Journal ArticleDOI
Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986
Zeev Maoz,Bruce Russett +1 more
TLDR
In this paper, the authors examine two explanatory models for the relative lack of conflict between democracies: the normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes, and the structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict impossible.Abstract:
Democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as nondemocracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible. Using different data sets of international conflict and a multiplicity of indicators, we find that (1) democracy, in and of itself, has a consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict or escalation in a dyad; (2) both the normative and structural models are supported by the data; and (3) support for the normative model is more robust and consistent.read more
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Posted Content
Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data
Gary King,Langche Zeng +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown that more efficient sampling designs exist for making valid inferences, such as sampling all available events and a tiny fraction of nonevents, which enables scholars to save as much as 99% of their (nonfixed) data collection costs or to collect much more meaningful explanatory variables.
Journal ArticleDOI
Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data
Gary King,Langche Zeng +1 more
TL;DR: The authors study rare events data, binary dependent variables with dozens to thousands of times fewer events than zeros (nonevents) and recommend corrections that outperform existing methods and change the estimates of absolute and relative risks by as much as some estimated effects reported in the literature.
Journal ArticleDOI
Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable
TL;DR: In this article, a simple diagnostic for temporal dependence and a simple remedy based on the idea that binary dependent variable (BTSCS) data are identical to grouped duration data is proposed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data
Keith Jaggers,Ted Robert Gurr +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors report and analyze an updated version of the widely-used Polity II dataset, consisting of annual indicators of institutional democracy and autocracy for 161 states spanning the years from 1946 through 1994.
Journal ArticleDOI
Seizing the Middle Ground:: Constructivism in World Politics
TL;DR: In recent years, a great deal has been written about a ''constructivist'' approach in International Relations, which argues that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures as mentioned in this paper, which is called Constructive International Relations (CIR).
References
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Book
The Evolution of Cooperation
TL;DR: In this paper, a model based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game was developed for cooperation in organisms, and the results of a computer tournament showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Evolution of Cooperation
R. B. Greene,Robert Axelrod +1 more
TL;DR: A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
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The analysis of cross-classified categorical data
TL;DR: The second edition has been updated and revised, with more emphasis on logic and logistic response properties and on the small-sample behavior of chi-square statistics as mentioned in this paper, and includes 40 to 50 new problems with most having separate data sheets.
Book ChapterDOI
Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that bipolarity, an equal military balance, and nuclear weapons have fostered the post-World War II order in Europe, and that domestic political factors, not calculations about military power or international economic system, are the principal determinants of peace.
Journal ArticleDOI
An evolutionary approach to norms
TL;DR: In this article, the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality is analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strategies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies.