Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy
Volume 6 Number 2 Article 2
4-1-1980
Psychotherapy and Religious Values Psychotherapy and Religious Values
Allen E. Bergin
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: No. 2 , Article 2.
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PSYCHOTHERAPY
AND
RELIGIOUS VALUES
By
Allen E. Bergin
..
Presented
at
Values
and
Human
Behavior Insititute, Brigham Young University
This article is reprintedfrom th Journal
of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 1980
Vol.
48,
No.1,
95-105.
It
is
an
abridged
sythesis
of
several lectures he delivered
in
symposia on the outcome
of
therapy
Psychotherapy sponsored
by
the Institute
for
the Study
of
Human Knowledge, the
University
of
Southern California, Col/ege
of
Continuing Education and Psychology
Department, the Albert Einstein Medical
Col/ege, and the European Conference
of
the Scoiety
fro
Psychotherapy Research
(delivered
in
San Francisco,
Los
Angeles,
New York and Oxford, England,
in
January, February,
April
and July
1979,
respectively).
Brother Bergin expresses gratitude to
Vic-
tor Brown, Truman Madsen, Spencer
Palmer,
Jeff
Bradshaw, and Karl White
for
their helpful suggestions. He also indicates
that he does
not
take credit
for
these ideas,
but
recognizes that they are inherent
in
the
Gospel. He also expresses thefeeling that the
reason his lectures have been so widely and
favorbly received
is that so many people
everywhere respect these values.
We
are
grateful to him
for
expressing them so clear-
ly and eloquently!
-Ed
The importance ofvalues. particularly religious ones.
has recently become a more salient issue in psychology.
The pendulum is swinging away from
the
naturalism.
agnosticism. and humanism
that
have dominated
the
field for most of this century.
There
are more reasons
for this
than
can
be
documented here.
but
a sampling
illustrates
the
point:
1. Science has lost its authority as the dominating
source of truth it once was. This change is both
reflected
in
and stimulated by analyses
that
reveal
science to
be
an intuitive
and
value-laden cultural form
(Kuhn. 1970; Polanyi. 1962). The ecological. social.
and
political consequences ofscience and technology are no
longer necessarily viewed as progress. Although a
belief
in
the
value of
the
scientific method appropriately
persists.
there
is
widespread
disillusionment with the
way it has
been
used
and
a loss of faith in it as the cure
for human ills.
*Brother Bergin
is Professor
of
Psychology
at
BYU and
President-elect
of
AMCAP
Copyright 1980
by
American Psychological Associa-
tion. Reprinted
by
permission.
3
2. Psychology in particular
has
been
dealt blows to its
status
as a source ofauthority for
human
action
because
of its obsession with
"methodolatry"
(Bakan. 1972) its
limited effectiveness in producing practical results, its
conceptual incoherence, and its alienation from
the
mainstreams
of
the
culture (Campbell, 1975;
Hogan.
1979).
During a long period of religious indifference in
Western
civilization. the behavioral sciences rose to a
crest
of
prominence as a potential alternative source
of
answers
to
basic life questions (London. 1964).
Enrollments
in
psychology
classes
reached
an
unparalleled peak.
but
our promises were
defeated
by
our premises. A psychology dominated by mechanistic
thought
and
ethical
naturalism
has proved insufficient.
and
interest
is declining. A corollary of this
trend
is
the
series
of
searing
professional
critiques
of
the
assumptions on which
the
field
rests
(Braginsky &
Braginsky. 1974; Collins. 1977; Kitchener. 1980:
Mvers. 1978).
3.
Modern times ha\'e
spawned
anxiety. alienation.
violence. selfishness (Kanfer. 1979). and depression
(Klerman. 1979):
but
the
human
spirit
appears
irrespressible. People
want
something more. The
spiritual and social failures
of
many organized religious
systems have
been
followed by
the
failures of
nonreligious
approaches.
This
seems
to
have
stimulated renewed hope
in
spiritual
phenomena.
Some
of this. as manifested in the proliferation of cults.
magic. superstitions. coerci\'e practices. and emotiona-
lism. indicates the negatiYe possibilities in the trend;
but the rising prominence of thoughtful and rigorous
attempts
to
restore a spiritual perspective to analyses of
personality.
the
human
condition. and even science
itselfrepresent
the positive possibilities (Collins. 1977:
M
verso
1978: Tart. 1977).
4.
Psychologists
are
being
influenced by the forces of
this developing Zeitgeist and are
part
of it. The
emergence
of
studies
of consciousness
and
cognition.
which gre\\" out of disillusionment with mechanistic
behaviorism
and
the growth
of
humanistic psychology.
has
set
the
stage
for a new examination of
the
possibility that presently unobservable realities -
namely. spiritual forces -
are
at work in
human
behavior.
Rogers (1973) posed this radical development as
follows:
There
may
be
a few who will
dare
to
investigate the possibility
that
there
is a
AMCAP JOURNAL/APRIL 1980
lawful reality which is not open to our five
senses; a reality in which
present,
past,
and
future
are
intermingled, in which space is
not a barrier
and
time has dispapeared
....
It
is
one
of
the most exciting challenges posed
to psychology. (p. 386)
Although
there
has
always
been
a keen
interest
in
such
matters
among a minority
of
thinkers
and
practitioners (Allport, 1950;
James,
1902;
Jung,
1958;
the pastoral counseling field, etc.), they have not
substantially influenced
mainstream
psychology. But
the
present
phenomenon
has
all
the
aspects
of
a
broad-based movement with a building momentum.
This
is
indicated
by
an
explosion
of
rigorous
transcendental meditation
research,
the
organization
and rapid growth
of
the
American Psychological
Association's Division
36 (Psychologists
Interested
in
Religious Issues, which
sponsored
nearly
70
papers
at
the
1979 national convention),
the
publication
of
new
journals with overtly spiritual contents, such as
the
journal
of
Judaism
and
Psychology
and
the
Journal
of
Theology
and
Psychology.
and
the
emergence
of
new
specialized, religious professional foci, such as
the
Association
of
Mormon Counselors
and
Psychothera-
pists.
the
Christian
Association
for Psychological
Studies,
and
so on.
These
developments
build
in
part
on
the
long-standing
but
insufficiently recognized work in
the
psychology
of
religion
represented
by
various
organizations (e.g., Society for
the
Scientific Study
of
Religion. American Catholic Psychological Associa-
tion). journals
(e.g
..
Review
of
Religious Research),
and
individuals like Clark, Dittes. Spilka, Strunk,
and
others (cf. FeifeI. 1958; Malony, 1977; Strommen,
1971); however.
the
newer
positions
are
more explicitly
proreligious
and
are
not
deferent
to
mainstream
psychology.
The
trend
is
therefore
also manifested by
the
publication
of
straightforward religious psychologies by
academicians such as
Jeeves
(1976), Collins (1977),
Peck (1978), Vitz (1977),
and
Myers (1978)
and
of
more
wide-open values analyses (Feinstein,
1979; ·Frank.
1977).
Even
textbooks
are
slowly
beginning
to
introduce
these
formerly taboo considerations. In
previous years basic psychology texts rarely
mentioned
religious
phenomena.
as
though
the
psychology
and
sociology
of
religion
literature
did not exist. But
the
new edition
of
the
leading introductory text (Hilgard,
Atkinson,
& Atkinson, 1979) contains a small section
called
"The
Miraculous".
Although
the
subject is still
interpreted
naturalisticaHy, its inclusion does mark a
change in
response
to
changing
views.
Values
and
Psychotherapy
These
shifting conceptual orientations are especiaHy
manifest
in
the
field
of
psychotherapy. in which
the
value
of
therapy
and
the
values
that
prevade
its
processes have become topics
of
scrutiny by both
professionals (Lowe,
1976; Smith, Glass, & Miller, in
press; Szasz,
1978)
and
the
public (Gross, 1978).
