Book ChapterDOI
Graphical Congestion Games
Vittorio Bilò,Angelo Fanelli,Michele Flammini,Luca Moscardelli +3 more
- pp 70-81
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This work considers congestion games with linear latency functions in which each player is aware only of a subset of all the other players and modeled by means of a social knowledge graph G, and gives a complete characterization of the games possessing pure Nash equilibria.Abstract:
We consider congestion games with linear latency functions in which each player is aware only of a subset of all the other players This is modeled by means of a social knowledge graph G in which nodes represent players and there is an edge from i to j if i knows j Under the assumption that the payoff of each player is affected only by the strategies of the adjacent ones, we first give a complete characterization of the games possessing pure Nash equilibria We then investigate the impact of the limited knowledge of the players on the performance of the game More precisely, given a bound on the maximum degree of G , for the convergent cases we provide tight lower and upper bounds on the price of stability and asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy All the results are then extended to load balancing gamesread more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Atomic congestion games on graphs and their applications in networking
TL;DR: It is shown that a PNE may not exist in general, but that it does exist in many important special cases including tree, loop, or regular bipartite networks, including systems with two resources or identical payoff functions for each resource.
Journal Article
Convergence and approximation in potential games
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the speed of convergence to approximately optimal states in two classes of potential games and provide bounds in terms of the number of rounds, where a round consists of a sequence of movements, with each player appearing at least once in each round.
Journal Article
Worst-case equilibria
TL;DR: In a system where noncooperative agents share a common resource, the price of anarchy is proposed, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, as a measure of the effectiveness of the system.
Book ChapterDOI
Competitive Routing over Time
TL;DR: This paper proposes temporal network congestion games that use coordination mechanisms -- local policies that allow to sequentialize traffic on the edges and considers congestion games with time-dependent costs, in which travel times are fixed but quality of service of transmission varies with load over time.
Journal ArticleDOI
Convergence in Player-Specific Graphical Resource Allocation Games
Valentino Pacifici,Gyorgy Dan +1 more
TL;DR: It is proved that pure strategy Nash equilibria always exist in graphical resource allocation games and an efficient distributed algorithm is proposed to reach an equilibrium over an arbitrary graph and its performance on different random graph topologies is illustrated.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Equilibrium points in n-person games
TL;DR: A concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple ofpure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player.
Book ChapterDOI
Non-cooperative games
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the set of equilibrium points of a two-person zero-sum game can be defined as a set of all pairs of opposing "good" strategies.
Journal ArticleDOI
Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I-III
TL;DR: The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc.