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Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth☆

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TLDR
In this article, the authors examine the wealth effects surrounding outside director appointments and find no clear evidence that outside directors of any particular occupation are more or less valuable than others, consistent with the hypothesis that outside board members are chosen in the interest of shareholders.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 1990-08-01. It has received 2031 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Shareholder & Independence.

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Factors Associated with the Development of Board Sub-committees

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the factors associated with the presence of board sub-committees, specifically audit, remuneration and nomination committees, and found that audit committee presence is positively associated with Big 6 auditors and the number of intercorporate relationships of the directors of the board.
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Corporate governance and the value-relevance of accounting information: evidence from Australia

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the relationship between corporate governance and the value relevance of accounting information in Australia and found that firms with strong governance structure exhibit higher value relevance in accounting information.
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Stock market reaction to the appointment of outside directors

TL;DR: In this article, the UK stock market's reaction to the appointment of outside non-executive board members was examined using a sample of 714 appointments reported by EXTEL between 1 July, 1993 and 31 December, 1996, showing that the share price reaction to outside director appointments is significantly more favourable when board ownership is low and the appointee possesses strong ex ante monitoring incentives.
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Foreign investors and corporate governance in Korea

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate whether poor corporate governance negatively affects equity participation of foreign investors and investigate whether firm-level efforts for better corporate governance attract more foreign investments, finding that foreign ownership is negatively associated with firms' ownership concentration but is positively associated with companies' efforts to improve corporate governance.
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The determinants of CEO compensation: Rent extraction or labour demand?

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated whether rent extraction or labour demand explains CEO compensation level in Australia and found that the rent extraction is not economically significant and does not persist beyond one year.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Separation of ownership and control

TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
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Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
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Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine properties of daily stock returns and how the particular characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies and show that recognition of autocorrelation in daily excess returns and changes in their variance conditional on an event can sometimes be advantageous.
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Outside directors and CEO turnover

TL;DR: This article examined the relation between the monitoring of CEOs by inside and outside directors and CEO resignations using stock returns and earnings changes as measures of prior performance, and found that there is a stronger association between prior performance and the probability of a resignation.
Posted Content

Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of aligning managers' interests with those of investors and offer agency-cost explanations of dividends, and conclude that "these two lines of inquiry rarely meet." Yet logically any dividend policy should be designed to minimize the sum of capital, agency and taxation costs.
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