Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1999"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the degree to which international norms are affecting debates over citizenship and national minorities in contemporary Germany, with empirical data drawn from the European human rights regime centered on the Council of Europe.
Abstract: The constructivist study of norms faces two central challenges—reintegrating agency into its largely structural accounts and unpacking its arguments at the national level. This article addresses these issues, and does so in four parts. First, I briefly review the burgeoning constructivist literature, exploring the ontological and theoretical reasons for its neglect of agency. Second, by adding social content to the concept of diffusion, the transmission mechanism linking international norms to domestic change, I explain the motivation of domestic actors to accept new normative prescriptions, thus making a start at restoring agency to constructivist accounts. Third, I argue these key actors will vary cross-nationally as a function of state-society relations (“domestic structure”).Fourth, the argument is applied to the politics of national identity in post—Cold War Europe. In particular, I examine the degree to which international norms are affecting debates over citizenship and national minorities in contemporary Germany, with empirical data drawn from the European human rights regime centered on the Council of Europe.
728 citations
TL;DR: Poe and Tate as mentioned in this paper found that military regimes lead to somewhat greater human rights abuse, defined in terms of violations of personal integrity, once democracy and a host of other factors are controlled.
Abstract: Here we seek to build on our earlier research (Poe and Tate, 1994) by re-testing similar models on a data set covering a much longer time span; the period from 1976 to 1993. Several of our findings differ from those of our earlier work. Here we find statistical evidence that military regimes lead to somewhat greater human rights abuse, defined in terms of violations of personal integrity, once democracy and a host of other factors are controlled. Further, we find that countries that have experienced British colonial influence tend to have relatively fewer abuses of personal integrity rights than others. Finally, our results suggest that leftist countries are actually less repressive of these basic human rights than non-leftist countries. Consistent with the Poe and Tate (1994) study, however, we find that past levels of repression, democracy, population size, economic development, and international and civil wars exercise statistically significant and substantively important impacts on personal integrity abuse.
659 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an alternative measure of policy portfolio similarity, S, is proposed, which avoids many of the problems associated with τ b, and uses data on alliances among European states to compare S to τ b.
Abstract: The pattern of alliances among states is commonly assumed to reflect the extent to which states have common or conflicting security interests. For the past twenty years, Kendall's τ b has been used to measure the similarity of nations' “portfolios” of alliance commitments. Widely employed indicators of systemic polarity, state utility, and state risk propensity all rely on τ b . We demonstrate that τ b is inappropriate for measuring the similarity of states' alliance policies. We develop an alternative measure of policy portfolio similarity, S , which avoids many of the problems associated with τ b , and we use data on alliances among European states to compare S to τ b . Finally, we identify several problems with inferring state interests from alliances alone, and we provide a method to overcome those problems using S in combination with data on alliances, trade, UN votes, diplomatic missions, and other types of state interaction. We demonstrate this by comparing the calculated similarity of foreign policy positions based solely on alliance data to that based on alliance data supplemented with UN voting data.
594 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors employ a polychotomous version of Mokken scaling analysis to create an improved measure of government respect for a subset of human rights known as physical integrity rights.
Abstract: We employ a polychotomous version of Mokken Scaling Analysis to create an improved measure of government respect for a subset of human rights known as physical integrity rights. The scale we produce is shown to be unidimensional, and it contains information about the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for these rights. No previous measure has explicitly addressed the issue of sequence of government respect for human rights. The sequence, or ordering, of respect for physical integrity rights that we find tells us which rights are more commonly respected (the rights not to be killed or disappeared) and which ones are more commonly violated (the rights not to be imprisoned arbitrarily or tortured). Our findings improve upon previous studies that have assumed unidimensionality and that have made a priori assertions of patterns of respect. They also stand in contrast to McCormick and Mitchell's (1997) claim that government respect for physical integrity rights is necessarily a multidimensional phenomenon.
360 citations
TL;DR: The authors further investigated the relationship between human rights and U.S. bilateral foreign aid and found that human rights considerations played a role in determining whether or not a state received military aid during the Reagan and Bush administrations, but not for the Carter or Clinton administration.
Abstract: This study furthers the inquiry into the relationship between human rights and U.S. bilateral foreign aid. We build the most comprehensive data set to date, extending the time period (1976–1995) and enlarging the number of countries under review (140). Rhetoric aside, human rights considerations did play a role in determining whether or not a state received military aid during the Reagan and Bush administrations, but not for the Carter or Clinton administration. With the exception of the Clinton administration, human rights was a determinant factor in the decision to grant economic aid, albeit of secondary importance. To the question “Does a state's human rights record affect the amount of U.S. bilateral aid it receives?” we answer yes for economic aid, but no for military aid. Human rights considerations are neither the only nor the primary consideration in aid allocation.
189 citations
TL;DR: The spread of information across borders is now possible on an unprecedented scale as discussed by the authors, thanks to satellites, the Internet, and 24-hour news coverage, we have more up-to-the-minute news about other states' internal politics than ever before.
Abstract: The spread of information across borders is now possible on an unprecedented scale. Thanks to satellites, the Internet, and 24-hour news coverage, we have more up-to-the-minute news about other states’ internal politics than ever before. This surfeit of information is increased by institutional transparency, defined as mechanisms that facilitate the release of information about policies, capabilities, and preferences to outside parties.
176 citations
TL;DR: This article found that the U.S. government would not be likely to exercise pressure on all UN resolutions but would do so on issues considered vital to America's national interests, such as women's empowerment.
Abstract: Many previous studies assessed the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid by focusing on voting coincidence rates of all UN votes and found no relationship between U.S. aid distribution and UN voting coincidence rates. Most UN resolutions, however, are simply not important enough for the U.S. to expend its scarce resources in influencing the outcomes. The U.S. government would not be likely to exercise pressure on all UN resolutions but would do so on issues considered vital to America's national interests. If there is any effect from receiving U.S. foreign aid on political outcomes in the UN, it is therefore most likely to emerge in voting coincidence rates on important issues. Using data collected for sixty-five developing countries between 1984 and 1993, a pooled cross-sectional and time-series research design is adopted to examine this hypothesis. Contrary to the argument that foreign aid is an ineffective policy instrument in the pursuit of America's global influence, the current findings suggest that the U.S. government has successfully utilized foreign aid programs to induce foreign policy compliance in the UN on issues that are vital to America's national interests. The end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the structure of the international system, and the rules that have guided U.S. foreign policy for the past forty years are now obsolete. The urgency of balancing the federal budget fuels political anxieties at home, and "the public is motivated by a pervasive sense that domestic problems warrant the bulk of America's energies" (Haass, 1995:43). Thus U.S. foreign aid, considered an important foreign policy instrument during the Cold War era, has found itself under intensive scrutiny in recent years (Doherty, 1995). Opponents of U.S. foreign assistance have questioned the effectiveness of these programs in promoting U.S. national interests and have pointed out that recipients of U.S. aid have often been short on gratitude. A report from the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in Washington, has suggested that 74 percent of the recipient countries voted against the U.S. a majority of the time in the United Nations in 1994.1 On these grounds, U.S. foreign aid is viewed as largely ineffective in winning friends in the international arena. The Clinton administration strongly opposes deep cuts in the budget for international affairs. In so doing, it has argued that foreign assistance remains an important instrument of American foreign policy through which the U.S. can exert Author's note: This study is supported by a research grant from Illinois State University. The author would like to
173 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors reveal evidence that the end of the Cold War has provided a dividend in terms of reduced transnational terrorism and that significant short-run and long-run effects are quantified with time-series analysis to be concentrated in reduced bombings and hostage-taking incidents.
Abstract: The article uncovers evidence that the end of the Cold War has provideda dividend in terms of reduced transnational terrorism. Significant short-run and long-run effects are quantified with time-series analysis to be concentrated in reduced bombings and hostage-taking incidents. Presumably, this dividend is the result of less state-sponsorship of terrorism by the Commonwealth of Independent States and other states, as well as the result of measures taken by industrial states to thwart terrorist attacks. A dividend does not appear untilthe last three quarters of 1994, at which time moves were well under way to integrate Eastern Europe with the West. Moreover, prior to this period, significant efforts had been made among Western nations to augment cooperative efforts to curb terrorism and to bring terrorists to justice. Using data for 1970 through mid-1996, we also examine trends and cycles in terrorist modes ofattack. There is virtually no evidence of an upward trend in transnational terrorism, contrary to media characterizations. All types of terrorist incidents display cycles whose duration lengthens with logistical complexity. Any change in these cycles in the post–Cold War era is concentrated in the high-frequency or short-lived cycles.
170 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that domestic political audiences exert a strong influence over which state in a crisis is likely to achieve a successful outcome and that relative national capabilities do tend to affect the outcomes of crises.
