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Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
9-1-1986
Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann
Wilfrid Laurier University
, hassmann@wlu.ca
Jack Donnelly
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E. and Donnelly, Jack, "Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes"
(1986).
Political Science Faculty Publications
. 19.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/poli_faculty/19
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HUMAN
DIGNITY,
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
AND
POLITICAL
REGIMES
RHODA
E. HOWARD
McMaster
University
JACK
DONNELLY
University
of
North
Carolina
Chapel
Hill
It
is often
argued
that internationally
recognized
human
rights
are
common
to all cultural
traditions
and
adaptable
to
a
great variety
of
social
structures
and political
regimes.
Such
arguments
confuse
human
rights
with
human
dignity.
All
societies
possess
conceptions
of
human
dignity,
but
the
conception
of human
dignity
underlying
international
human
rights
standards
requires
a
particular
type
of
"liberal"
regime.
This
conclusion
is reached
through
a
comparison
of
the
social
structures
of
ideal
type
liberal,
minimal,
traditional,
communist,
corporatist
and developmental
regimes
and
their
impact
on
autonomy,
equality,
privacy,
social
conflict,
and
the
definition
of
societal
membership.
T
he
international
human
rights
elaborated
in
the
Universal
Declaration
of Human
Rights
and
the
In-
ternational
Human
Rights
Covenants
often
are
held
to
be compatible
with
a
great
variety
of
political
regimes.
For
ex-
ample,
Khushalani
(1983,
p. 404)
argues
that
"the concept
of
human rights
can be
traced
to
the origin
of the human
race
itself,"
and
that
"all
the
philosophies
of
our
time"
are committed
to
human
rights.
Likewise,
Graefrath
(1983,
p.
6)
argues
that
international
human
rights
standards
"can
be adapted
to any
legal system"
(cf.
Buultjens,
1980;
Gros
Espiell,
1979;
Mara-
singhe,
1984;
Mojekwu,
1980;
Pollis,
1982;
Ruffin,
1982;
Stackhouse,
1984;
Wiarda,
1982).
We
argue,
however,
that
international
human
rights
standards
are
based
on a distinctive
substantive
concep-
tion of
human
dignity.
They therefore
re-
quire
a
particular
type
of "liberal"
regime,
which may
be institutionalized
in various
forms,
but
only
within
a relatively
nar-
row
range
of
variation.
The authors
cited
above
confuse
human
rights
with
human
dignity.
"Human
dignity"
figures
prominently
in
international
human
rights
documents;
for
example,
the
International
Human
Rights
Covenants
proclaim
that human
rights
"derive
from
the
inherent dignity
of
the
human
person"
(1966).
Furthermore,
every
form
of
political
regime
implicitly
reflects
a
particular
social
conception
of
human
dignity.
Nonetheless,
human
rights
and
human
dignity
are
quite
distinct
notions.
AMERICAN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
REVIEW
VOL.
80
NO.
3
SEPTEMBER,
1986
American
Political
Science
Review
Vol.
80
Conceptions
of
human
dignity,
in their
social and political
aspects, express par-
ticular
understandings of the inner
(moral) nature and
worth of the human
person and his or her
proper (political)
relations with society.
Human rights, by
contrast, are the
equal and inalienable
rights, in the strong
sense of entitlements
that
ground
particularly powerful claims
against the state, that
each person has
simply as a human
being. Human rights
are
a
particular social
practice that aims
to realize a
distinctive
substantive concep-
tion
of
human
dignity
(Donnelly,
1982a).
Conceptions
of
human
dignity vary dra-
matically across
societies, and most of
these
variations are
incompatible with the
values of
equality
and autonomy that
underlie human
rights. Most
regimes-
and their
underlying social
conceptions of
human
dignity-necessarily deny both
the idea and
the practice
of
human
rights.
In order to
examine the relations
be-
tween
human rights and
conceptions of
human dignity across
a wide range of
regimes,
our
analysis
relies
heavily
on the
use
of
ideal
types-"the
construction
of
certain elements
of
reality
into a
logically
precise conception"
(Weber, 1946, p.
59)-especially
ideal-type conceptions
of
the
human
person
and his or her
obliga-
tions
to and
claims
upon
society
and the
state. We
first
specify
the
philosophical
and
structural
connections
between
the
"liberal"
conception
of human
dignity
and
the
principle
and
practice
of
human
rights.
Then
we show
how four
major
contemporary regime
types,
which
we
call
communitarian,
necessarily repudiate
human
rights
because
of
their
commit-
ment
to
alternative
social
conceptions
of
human dignity.
The
particular interpretation
of
liberal-
ism
we adopt provides
the philosophical
and
structural basis
for
international
human
rights
norms. This
is
not a
paper
on
liberal
theory.
In
another
context we
would
argue
for the
authenticity
of
our
in-
terpretation,
but
here
we claim
only
that
it is a plausible,
standard reading of
the
liberal tradition.
Our subject
in this article
is human
rights, not liberalism.
There-
fore, even
if our definition
should prove
to be stipulative,
the substance
of our
argument,
which
focuses on
the social and
political
requirements
of
human rights,
would remain
largely unaffected.
We should
also note that
we do not join
arguments
about
the
content of lists of
human rights.
Instead, as
is common in
the
human
rights literature,
we accept the
list
in
the Universal
Declaration of
Human
Rights
without argument.
In par-
ticular,
we
avoid rehashing
old
arguments
about
economic and social
rights. Both on
theoretical
grounds (see
Donnelly, 1982b;
Donnelly,
1985,
ch.
6;
Shue, 1980, pt. 1).
and
in
light
of the
nearly universal
official
acceptance
of the
Universal Declaration,
we
adopt
the
full
list of
rights
it
provides,
with
civil,
political,
economic,
and social
rights
on an
equal footing.
While
these two
simplifying
assump-
tions narrow our
focus,
our argument
re-
mains significant
and controversial. We
contend
that internationally recognized
human
rights
require
a
liberal regime.
Other
types
of
regimes,
and
the
concep-
tions
of human
dignity
on which they
rest, may
be
defensible
on
other
moral or
political grounds,
but they
will
not
stand
up
to
scrutiny
under
the
standard of
human
rights.
Liberalism
and
Human
Rights:
A
Necessary
Connection
Liberalism,
Equality,
and Personal
Autonomy
We
follow Ronald
Dworkin
(1977,
ch.
12; 1985,
ch.
8)
in
arguing
that the heart
of liberalism
is
expressed
in
the
basic
pol-
itical right to
equal
concern
and respect:
Government
must
treat
those
whom
it
governs
with concern,
that
is,
as
human
beings
who
are
capable
of
suffering
and
frustration,
and
with
respect,
that
is,
as human
beings
who
are
capable
802
1986
Human
Dignity,
Human
Rights,
Political
Regimes
of
forming and acting on intelligent conceptions
of how
their lives should be lived. Government
must not only treat people with concern and
respect, but with equal concern and respect. It
must not distribute goods or opportunities un-
equally
on
the ground that some citizens are en-
titled to more because they are worthy of more
concern. It
must not constrain liberty on the
ground that one citizen's conception of the good
life . . . is nobler or superior to another's.
(Dworkin, 1977, p. 273)
The state
must treat each person
as
a
moral and
political equal-not assure
each
an
equal
share of
social resources,
but
treat all with
equal
concern
and
respect. Inequalities in goods or oppor-
tunities
that arise
directly
or
indirectly
from political decisions-and many such
inequalities are easily justified
within a
liberal regime-must
be
compatible with
the
right
to
equal
concern and
respect.
Personal
liberty, especially
the
liberty
to choose and
lead one's
own
life, clearly
is
entailed by the principle of equal
respect:
for
the state
to interfere
in
mat-
ters of
personal morality
would
be to treat
the
life
plans
and
values
of
some
as
superior
to
others.
A certain
amount
of
economic
liberty
is also
required,
at
least
to the extent that decisions
concerning
consumption, investment,
and risk reflect
free
decisions based on
personal
values
that arise
from
autonomously
chosen con-
ceptions
of the
good
life.
Liberty alone,
however,
cannot serve as
the
overriding
value of social
life,
as the end to be max-
imized by political association.
Liberty readily degenerates
into license
and social atomization unless checked
by
a
fairly expansive, positive conception
of
the
persons
in
relation
to whom it
is
exer-
cised.
If
liberty
is to foster
dignity,
it
must
be
exercised within the constraints of
the
principle
of
equal
concern
and
respect.
In
fact, autonomy
and
equality
are less
a
pair
of
guiding principles
than
different
manifestations of the central liberal
com-
mitment to the
equal
worth
and
dignity
of
each and
every person.
Each
human
being is of equal
moral
worth
individually,
whatever
his
or
her
social
utility.
Individuals-regardless
of
who
they
are
or where
they
stand-have
an inherent
dignity
and moral worth
that
the
state
must
not
merely
passively
respect, but
for
which it
must
demon-
strate
an active concern.
Furthermore,
everyone
is entitled to this
equal
concern
and
respect.
Minimum standards
of
polit-
ical
treatment are
embodied in
(human)
rights; they are
not
merely
desirable
goals
of social
policy.
This
implies
a
particular
conception
of the
relation
of the indi-
vidual
to the
community
and the
state.
Man is a
social animal;
human poten-
tial, and even
personal
individuality,
can
be
developed
and expressed
only in
a
social
context. Society
requires
the
discharge
of
certain
political
functions,
and
large-scale
political
organization
re-
quires
the
state.
However,
the
state-es-
pecially
the modern
state-also
presents
particularly
serious threats to
human
dig-
nity. The
state is easily
turned to
the
denial of
equal concern
and
respect,
through
the
enforcement of
a
particular
vision of
the
good
life or the
entrench-
ment
of
privileged
inequality.
Therefore,
human
rights
have a
special
reference to
the
state,
in
order to
keep it
an
instrument
to
realize, rather than
undermine, equal
concern
and
respect.