In what foHows,
these
issues
are analyzed, as they
AMCAP JOURNAL/APRIL 1980
4
pertain to spiritual values, in
terms
of
six
theses.
Thesis 1: Values are an inevitable
and
pervasive
part
of
psychotherapy. As an applied field, psychotherapy is
directed toward practical goals
that
are
selected in
value
terms.
It
is even necessary when establishing
criteria for
measuring
therapeutic
change to decide, on
a value basis,
what
changes
are
desirable. This
necessarily
requires
a philosophy
of
human
nature
that
guides
the
selection
of
measurements
and
the
setting
of
priorities
regarding
change. Strupp, Hadley,
and
Gomes-Schwartz (1977)
argued
that
there
are at
least
three
possibly
divergent
value sy:;lems
a,
play in such
decisions - those
of
the
client,
the
clinician,
and
the
community at large. They
stated
that
though
there
is no
consensus
regarding
conceptions
of
mental health, a
jU9gment
must
always
be
made
in relation to some
iffiplicit
or
explicit
standard,
which
presupposes
a
definition
of
what is
better
or worse. They
asked
that
we consider
the
foHowing:
If,
following
psychotherapy,
a
patient
manifests increased self-assertion coupled
with
abrasiveness,
is this good
or
a poor
therapy
outcome?
...
If
... a
patient
obtains a
divorce. is this to
be
regarded
as
a desirable
or an
undesirable
change? A
patient
may
turn
from homosexualilty to heterosexuality
or he may become more accepting
of
either;
an ambitious, striving
person
may
abandon
previously valued goals
and
become more
placid
(e.g.,
in primal
therapy).
How
are
such
changes
to
be
evaluated? (Strupp
et
al.. 1977, pp. 92-93).
Equally
important
is
the
fact
that
in
increasing
number,
patients
enter
psychotherapy not for
the
cure
of
traditional
"symptoms"
but
(at
least
ostensibly) for
the
purpose
of
finding
meaning
in
their
lives. for
actualizing themselves. or for maximizing
their potential. (Strupp
et
aI., 1977, p. 93).
Conseq
uently
...
every
aspect
of
psychotherapy
presupposes
some implicit moral
doctrine"
(London,
1964. p. 6). Lowe's (1976)
treatise
on value orientations
in
counseling
and
psychotherapy
reveals
with
pains-takingclarity
the
philosophical choices on which
the
widely
divergent
approaches
to intervention hinge.
He
argued
cogently
that
everything
from behavioral
technology to community consultation is intricately
inter-woven with secularized moral systems,
and
he
supported
London's (1964)
thesis
that
psychotherapists
constitute a secular priesthood
that
purports
to
establish
standards
of
good
living.
Techniques
are
thus
a
means
for mediating
the
value
influence
intended
by
the
therapist.
It
is inevitable
that
the
therapist
be
such a moral agent. The
danger
is in
ignoring
the
reality
that
we
do this, for
then
patient,
therapist,
and
community neither
agree
on goals nor
efficiently work toward them. A correlated
danger
is
that
therapists,
as
secular moralists, may promote
changes not valued by
the
client
or
the
community,
and
in this sense, if
there
is not some consensus
and
openness about what is
being
done,
the
therapists may
be unethical or su1;Jversive.
The
impossibility
of
a
value-free
therapy
is
demonstrated by certain data. I allude to
just
one of
many iIlustrations
that
might
be
cited. Carl Rogers
personally values
the
freedom of
the
individual
and
attempts
to promote
the
free expression
of
each client.
However, two
independent
studies done a decade
apart
(Murray, 1956; Truax, 1966) showed
that
Carl Rogers
systematically rewarded
and
punished
expressions
that
he liked
and
did not like in
the
verbal behavior
of
clients. His values significantly regulated
the
structure
and
content
of
therapeutic sessions as well as their
outcomes
(cf. Bergin, 1971).
If
a person who intends to
be
nondirective cannot be.
then
it is likely
that
the
rest
of
us cannot either.