Abstract: In a recent article, James Fearon advances an innovative approach to the study of interstate crises. He adds to the traditional view (that crisis outcomes are influenced by the balance of capability and the balance of resolve) the notion that domestic political audiences exert a strong influence over which state in a crisis is likely to achieve a successful outcome. His game-theoretic analysis yields a number of interesting hypotheses, which are tested in this study using data on militarized disputes, the structure of polities, and national capability. In general the results strongly support Fearon's model, though we find that relative national capabilities do tend to affect the outcomes of crises. This study highlights the importance of combining formal models of political events with large-N empirical tests.
153 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an interest-group model of endogenous policy suggests that multilateral sanctions can undermine the political effectiveness of opposition groups in the target country, or strengthen those groups supporting the objectionable policy of the ruling regime.
Abstract: Multilateral economic sanctions can be expected to impose greater terms-of-trade effects on a target nation than unilateral sanctions. Yet despite their potential for greater economic damage, multilateral sanctions often are less effective in bringing about desired political results in the target. An interest-group model of endogenous policy suggests that multilateral sanctions can undermine the political effectiveness of opposition groups in the target country, or strengthen those groups supporting the objectionable policy of the ruling regime. Such perverse effects are due in part to the inability of multilateral coalitions to enforce cooperation among members, and to the appropriation of sanctions rents in the target country. Unilateral sanctions, however, imposed by a country with close ties to the target, are often effective in achieving their intended political objectives.
128 citations
TL;DR: The role and range of activities of ethnic interest groups in U.S. -foreign policy has received relatively little scholarly attention, though in the wake of the Cold War analysis of their activities has increased.
Abstract: The role and range of activities of ethnic interest groups in U.S. -foreign policy has received relatively little scholarly attention, though in the wake of the Cold War analysis of their activities has increased. The case of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) during the 1980s suggests, however, that ethnic interest group activity is not new and may be far more complex than our standard conceptualizations allow. We review the literature on the role of ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy and assemble some common assumptions and arguments about their origins, roles and relations with the government, and the conditions that favor their success. Then we examine origins of CANF, its web of relationships with government even dluring the Cold War, and its role as a near co-executor of policy. We conclude by assessing what the CANF case suggests about standard views of the roles of at least some ethnic interest groups in the process of making U.S. foreign policy, including the need to see how the state may try to use and sponsor such groups to further its policy goals. The study of U.S. foreign policy, and foreign policy analysis more generally, has paid relatively little attention to the role and power of ethnic interest groups and the full range of their activities. Early studies showed these groups to have little influence, and the Cold War contributed to a foreign policymaking process that was largely dominated by the president. Interest group activity in foreign policy seemed relatively unimportant with a few notable exceptions. In the wake of the Cold War, though, scholars and journalists have begun to pay more attention to the activities of these groups in foreign and security policy. In an era when security threats are less pressing, when Congress is more engaged, and when the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" politics is less clear, many have pointed to the increasing activism, if not always influence, of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Dent, 1995; Uslander, 1995; Vidal, 1996; Glastris, 1997). The case of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) during the 1980s-its origins, its web of relationships with the government even during the Cold War, and its role as a near co-executor of policy-suggests, however, that ethnic
TL;DR: This article found that a large proportion of the militarized disputes between democracies in the post-World War II period involve fisheries, maritime boundaries, and resources of the sea, and well-established democracies are able to remove territory as a contentious issue among them.
Abstract: Scholars of international politics have been slow to address the fundamental issues that ground interstate conflict. Territory has frequently been cited as a primary source of contention among states, but it remains only one issue and not even the one most prevalent in the post‐World War II time period. We take the first step toward understanding the broader theoretical link between regime type, issues, and militarized conflict by collecting new data on the issues in dispute between democracies from 1946 to 1992. We find that (1) a large proportion of the militarized disputes between democracies in the post-WWII period involve fisheries, maritime boundaries, and resources of the sea, (2) well-established democracies are able to remove territory as a contentious issue among them, (3) disputes between democracies have become less severe and shorter in duration over time, and (4) a majority of the post-WWII militarized disputes between democracies are not resolved. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these empirical findings for the democratic peace literature.
TL;DR: In this paper, the problematic nature of "authority" in the global political economy is addressed, focusing on the rules governing international commercial relations, which today form part of the juridical conditions of global capitalism, the location and structure of political authority are argued to be historically specific.
Abstract: This article addresses the problematic nature of “authority” in the global political economy. Focusing on the rules governing international commercial relations, which today form part of the juridical conditions of global capitalism, the location and structure of political authority are argued to be historically specific. They have changed with the emergence of different historic blocs and as a result of consequent alterations in state-society relations. The article emphasizes the significance of private corporate power in the construction of the global political economy and hegemonic authority relations. However, the significance of private authority is obscure and little understood by students of international relations. This gives rise to analytical and normative grounds for adopting a historical materialist approach to the analysis of global authority that incorporates national, subnational, and transnational influences.
TL;DR: The authors found that floating exchange rate regimes are more likely in democratic than in nondemocratic polities and that democratic polities with majoritarian electoral systems were more likely to fix their exchange rates than those with systems of proportional representation.
Abstract: Policymakers use a fixed exchange rate regime to signal their commitment to low inflation and to exchange rate stability. Increasing economic integration and the rise of democratic institutions make it more difficult for policymakers to maintain the credibility of this commitment. We use binary probit (with a variety of corrections for autocorrelated and heteroscedastic disturbances) to test hypotheses relating democratic institutions to exchange rate regime choice on a sample of 76 developing countries over the period 1973‐1994. The empirical analysis indicates that domestic political preferences—as measured by the structure of domestic political institutions and the fractionalization of the party system—influence exchange rate regime choice. We find that floating exchange rate regimes are more likely in democratic than in nondemocratic polities and that democratic polities with majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to fix their exchange rates than those with systems of proportional representation. The growth of international capital markets is truly extraordinary. Cross-border capital flows dwarf those of international trade: recent estimates suggest that foreign exchange trading alone now exceeds one trillion dollars a day. The magnitude and volatile nature of international capital flows has led some political economists to suggest that increased economic integration and capital mobility has become so pervasive that it now acts as a “structural characteristic of the international system, similar to anarchy” (Keohane and Milner, 1996:257). These scholars point to globalization as a crucial factor leading to a convergence of economic policy in the industrialized world. While a wave of economic liberalization has swept OECD economies, governments in developing countries still use a variety of traditional economic tools to protect the relative autonomy of their domestic policies. Vital in this process is exchange rate policy for it is the exchange rate that serves as a buffer between international and domestic markets. Even after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates, most developing countries continue to fix the value of their currency to that of their major trading partner. The logic is clear: by fixing the domestic currency’s value to that of a trading partner, exchange rate volatility is minimized. As a result, bilateral flows of capital and goods are not disrupted by exchange rate uncertainty and
TL;DR: The state of international studies as the 20th century draws to a close is disconcerting as mentioned in this paper. Among the shortcomings are intolerance of competing paradigms, models, methods, and findings; a closed-mind mentality; a tendency to research fashions; the increasingly visible retreat from science in International Studies; and the low value placed by most scholars on cumulation of knowledge.
Abstract: The state of International Studies as the 20th century draws to a close is disconcerting. Among the shortcomings are intolerance of competing paradigms, models, methods, and findings; a closed-mind mentality; a tendency to research fashions; the increasingly-visible retreat from science in International Studies; and the low value placed by most scholars on cumulation of knowledge.
Flawed dichotomies are pervasive: theory versus history as approaches to knowledge; deductive versus inductive paths to theory; a horizontal (breadth) versus vertical (in-depth) focus of inquiry, based upon aggregate data (quantitative) vs. case study (qualitative) methods of analysis, using large ‘N’ vs. small ‘N’ clusters of data; system vs. actor as the optimal level of analysis, and closely related, unitary vs. multiple competing actors; rational calculus vs. psychological constraints on choice, and the related divide over reality vs. image as the key to explaining state behavior; and neo-realism vs. neo-institutionalism as the correct paradigm for the study of world politics.
Without the integration of knowledge, revised from time to time in the light of fresh theoretical insights, improved methods, and new evidence, International Studies is destined to remain a collection of bits and pieces of explanation of reality and behavior.
In this spirit, an attempt to overcome the dichotomies and to achieve synthesis, along with cumulation, was the raison d' etre of the International Crisis Behavior Project, now entering its 25th year of systematic research on crisis, conflict and war in the 20th century. From the flawed dichotomies has emerged synthesis in paths to theory, methodologies, the testing of propositions, and cumulation of knowledge, one demonstration that it is possible to transform International Studies into a genuine social science discipline.
TL;DR: This paper examined the socioeconomic impacts of structural adjustment in sixteen Latin American countries and found that adjustment was weakly associated with growth and reform did seem to reduce inflation, and that low levels of growth or even mere economic stability are the best remedy for poverty and inequality.
Abstract: The 1980s were painful years of structural adjustment during which many developing countries abandoned statist economic models in favor of market-oriented paradigms. The proponents of structural adjustment, including international lending agencies such as the IMF and World Bank, argued that reforms were necessary to restore growth and curtail inflation. The opponents of adjustment claimed its macroeconomic results were not a foregone conclusion and, regardless of them, such changes would drastically affect the already precarious position of the poor. We use data from sixteen Latin American cases to examine the socioeconomic impacts of structural adjustment. Adjustment was weakly associated with growth, and reform did seem to reduce inflation. Counterintuitively, the extent of structural adjustment appears to be negatively associated with both poverty and inequality. Finally, empirical data show that low levels of growth or even mere economic stability are the best remedy for poverty and inequality.
TL;DR: This article replicated, extended, and added a longitudinal dimension to a recently published analysis focusing on the relationship between sex and attitudes toward international conflict, and specifically on the hypothesis that women are more peace-oriented than men.
Abstract: This research report replicates, extends, and adds a longitudinal dimension to a recently published analysis focusing on the relationship between sex and attitudes toward international conflict, and specifically on the hypothesis that women are more peace-oriented than men. The study being replicated utilized public opinion data from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. The present report extends the analysis, employing one additional data set from Israel, two additional data sets from Palestine, and new data sets from Jordan and Lebanon. In contrast to findings from studies conducted in the United States and Europe, none of the nine Middle Eastern data sets yields a statistically significant relationship between sex and attitudes toward international conflict. The article considers possible reasons for the difference between findings from the Middle East and those based on research in the West. Emphasizing the notion of salience, it hypothesizes that characteristics of the conflict about which attitudes are held may be more important than country or regional attributes in determining the applicability of the women and peace hypothesis.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the first quantitative, empirical tests of hypotheses of strategy choice and find that democracies and industrialized states are more likely to choose maneuver strategies, and that a state's own experiences affect the likelihood of it choosing maneuver.
Abstract: Military strategy is centrally important to understanding the causes, conduct, and outcomes of war. Several foreign policy theories make predictions as to what military strategies a state will choose. This article presents the first quantitative, empirical tests of hypotheses of strategy choice. Analysis was conducted on a random sample of country-years taken from the population of all countries from the years 1903 to 1994. Military strategy is classified as being either maneuver, attrition, or punishment. Empirical findings reveal that democracies and industrialized states are more likely to choose maneuver strategies, and that a state's own experiences affect the likelihood of it choosing maneuver. Factors found not to affect strategy choice include terrain, the level of external threat, troop quality, whether a state is democratizing, whether a state is a mixed regime, whether a state is a military regime, and vicarious experiences.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the structuring of citizens' attitudes on foreign policy issues in the U.S. and Sweden and argue for a plausible theoretical interpretation of the Swedish foreign policy dimensions that is somewhat different from the one offered in the American case.
Abstract: In this article we compare the structuring of citizens' attitudes on foreign policy issues in the U.S.A. and Sweden. Most of the studies in this area have been carried out on U.S. data, which have made any generalization of the findings to other states difficult. The material is the 1995 SOM study, with a sample of 2,800 individuals. Swedish citizens' foreign policy attitudes were structured along two dimensions. The first dimension showed similarities with Wittkopf's “militant internationalism” dimension; the second dimension showed similarities with Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis's “multilateralism-unilateralism” dimension. As in the United States, ideology has a high explanatory power on individuals' placement on the first dimension, but in Sweden gender and attitudes on “green issues” have some additional explanatory power. On the second dimension education has high explanatory power in both Sweden and the U.S.A., but in Sweden attitudes on “green issues” are also of importance. In the article we argue for a plausible theoretical interpretation of the Swedish foreign policy dimensions that is somewhat different from the one offered in the American case.
TL;DR: This article examined the role of the United States in Japan's foreign aid policy and concluded that Japan's responsiveness to American pressure reflects an act of will rather than a lack of coherent policy stemming from bureaucratic politics.
Abstract: This article examines the role of the United States in Japan's foreign aid policy. The Japanese government often alters its course of action under U.S. pressure even if doing so would apparently undermine its own interests. Japan's unusual responsiveness to U.S. preferences appears counterintuitive given the fact that at least in the realm of foreign aid Japan's power clearly surpassed that of the United States. This article posits that Japan's responsiveness stems in large part from the asymmetry of interdependence between the two countries. After critically reviewing the existing literature, it conducts two case studies to examine the validity of the argument. The article concludes that the United States played a crucial role but Japan's responsiveness to American pressure reflects an act of will rather than a lack of coherent policy stemming from bureaucratic politics. The findings have important implications to the ongoing debate over whether Japan is a “reactive state.”
TL;DR: The 1994 Summit of the Americas marked a high point in hemispherism-our label for the active attempt by the nations of the Western Hemisphere to form regimes of cooperation with one another.
