Journal ArticleDOI
Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth☆
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In this article, the authors examine the wealth effects surrounding outside director appointments and find no clear evidence that outside directors of any particular occupation are more or less valuable than others, consistent with the hypothesis that outside board members are chosen in the interest of shareholders.Citations
More filters
Journal Article
Business Case for Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Kenya
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated business case of corporate transparency in Kenya and found that indeed corporate transparency has a positive and significant effect on firm performance, which has important policy implications on corporate disclosures in Kenya.
Journal ArticleDOI
Activism and the Shift to Annual Director Elections
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine a sample of 465 firms that switch from staggered boards to annual elections between 2003 and 2010 and find that firms are substantially more likely to be acquired in the ensuing two years when the shift to annual election is pushed by activist hedge funds.
Journal ArticleDOI
CEO Tenure, Board Composition, and Regulation
TL;DR: This article examined the effect of deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s on the size of the board of directors, its composition, and on CEO tenure, and found that deregulation increased the hazard rate or reduced the tenure of CEOs.
Posted Content
The Effects of Experience, Ownership, and Knowledge on IPO Survival: Evidence from the Neuer Markt
TL;DR: In this article, the implications of ownership and its induced incentives on firm performance for young and high-tech firms were studied using a unique data set of all 341 firms listed on the Neuer Markt, the German counterpart of the NASDAQ.
Journal ArticleDOI
Sustainable corporate governance and new auditing issues: a preliminary empirical evidence on key audit matters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the relationship between the quality of internal corporate governance mechanisms and the audit issues disclosed by external auditors in their report, assuming the beneficial effect related to the adoption of a sustainable corporate governance system.
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Separation of ownership and control
Eugene F. Fama,Michael C. Jensen +1 more
TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Journal ArticleDOI
Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine properties of daily stock returns and how the particular characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies and show that recognition of autocorrelation in daily excess returns and changes in their variance conditional on an event can sometimes be advantageous.
Journal ArticleDOI
Outside directors and CEO turnover
TL;DR: This article examined the relation between the monitoring of CEOs by inside and outside directors and CEO resignations using stock returns and earnings changes as measures of prior performance, and found that there is a stronger association between prior performance and the probability of a resignation.
Posted Content
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of aligning managers' interests with those of investors and offer agency-cost explanations of dividends, and conclude that "these two lines of inquiry rarely meet." Yet logically any dividend policy should be designed to minimize the sum of capital, agency and taxation costs.