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Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth☆
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TLDR
In this article, the authors examine the wealth effects surrounding outside director appointments and find no clear evidence that outside directors of any particular occupation are more or less valuable than others, consistent with the hypothesis that outside board members are chosen in the interest of shareholders.Citations
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Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the presence of a defense is negatively related to subsequent acquisition likelihood, yet has no impact on takeover premiums for firms that are acquired, and suggest that managers shift the cost of takeover protection onto non-managerial shareholders.
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Family ownership, board independence and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from Hong Kong
Gerald Chau,Sidney J. Gray +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and levels of family ownership and board independence including the influence of an independent chairman, and found that the appointment of independent non-executive directors is positively associated with higher voluntary disclosure.
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Evaluating Boards of Directors: What Constitutes a Good Corporate Board?
TL;DR: In this paper, a comparison between academic literature, corporate governance rating systems and field research into board practices is made to identify what constitutes a good board of directors, and the results highlight the need for a better understanding of all elements that determine board effectiveness.
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Board Connections and M&A Transactions
Ye Cai,Merih Sevilir +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine M&A transactions between firms with current board connections and find that acquirers obtain higher announcement returns in transactions with a first-degree connection where the acquirer and the target share a common director.
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Corporate governance and agency conflicts
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate whether corporate governance is associated with the level of agency conflicts in firms and find that firms with greater agency conflicts have better governance mechanisms in place, particularly those related to the board, audit committee, and auditor.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Separation of ownership and control
Eugene F. Fama,Michael C. Jensen +1 more
TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
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Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
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Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine properties of daily stock returns and how the particular characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies and show that recognition of autocorrelation in daily excess returns and changes in their variance conditional on an event can sometimes be advantageous.
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Outside directors and CEO turnover
TL;DR: This article examined the relation between the monitoring of CEOs by inside and outside directors and CEO resignations using stock returns and earnings changes as measures of prior performance, and found that there is a stronger association between prior performance and the probability of a resignation.
Posted Content
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of aligning managers' interests with those of investors and offer agency-cost explanations of dividends, and conclude that "these two lines of inquiry rarely meet." Yet logically any dividend policy should be designed to minimize the sum of capital, agency and taxation costs.