Abstract: The 1994 Summit of the Americas marked a high point in hemispherism-our label for the active attempt by the nations of the Western Hemisphere to form regimes of cooperation with one another. To explain why hemispherism has not been a more powerful trend in the last 200 years, structural, interest, and cultural variables are relevant but insufficient factors. An important and often overlooked obstacle to hemispherism has been contrarian ideas. Specifically, constellations of intellectual traditions that question the value of hemispheric cooperation have dampened both the demand for and supply of such regimes. Only when these antihemispheric intellectual traditions were in retreat-the late nineteenth century, the mid twentieth century, and the early 1990s-has hemispherism flourished. We posit three mechanisms through which intellectual traditions can decline, thus generating a modified cognitivist argument that can supplement power-based and interest-based explanations of regime formation and robustness. In 1990, Mexico made a daring proposal to the United States: the establishment of a free trade zone between both nations. Historically, this was not the first time that a Latin American nation approached the United States with a request for securing a special bilateral relationship or economic alliance. What was new, however, was that the U.S. accepted. First, President George Bush embraced Mexico's proposal to negotiate'a free trade agreement, and in his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), envisioned expanding free trade throughout the hemisphere. Then, President Bill Clinton completed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and obtained congressional ratification. Clinton went further: in 1994 he invited the democratically elected presidents and heads of governments of the Americas to a summit to discuss ways of deepening hemispheric cooperation. Latin Americans accepted the invitation with one condition: that free trade should be the centerpiece
TL;DR: This article used data from the Leadership Opinion Project (LOP), a panel survey of American opinion leaders which brackets the end of the Cold War, to investigate two interrelated questions about the structure of elites' foreign policy beliefs.
Abstract: We use data from the Leadership Opinion Project (LOP), a panel survey of American opinion leaders which brackets the end of the Cold War, to investigate two interrelated questions about the structure of elites' foreign policy beliefs. We assess, first, whether the militant internationalism/cooperative internationalism scheme, developed primarily by Wittkopf (1981, 1990) and Holsti and Rosenau (1990), has continued relevance now that the USSR has collapsed; and second, whether Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987, 1990; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson, 1993) domain-specific, hierarchical model of mass belief structure can be applied to elite belief systems. The evidence indicates that respondents' past stances toward military and cooperative ventures are highly predictive of their views once the Cold War ends. This continuity in leaders' postures toward international affairs, in itself, suggests that “enemy images” of the Soviet Union were less important within elite belief systems than Hurwitz and Peffley (1990; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992) posited for the mass public. The starkest difference, however, between their findings for mass samples and our findings for a leadership sample centers on the importance of ideology in constraining foreign policy beliefs, and the close interconnection with domestic beliefs. Consequently, as we illustrate, predictable ideological divisions among opinion leaders persist in the post-Cold War era. In sum, our evidence demonstrates considerable continuity in elites' beliefs despite profound changes in the global system, and reaffirms the importance that ideology plays in structuring attitudes within elite belief systems.
TL;DR: The mischaracterization of the works of the early Economic Nationalists and early Economic Liberals has obscured both the variety within each school and the connections between them as discussed by the authors, and it has not been enough recognition that economic Nationalism and economic Liberalism are neither as internally unified schools of thought as often portrayed nor as easily separated.
Abstract: The mischaracterization of the works of the early Economic Nationalists and early Economic Liberals has obscured both the variety within each school and the connections between them. Many scholars have written about misinterpretations of Adam Smith's ideas, but few have corrected similar misinterpretations of the ideas of the leading Economic Nationalists, Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List. List and Hamilton have been falsely portrayed as mercantilistic advocates of autarky and unlimited protectionism. A comparison of their works with those of the leading early Liberals: Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill, indicates a more complex pattern. Hamilton's and List's ideas, rather than being the antithesis of Liberalism, are a synthesis of it and mercantilism. This reappraisal indicates that some of the more controversial aspects of Economic Nationalism, such as its promotion of autarky, are not an essential part of this school of thought. Although the classical works of Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism continue to influence opinion on the proper role of the state in promoting economic development, many understandings of the differences between these two schools of thought are mistaken or incomplete. Since other scholars have written extensively about the mischaracterization of the early Liberals, this article will focus more on the Economic Nationalists. Often there has not been enough recognition that Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism are neither as internally unified schools of thought as often portrayed nor as easily separated. In particular, the Liberal elements in the works of the most notable Nationalists, Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, have been underemphasized.
