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On the private provision of public goods

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TLDR
In this article, the authors consider a general model of non-cooperative provision of a public good and show that there is always a unique Nash equilibrium in the model and characterize the properties and the comparative statics of the equilibrium.
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This article is published in Journal of Public Economics.The article was published on 1986-02-01 and is currently open access. It has received 2237 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Public good & Public goods game.

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Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public “bad” economies

TL;DR: In this paper, a general equilibrium framework is used to analyze the equilibrium provision of a pure public bad commodity (for example pollution), and the main results for economies with heterogeneous agents state that the asymptotic Lindahl allocation of the public bad is the null allocation.
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The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-pay Auction

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate a group all-pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group-specific public good.
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International environmental policy and poverty alleviation

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate how alternative national and international policies and circumstances impact the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) contribution to sustainable development and the pursuit of poverty eradication goals in developing countries.
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Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes

TL;DR: This paper showed that an expansion of group size exacerbates free-riding tendencies as long as private consumption and the public good are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes, and generalized a previous Cobb-Douglas example with respect to preferences and asymmetric equilibria.
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On the Private Provision of Two or More Public Goods

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods, and explore the new possibilities that arise in this setting, and show that, when there are many pub- lic goods, voluntary contribution equilibrium typically generates, not only too low a level of public goods provision, but also the wrong mix of goods.
References
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Book

A Treatise on the Family

TL;DR: The Enlarged Edition as mentioned in this paper provides an overview of the evolution of the family and the state Bibliography Index. But it does not discuss the relationship between fertility and the division of labor in families.
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Are Government Bonds Net Wealth

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the effects of different types of intergenerational transfer schemes on the stock of public debt in the context of an overlapping-generations model and show that finite lives will not be relevant to the capitalization of future tax liabilities so long as current generations are connected to future generations by a chain of operative inter-generational transfers.
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Economists free ride, does anyone else?: Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV

TL;DR: In this article, closely related experiments testing the free rider hypothesis under different conditions, and sampling various sub-populations, are reported, and results question the empirical validity and generality of a strong version of the hypothesis.
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The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income

TL;DR: When a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is unaffected by a redistribution of income as discussed by the authors, regardless of differences in individual preferences and despite differences in marginal propensities to contribute to the public good.