the superiority of the CNN algorithm for high- frequencies information feature extraction and the learning ability of the LSTM algorithm for global features of high -frequency information.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Consume now or later? Time inconsistency, collective choice and revealed preference
TL;DR: This article developed a revealed preference methodology for exploring whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of nonstationarities at the individual level or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit.
Journal ArticleDOI
Decentralized Trading with Private Information
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider an economy in which a large number of agents trade two assets in bilateral meetings and show that, over time, uninformed agents can elicit information from their trading partners by making small offers.
Journal ArticleDOI
Contagious Adverse Selection
Stephen Morris,Hyun Song Shin +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors illustrate the corrosive effect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset market and show how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade, and discuss the role of contagious adverse selection and the problem of toxic assets.
Journal ArticleDOI
Reputation and Persistence of Adverse Selection in Secondary Loan Markets
TL;DR: This article developed a model with adverse selection and reputation that is consistent with such fluctuations in the volume of new issuances in secondary loan markets, and described policies that can implement efficient outcomes unless collateral values are low and originators reputational levels are low.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information percolation in segmented markets
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information, and characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information gathering incentives.
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