TL;DR: In this paper, a new theory based on the externalization of domestic conflict in the revolutionary states was proposed, where the radicals externalized their domestic conflicts with the moderates, who had transnational ties with the U.S., by fomenting tensions with Washington.
Abstract: Although scholars focused on Soviet–American relations during the Cold War, the greatest number of conflicts for the U.S. occurred in the Third World, and most of these were with revolutionary states. Could U.S. policies toward the new revolutionary states have prevented the almost universal collapse in relations? Two dominant explanations for this breakdown are (1) American hostility toward revolutionary change and (2) Stephen Walt's variant of the spiral model. Using the comparative case approach and selecting “hard cases,” this article disputes these explanations and offers a new theory based on the externalization of domestic conflict in the revolutionary states. Given their ideological goals, the radicals externalized their domestic conflicts with the moderates, who had transnational ties with the U.S., by fomenting tensions with Washington. To demonstrate that this theory can be generalized, this article varies the dependent variable and shows through a critical case that its lack of conflict can best be explained by the absence of the conditions that lead to externalization. The foreign policies of both the U.S. and revolutionary states are explained by classical realism as opposed to Walt's structural realism, which fails to account for the foreign policies of Third World states.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the effects of exported arms on the political and military relationships between three sets of rival importers (India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, and Ethiopia-Somalia) during the 1950-1991 period.
Abstract: There has not been much formal or empirical research on the impact of Cold War–era arms transfers on regional subsystems, and the work that has been undertaken is inconclusive: arms transfers appear, in some cases, to promote stability, but in other situations they are shown to be destabilizing. This study confronts the issue directly by developing and testing both stability and instability models of Superpower (U.S. and USSR) and third-country arms transfers. The models examine the effects of exported arms on the political and military relationships between three sets of rival importers—India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, and Ethiopia-Somalia—during the 1950–1991 period. Tests of the models with recently released arms trade data reveal that the weapons shipments of the U.S. and USSR were profoundly destabilizing, while those of third parties generally had little impact on subsystem political and military relationships. An intriguing exception to these patterns is the weapons transfers of the PRC, specifically to Pakistan: these are found to have lessened the military imbalance between Pakistan and India, suggesting that the PRC's reputation as an irresponsible exporter deserves further review.
TL;DR: In this paper, the interactive effects of both joint democracy and joint maturity on the levels of intensity reached in militarized conflict were examined and the conditional importance of both factors was revealed.
Abstract: A good deal of recent research has focused on the possible dangers associated with young democracies that are trying to weave their way through modern interstate relations for the first time. Democratic transitions, and their immediate aftermath, have been isolated as periods plagued by all sorts of potential conflict. Further, some studies implicitly suggest that the maturity of the regime may matter at least as much as the type of regime. This research directly examines the interactive effects of both joint democracy and joint maturity on the levels of intensity reached in militarized conflict. The findings reveal the conditional importance of both factors. Joint democracy imparts disparate effects on the hostility intensification of disputes, in terms of direction and magnitude, depending on maturity levels. Similarly, the magnitude of the joint maturity impact is contingent on democracy levels, although the direction of its influence remains unchanged across varying degrees of democracy. These findings signal the necessity of explicitly considering linkages between the effects of regime type and regime maturity in theories and tests of dyadic conflict dynamics.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors report findings from a study to record systematically the rise and fall of Maya polities in the Mesoamerican political system, using sources from archaeology and epigraphy.
Abstract: The analysis of politics in antiquity presents new opportunities for political science and international relations, particularly the ancient New World (c. 2000 B.C. to A.D. 1521). Governance through leadership and institutions, collective action, war and peace, alliance dynamics, regional hegemonies, interstate rivalries, and other universal patterns of world politicsexisted in Mesoamerica, antedating the modern state system. We report findings from a study to record systematically the rise and fall of Maya polities in the Mesoamerican political system, using sources from archaeology and epigraphy. Based on tests of competing hypotheses and new distribution statistics and hazard rates (survival analysis) for 72 Maya polities, our findingssupport a model of Maya political dynamics based on Preclassic origins, punctuated phases of development, multiple cycles of system expansion and collapse, and weaker political stability for increasingly complex polities. We draw two main implications: (a) a new theory of the Maya political collapse(s), based on their failure to politically integrate; and (b) confirmation for a newperiodization of Maya political evolution, different from the traditional cultural periodization, based on several cycles of rise-and-fall, not just one. Our findings may also make possible future investigations in areas such as the war-polarity and war-alliances hypotheses.
TL;DR: This paper explored the connections between the Long Wave and the Leadership Cycle by examining their possible effect on long-term patterns in major power war and colonial expansion, and found strong identifiable effects of these processes on colonization.
