(1996). All the world's a stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 433-453.

http://tedsider.org/papers/all_the_worlds_a_stage.pdf

On being in the same place at the same time

All the world's a stage

There is a well-known argument from Leibniz’s Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this ‘opacity’ defence has intolerable consequences for the functioning of our language and that the original argument should therefore be allowed to stand.

The Non‐Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter

INTRODUCTION PART ONE DL FOUNDATIONS, OLD AND NEW 1 Individualism: a recipe for warding off " 2 Getting to the consensus view 3 Seeds of doubt 4 Another puzzle: a competing consensus 5 Tools and terminology 6 Grounding and anchoring 7 Case study: laws as frame principles 8 Two kinds of individualism 9 Against conjunctivism PART TWO DL GROUPS AND THE FAILURE OF INDIVIDUALISM 10 Groups and constitution 11 Simple facts about groups 12 The identity of groups 13 Kinds of groups 14 Group attitudes: patterns of grounding 15 Group action: more than member action 16 Group intention 17 Other theories I: social integrate models 18 Other theories II: status models LOOKING AHEAD Acknowledgements Bibliography Index

https://philpapers.org/archive/EPSTAT.pdf

The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences

background

/pdf/spatial-reasoning-and-ontology-parts-wholes-and-locations-ir0lpbh9os.pdf

Spatial Reasoning and Ontology: Parts, Wholes, and Locations

It is common for the whole of one object and the whole of another to occupy just the same place at just the same time. So say many identity theorists, partly on the basis of reasoning such as this: Before us lies a copper statue. In just the same place, presumably, there is some copper and a piece of copper. Now what are the relations among the statue, the copper, and the piece of copper? They can't all be the same one thing, since they differ in their persistence conditions. Suppose that tomorrow we are going to hammer the statue flat and then break what remains into bits. Both the copper and the piece of copper, but not the statue, will survive the flattening. And the copper, but not the piece of copper, will survive the subsequent shattering. So before us there are three objects occupying just the same place. Or if the copper is not an object, there are two such objects: the statue and the piece of copper. Of course, it is only because the statue and the piece of copper consist of the same particles of matter that they are able to occupy the same place. Supporters of such reasoning propose that the commonsense principle of one material object to a place be restricted so as to apply only to objects of the same sort. They would allow place-sharing by a statue and a piece of copper, although not by two statues or by two pieces of copper. Let's reserve the term 'coincidence' and its cognates for cases in which the whole of one object wholly occupies the place wholly and simultaneously occupied by the whole of another. Note that as here defined, 'coincidence' denotes an irreflexive relationship. We will use 'coextension' and its cognates for the corresponding reflexive relationship.

/pdf/preserving-the-principle-of-one-object-to-a-place-a-novel-uay514hhyp.pdf

On being in the same place at the same time

Citations

All the world's a stage

The Non‐Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter

The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences

Spatial Reasoning and Ontology: Parts, Wholes, and Locations

Preserving the principle of one object to a place: A novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions

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Persons and bodies : a constitution view

Sameness and substance

Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time