Journal ArticleDOI
Potential, Value, and Consistency.
Sergiu Hart,Andreu Mas-Colell +1 more
TLDR
In this article, a real-valued function P is defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: in every game, the marginal contributions of all players (according to P) are efficient (i.e., add up to the worth of the grand coalition).Abstract:
Let P be a real-valued function defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: In every game, the marginal contributions of all players (according to P) are efficient (i.e., add up to the worth of the grand coalition). It is proved that there exists just one such function P--called the potential--and moreover that the resulting payoff vector coincides with the Shapley value. The potential approach yields other characterizations for the value; in particular, in terms of a new internal consistency property. Further results deal with weighted values and with the nontransferable utility case. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts
Lars Stole,Jeffrey Zwiebel +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees is presented, and equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo-classical (non-bargaining) firm's profits and a generalization of Shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game.
Journal ArticleDOI
Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
TL;DR: This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems as a group of agents having claims on a resource but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims.
Book
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
TL;DR: This talk introduces basic concepts from cooperative game theory, and in particular the key solution concepts: the core and the Shapley value, and introduces the key issues that arise if one is to consider the cooperative games in a computational setting.
Journal ArticleDOI
Bargaining and Value
Sergiu Hart,Andreu Mas-Colell +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of non-cooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form, is presented and analyzed, which leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in a general nontransferable utility case.
Journal ArticleDOI
Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency
Hervé Moulin,Scott Shenker +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them, and characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanism and find that the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
A Value for n-person Games
TL;DR: In this paper, an examination of elementary properties of a value for the essential case is presented, which is deduced from a set of three axioms, having simple intuitive interpretations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
TL;DR: For three different bankruptcy problems, the 2000-year old Babylonian Talmud prescribes solutions that equal precisely the nucleoli of the corresponding coalitional games, and a rationale for these solutions that is independent of game theory is given in this article.
Book
Values of Non-Atomic Games
TL;DR: The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press as mentioned in this paper, and these editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions.
Journal ArticleDOI
The kernel of a cooperative game
Morton Davis,Michael Maschler +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defined the kernel of a cooperative n-person game and applied it to the 3-person games, to the 4-person constant-sum games and to games in which only the n and the (n-1)-person coalitions are allowed to be non-flat.
Posted Content
Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study allocation rules, which are functions mapping conference structures to payoff allocations, and describe how the outcome of a cooperative game might depend on which groups of players hold cooperative planning conferences.