Abstract: This study explores the connections between the Long Wave and the Leadership Cycle by examining their possible effect on long-term patterns in major power war and colonial expansion. Building directly upon the Leadership Cycle work of Modelski and Thompson, Goldstein's Long Wave analysis, and the Modern World System School, a new analytical framework is developed. This framework treats the Leadership Cycle and Long Wave as separate, though interconnected processes, and permits derivation of empirically testable hypotheses concerning the effects of the Leadership Cycle and Long Wave on armed conflict in the system, and on the timing of colonial expansion by major powers into the periphery. This “phase-pair” framework also allows assessment of the effect of each systemic process while controlling for the effect of the other. The results of our analysis suggest that the Long Wave and Leadership Cycle not only are associated with the most severe or systemic wars, but may affect conflict more broadly within the system. We also find strong identifiable effects of these processes on colonization. Finally, all results taken together indicate the Long Wave and Leadership Cycle should be treated as distinct, though interrelated processes.
TL;DR: This article argued that changes in the commercial composition of the emerging contenders from a mix of liberal and non-non-liberal contenders in the first and second periods (1903-1906, 1917-1923, and 1930-1932 British decision makers debated whether to adopt a system of imperial preferences, but adopted in 1932 at the Ottawa Conference.
Abstract: In 1903-1906, 1917-1923, and 1930-1932 British decision makers debated whether to adopt a system of imperial preferences. Preferences were rejected in 1906 and 1923, but adopted in 1932 at the Ottawa Conference. The existing political economy literature focuses primarily on the hegemon's position in the international system, state or society centered arguments, and the role of ideas and beliefs to explain changes in a hegemon's foreign commercial policy. Using a second image reversed argument, I contend that changes in the commercial composition of the emerging contenders from a mix of liberal and nonliberal contenders in the first and second periods (1903-1906; 1917-1923) to nonliberal contenders in the third period (1930-1932) strengthened economic nationalists over free traders, contributing to Britain's adoption of imperial preferences. Although greatly diminished in strength, free traders were able to moderate the protectionist policies through the Ottawa Agreements and the Sterling Area. Why did Britain's foreign commercial policy prior to World War I and the immediate postwar years differ from its commercial policy in the decade prior to World War II when all three periods were characterized by relative British industrial decline, foreign protectionism, unemployment (in the latter two periods), and emerging competitors for regional hegemony?1 In particular, why did Britain's leaders reject a foreign commercial policy of imperial preferences in 1906 and 1923, but in 1932, at the Ottawa Conference, adopt a system of imperial preferences? The existing political economy literature focuses primarily on changes in the hegemon's position in the international system (hegemonic stability theory), state or society centered arguments, and the role of ideas and beliefs to explain changes in a hegemon's foreign commercial policy. For the most part, these explanations emphasize insideout arguments; the underlying forces that shift a hegemon's foreign commercial Author's note: The ideas in this article originated during a fellowship from the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and TheJohn D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and I am grateful
TL;DR: In this article, a generic catch-22 game based on the theory of moves (TOM) is proposed to model the dynamics of conflict spirals, in which the best response of the row player is to inflict on the column player a worst or next-worst outcome, and possibly vice versa.
Abstract: In his classic novel Catch-22 (1961), Joseph Heller describes a thoroughly frustrating situation faced by a combat pilot in World War II. This is generalized to a “generic” 2 × 2 strict ordinal game, in which whatever strategy the column player chooses, the best response of the row player is to inflict on the column player a worst or next-worst outcome, and possibly vice versa. In the 12 specific games subsumed by the generic game, which are called catch-22 games , “moving power” is “effective,” based on the theory of moves (TOM).
A generic “Mobilization Game” applicable to international crises, in which the rules of TOM are somewhat modified, is used to divide the catch-22 games into two mutually exclusive classes. Predictions for each class are compared with the behavior of decision-makers in two Egyptian-Israeli crises. In the 1960 Rotem crisis, Egypt retracted its mobilization after a discreet countermobilization by Israel, which is consistent with being in a class I game in which a status-quo state has moving power. In the 1967 crisis, escalation moved up in stages from a class I to a class II game, which precipitated war and is consistent with cycling wherein both a status-quo and a revisionist state think they have moving power. It is argued that catch-22 games better model the dynamics of conflict spirals than does the usual static representation of the security dilemma as a Prisoners' Dilemma. How such conflict spirals might be ameliorated is discussed with respect to recent conflicts in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and the former Yugoslavia.