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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation

Michael A. Nowak
- 08 Dec 2006 - 
- Vol. 314, Iss: 5805, pp 1560-1563
TLDR
Five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation are discussed: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocities, network reciprocation, group selection, and group selection.
Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI

Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response.

Jay J. Van Bavel, +42 more
TL;DR: Evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics is discussed, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping.
Journal ArticleDOI

The structure and dynamics of multilayer networks

TL;DR: This work offers a comprehensive review on both structural and dynamical organization of graphs made of diverse relationships (layers) between its constituents, and cover several relevant issues, from a full redefinition of the basic structural measures, to understanding how the multilayer nature of the network affects processes and dynamics.
Journal ArticleDOI

Evolutionary games on graphs

György Szabó, +1 more
- 01 Jul 2007 - 
TL;DR: The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.
Book ChapterDOI

Evolution and the Theory of Games

TL;DR: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females, and a troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young.
References
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Book

The Evolution of Cooperation

TL;DR: In this paper, a model based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game was developed for cooperation in organisms, and the results of a computer tournament showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. I

TL;DR: A genetical mathematical model is described which allows for interactions between relatives on one another's fitness and a quantity is found which incorporates the maximizing property of Darwinian fitness, named “inclusive fitness”.
Book

The Selfish Gene

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors take up the concepts of altruistic and selfish behaviour; the genetical definition of selfish interest; the evolution of aggressive behaviour; kinship theory; sex ratio theory; reciprocal altruism; deceit; and the natural selection of sex differences.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Evolution of Cooperation

TL;DR: A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

TL;DR: In this paper, a model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior, and the model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the system.