In
the
inevitable
con-
flicts between the
individual
and the
state,
the
liberal
gives prima
facie priority,
in
the
areas protected
by
human rights,
to
the
individual.
For the
liberal,
the
individual is
not
merely separable
from
the
community
and social
roles,
but
specially
valued
precisely
as
a
distinctive,
discrete
in-
dividual-which
is
why
each
person
must
be treated with
equal concern and
respect.
The state and
society are
conceived,
in
more or
less contractarian
terms,
as forms
of
association for
the fuller
unfolding
of
human
potential, through
the
exercise
and
enjoyment
of human
rights. Human
dig-
nity,
for the
liberal, is
largely encom-
passed
in
the vision of
life as
an
equal
and
autonomous member of
society,
enjoying
a full
range
of
human
rights.
803
American
Political Science Review
Vol.
80
This
liberal
view of
man
is rooted in
structural
changes
that
began
to
emerge in
late
medieval
and
early
modern
Europe,
gained
particular
force
in
the
eighteenth
and
nineteenth
centuries,
and
today
are
increasingly
the
norm
throughout
the
world.
The
"creation" of
the
private
in-
dividual
separate
from
society is
closely
linked to
the
rise
of
a
new,
more
complex
division
of
labor,
the
resulting
changes
in
class
structure
(particularly
the
rise
and
then
dominance of
the
bourgeoisie), and
a
new
vision
of
the
individual's
relationship
to
God,
society,
and
the
state.
These
developments
are
well
known,
and need
not
be
recounted
here.
For
our
purposes,
though,
it
is
important
to
stress
that
in
the
social
changes of
moderniza-
tion-especially
migration,
urbanization,
and
technological
development-the
all-
encompassing
moral
whole of
traditional
or
feudal
society
was
replaced
by
a
much
more
segmented
social
order.
In
par-
ticular,
politics
was
separated
from
religion, the
economy, and
law, which
were
likewise
separated from one
another.
Individuals,
too, were
separated
from
society
as a
whole;
no
longer
could
persons be
reduced
to their
roles,
to
parts
of
the
community. With
separate
in-
dividuals,
possessing
special
worth
and
dignity
precisely
as
individuals,
the
basis
for
human
rights
was
established.
Occurring
parallel to these
changes
in
society
was the
equally
well-known
development
of the
modern
state.
The
new
bourgeois class
was
initially
a
prin-
cipal backer of the
newly
rising
princes
and
kings
and their
states;
both
shared
an
interest
in
freeing
themselves
from
the
constraints of
the old
feudal
order.
However,
as
the
modern
state's
power
grew,
it
increasingly
threatened the
in-
dividual
citizen.
Bourgeois
"freemen"
began
to
demand,
therefore,
that
they
in-
deed
be
free.
Such
demands
eventually
took the form
of
arguments
for
the
universal
natural
rights
and
equality
of
all
men.
In
the
new
socially
mobile
society,
in which
entrance to
and exit
from the
bourgeois
class was
relatively
unpredic-
table, a
new set of
privileges
could not
readily
be
reserved
for
a
new elite defined
by
birth
or
some similar
characteristic.
Rather,
in
order that
some (the
bour-
geoisie) might
be
able to exercise these
new rights,
they had
to be
guaranteed
for
all.
Thus,
human rights
came to be
articu-
lated
primarily
as claims of
any
individual
against
the
state. Human
rights lay
down
the basic form
of
the
relationship be-
tween the
(new,
modern)
individual
and
the (new,
modern)
state, a
relationship
based
on the
prima
facie
priority
of the in-
dividual over
the state
in
those
areas
pro-
tected
by
human
rights. Human
rights
are
viewed
as
(morally) prior to and above
society
and the
state,
and under
the
con-
trol
of
individuals,
who hold them
and
may
exercise them
against
the
state
in
ex-
treme
cases. This reflects not
only
the
equality
of all
individuals,
but
also
their
autonomy-their
right
to
have
and
pur-
sue interests
and goals different from
those
of
the
state
or
its rulers. In the
areas
and
endeavors
protected
by
human
rights,
the
individual
is
"king,"
or
rather,
an
equal
and autonomous
person
entitled
to
equal
concern and
respect.
In
practice,
of
course,
these values and
structural
changes
remain
incompletely
realized
even
today,
and for
most
of the
modern
era
they
have been
restricted to a
small
segment
of
the
population.
None-
theless,
the ideal
was established and
its
implementation
begun.
Even if
the de-
mand
for
human
rights
began
as
a tactic
of the
bourgeoisie
to
protect
its own
class
interests,
the
logic
of
universal,
inalien-
able
personal
rights
has
long
since
broken
free
of
these
origins.
Furthermore,
while these
processes
of
sociopolitical
individuation
and state
building
were
first
played
out
in
Europe,
they
are
increasingly
the rule
throughout
the world.
As
a
result,
the
structural
basis
for a
society
of
equal
and
autonomous in-
804