Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players. Yet the context of interaction, perceptions, and strategies is also important. Issues are linked to one another through multilevel games, which may be compatible or incompatible. Whether reciprocity constitutes an effective strategy depends both on linkages among issues and on the institutions within which negotiations take place. Perceptions are always significant and often decisive. Decision makers often actively seek to change the contexts within which they act by linking issues, trying to alter others' perceptions, establishing institutions, and promoting new norms. This finding suggests the importance of linking the upward-looking theory of strategy with the downward-looking theory of regimes.

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Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention

Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies And Institutions

World politics is commonly referred to as anarchic, meaning that it lacks a common government. Yet a Hobbesian “war of all against all” does not usually ensue: even sovereign governments that recognize no common authority may engage in limited cooperation. The anarchic structure of world politics does mean, however, that the achievement of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement. On the contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0020818300004458

Reciprocity in international relations

What circumstances favor the realization of mutual interests in the absence of centralized authority? And through what strategies can nations foster the emergence of cooperation by altering the circumstances that they confront? Elementary game theory suggests three sets of conditions that serve as proximate explanations of the incidence of cooperation and discord: (i) Payoff Structure: Mutual and Conflicting Preferences; (2) The Shadow of the Future: Single-play and Iterated Games; and (3) Number of Players: Two-Person and N-Person Games. Each of these three attributes of context may be subject to willful modification. Nations may create the preconditions for cooperation through strategies to alter payoffs, lengthen the shadow of the future, and reduce the number of actors required to realize limited mutual interests.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100010534

Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses And Strategies

1. Introduction 2. Fear, interest and honor 3. The spirit and its expression 4. The ancient world 5. Medieval Europe 6. From Sun King to Revolution 7. Imperialism and World War I 8. World War II 9. Hitler to Bush and beyond 10. General findings and conclusions.

/pdf/a-cultural-theory-of-international-relations-4bpcaeiy8z.pdf

A Cultural Theory of International Relations

Informal agreements are the most common form of international cooperation and the least studied. Ranging from simple oral deals to detailed executive agreements, they permit states to conclude profitable bargains without the formality of treaties. They differ from treaties in more than just a procedural sense. Treaties are designed, by long-standing convention, to raise the credibility of promises by staking national reputation on their adherence. Informal agreements have a more ambiguous status and are useful for precisely that reason. They are chosen to avoid formal and visible national pledges, to avoid the political obstacles of ratification, to reach agreements quickly and quietly, and to provide flexibility for subsequent modification or even renunciation. They differ from formal agreements not because their substance is less important (the Cuban missile crisis was solved by informal agreement) but because the underlying promises are less visible and more equivocal. The prevalence of such informal devices thus reveals not only the possibilities of international cooperation but also the practical obstacles and the institutional limits to endogenous enforcement.

Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention

Citations

Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies And Institutions

Reciprocity in international relations

Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses And Strategies

A Cultural Theory of International Relations

Why are some international agreements informal

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