Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
Attila Szolnoki,Matjaz Perc +1 more
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It is revealed that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators.Abstract:
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictive impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.read more
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Evolution and the Theory of Games
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Journal ArticleDOI
Coevolutionary games--a mini review.
Matjaz Perc,Attila Szolnoki +1 more
TL;DR: A review of recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject can be found in this article.
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Evolutionary game theory: temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics
TL;DR: In this paper, a review of non-mean-field effects in evolutionary game dynamics is presented, focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared to the outcome of replicator dynamics.
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Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics
TL;DR: This review discusses temporal and spatial effects focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared to the outcome of replicator dynamics, and the hypothesis of linearity and its relation to the choice of the rule for strategy update is analyzed.
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Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed new universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength, and proved universality by showing that the conditions for an ESS and the expressions for the internal equilibriums in an infinite, well-mixed population subjected to any of the five reciprocity mechanisms depend only on the new scaling parameters.
References
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Book
The Evolution of Cooperation
TL;DR: In this paper, a model based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game was developed for cooperation in organisms, and the results of a computer tournament showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Evolution of Cooperation
R. B. Greene,Robert Axelrod +1 more
TL;DR: A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Book
Evolution and the Theory of Games
TL;DR: A modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts, was proposed in this paper.
Book
Evolutionary games and population dynamics
Josef Hofbauer,Karl Sigmund +1 more
TL;DR: In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities.
Journal ArticleDOI
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
Michael A. Nowak,Robert M. May +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the consequences of placing players in a two-dimensional spatial array: in each round, every individual 'plays the game' with the immediate neighbours; after this, each site is occupied either by its original owner or by one of the neighbours, depending on who scores the highest total in that round; and so to the next round of the game.