Open AccessProceedings Article
Graphical models for game theory
Michael Kearns,Michael L. Littman,Satinder Singh +2 more
- pp 253-260
TLDR
The main result is a provably correct and efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in one-stage games represented by trees or sparse graphs.Abstract:
We introduce a compact graph-theoretic representation for multi-party game theory. Our main result is a provably correct and efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in one-stage games represented by trees or sparse graphs.read more
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References
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Book ChapterDOI
Non-cooperative games
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the set of equilibrium points of a two-person zero-sum game can be defined as a set of all pairs of opposing "good" strategies.
Journal ArticleDOI
Nash and Correlated Equilibria: Some Complexity Considerations
Itzhak Gilboa,Eitan Zemel +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the complexity of computing Nash and correlated equilibria for a finite game in normal form was studied and it was shown that the problem is NP-hard for Nash equilibrium but polynomial for correlated equilibrium.
Journal ArticleDOI
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games
Daphne Koller,Brian Milch +1 more
TL;DR: This paper provides a sound and complete graphical criterion for determining strategic relevance, and shows how strategic relevance can be used to detect structure in games, allowing a large game to be broken up into a set of interacting smaller games, which can be solved in sequence.
Book ChapterDOI
Chapter 2 Computation of equilibria in finite games
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide an overview of the latest state-of-the-art methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for general finite n-person games.