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Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma

Robert Jervis
TLDR
The model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the cost of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate.
Abstract
International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI

Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics

TL;DR: The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory as mentioned in this paper, and the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by "structure" versus "process" and institutions.
Journal ArticleDOI

Rationalist explanations for war

TL;DR: The authors show that there will exist negotiated settlements that rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight under very broad conditions, under the assumption that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it.
Book ChapterDOI

Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that bipolarity, an equal military balance, and nuclear weapons have fostered the post-World War II order in Europe, and that domestic political factors, not calculations about military power or international economic system, are the principal determinants of peace.
Journal ArticleDOI

Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors modeled international crises as a political "war of attrition" in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate, and found that the side with a stronger domestic audience is always less likely to back down than the side less able to generate audience costs.
Book ChapterDOI

The False Promise of International Institutions

TL;DR: In the post-Cold War era, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions.
References
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Book

The Strategy of Conflict

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a theory of interdependent decision based on the Retarded Science of International Strategy (RSIS) for non-cooperative games and a solution concept for "noncooperative" games.
Book

Perception and misperception in international politics

Robert Jervis
TL;DR: Jervis's work on perception and misperception in foreign policy was a landmark in the application of cognitive psychology to political decision-making as mentioned in this paper, and has been widely used in the literature.
Book

Arms and Influence

TL;DR: In this paper, Schelling argues that military power is not so much exercised as threatened in our world of nuclear weapons, and the exploitation of this power, for good or evil, to preserve peace or to threaten war, is diplomacy-the diplomacy of violence.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Resolution of Conflict

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse the features of one form of conflict, an analysis which they hope will throw light on what sorts of factors conffict resolution must take into account.
Book

Prisoner's Dilemma

TL;DR: The game of prisoner's dilemma by A.W. Tucker has attracted wide attention, doubtless because it has raised doubts about the universal applicability of the so called Sure-thing Principle as a principle of rational decision as mentioned in this paper.