Price of anarchy in electric vehicle charging control games: When Nash equilibria achieve social welfare
TLDR
In this paper, the authors considered the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints.About:
This article is published in Automatica.The article was published on 2018-10-01 and is currently open access. It has received 34 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Price of anarchy & Nash equilibrium.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Continuous-Time Integral Dynamics for a Class of Aggregative Games With Coupling Constraints
TL;DR: This work proposes simple semidecentralized integral dynamics and proves their global asymptotic convergence to a variational generalized aggregative or Nash equilibrium based on Lyapunov arguments and invariance techniques for differential inclusions.
Journal Article
Worst-case equilibria
TL;DR: In a system where noncooperative agents share a common resource, the price of anarchy is proposed, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, as a measure of the effectiveness of the system.
Journal ArticleDOI
Optimal deadline scheduling for electric vehicle charging with energy storage and random supply
TL;DR: A new methodological approach is proposed to establish full characterizations of an optimal scheduling policy that enable the development of scalable computational approaches and achieves close-to-optimal performance in numerical experiments with real-world electricity pricing and solar generation data.
Posted Content
A Douglas-Rachford splitting for semi-decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in Monotone Aggregative Games.
TL;DR: This work addresses the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a population of agents playing aggregative games with affine coupling constraints and designs a single-layer, fixed-step algorithm with convergence guarantee for general (non cocoercive, non-strictly) monotone aggregation games.
Journal ArticleDOI
Probably Approximately Correct Nash Equilibrium Learning
Filiberto Fele,Kostas Margellos +1 more
TL;DR: This work considers a multi-agent noncooperative game with agents' objective functions being affected by uncertainty, and accompanies the computed Nash equilibrium with a priori and a posteriori probabilistic robustness certificates, providing confidence that the computed equilibrium remains unaffected when a new uncertainty realization is encountered.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Price-Based Coordinated Aggregation of Networked Distributed Energy Resources
TL;DR: A distributed algorithm is proposed that enables the DERs to seek this Nash equilibrium and relies on simple computations using local information acquired through exchange of information with neighboring DDERs.
Journal ArticleDOI
Integrated Power Management of Data Centers and Electric Vehicles for Energy and Regulation Market Participation
TL;DR: A two-layer hierarchical power management framework is proposed, which enables a systematic design of both the tracking control and market planning problems and outperforms other designs that manage different regulation assets separately.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
On aggregative and mean field games with applications to electricity markets
TL;DR: An algorithm is presented that converges to the Nash equilibrium in a decentralized fashion with provable guarantees for managing the charging of a large fleet of plug-in electric vehicles.
Journal ArticleDOI
Efficiency-Risk Tradeoffs in Electricity Markets with Dynamic Demand Response
TL;DR: This work examines in an abstract framework how a tradeoff between efficiency and risk arises under different market architectures and provides a convex characterization of the Pareto front of system performance measures, which serves as a benchmark of the tradeoffs for the system operator to evaluate the pricing rules.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Uniform and complex bids for demand response and wind generation scheduling in multi-period linked transmission and distribution markets
TL;DR: The paper's contribution is the proposal of tractable complex bid rules that allow market participants to reveal their true inter temporal utility of consumption and their net revenue from wind generation, and enable the market operator to compute the actual Nash equilibrium in a single solution of the market clearing algorithm.
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