Similarly, when we do reserach with so-called
objective criteria. we select
them
in
terms
of subjective
value
judgments.
which is one reason we haye so much
difficulty in agreeing on
the
results
of
psychotherapy
outcome
studies.
If
neither
practitioners
nor
researchers can
be
nondirective,
then
they
must
accept
certain realities about
the
influence they have. A
value-free, approach
is
Impossible.
Thesis 2: Not only do theories. techniques.
and
criteria reveal
pervasive
value
judgments
but
outcome
data comparing
the
effects
of
diverse techniques show
that
non-technical.
value-laden
factors
pervade
professional change processes. Comparative studies
reveal
few
differences
across
techniques.
thus
suggesting that non-technical or personal variables
account for much of
the
change. Smith
et
al. (in press)
in analyzing 475 outcome studies, were able to attribute
only a small
percentage
of outcome variance to
technique factors. Among the 475 studies were many
that included supposedly technical behavior therapy
procedures. The lack of technique differences
thrusts
value questions upon us because change appears to
be
a function
of
common
human
interactions, including
personal and belief
factors-the
so-called nonspecific
or common ingredients
that
cut across therapies
and
that may
be
the
core of therapeutic change (Bergin &
Lambert, 1978; Frank. 1961, 1973).
Thesis 3: Two broad classes
of
values are dominant in
the
mental
health professions. Both exclude religious
values. and both establish goals
for
change that
frequently
clash with theistic
systems
of
belief
The
first of
these
can
be
called clinical pragmatism. Clinical
pragmatism is
espoused
particuarly by psychiatrists,
nurses, behavior therapists,
and
public agencies.
It
.consists of straightforward implementation of
the
values of
the
dominant social system. In other words,
the
clinical operation functions within the system.
It
does not ordinarily question
the
system,
but
tries to
make
the
system work.
It
is centered, then, on
diminishing pathologies or disturbances, as defined by
the
clinician as an
agent
of
the
culture. This
means
adherence to such objectives as reducing anxiety,
relieving depression, resolving guilt, suppressing
5
deviation, controlling bizarreness, smoothing confl.ict,
diluting obsessiveness,
and
so forth. The
~edlcal
origins ofthis system
are
clear.
It
is pathology
onented.
Health is defined
as
the
absence of pathology.
Pathology is
that
which disturbs
the
person or those in
the
environment.
The
clinician
then
forms an alliance
with
the
person
and
society to eliminate
the
disturbing
behavior.
The second major value system can
be
called
humanistic idealism.
It
is
espoused
particularly by
clinicians with itnerests in philosophy
and
social reform
such as Erich Fromm, Carl Rogers, Rollo May,
and
various
group
and
community
interventionists.
Vaughan's
(1971) study
of
this approach identified
quantifiable
themes
that
define
the
goals of positive
change within this frame of reference. They
are
flexibility
and
self-exploration; independence; active
goal orientation with self-actualization as a core goal;
human dignity
and
self-worth; interpersonal involve-
ment;
truth
and
honesty; happiness;
and
a frame of
orientation or philosophy by which one guides
one's
life. This is different from clinical
pragmatism
in
that
it
appeals to idealists. reformers, creative persons,' .and
sophisticated clients who have significant ego
~trength.
It is less practical, less conforming,
and
harder
to
measure
than
clinical pathology
themes
because.
it
addresses
more directly
broad
issues such
as
what
is
good
and
how life should
be
lived. It
embraces
a social
value
agenda
and
is often critical
of
traditional
systems
of
religious values
that
influence child rearing, social
standards,
and
ultimately.
criteria
of
positive
therapeutic change. Its influence is more prevalent in
private therapy, universities,
and
independent
clinical
centers or reserach institutes,
and
amon.g theologians
and
clinicians
who
espouse
spiritual"'humanism
(Fromm. 1950).
Though clinical
pragmatism
and
humanistic idealism
have appropriate places
as
guiding
structures
for
clinical intervention
and
though I personally
endorse
much
of
their content, they
are
not sufficient to cover
the spectrum of values
pertinent
to human
beings
and
the frameworks within which they function. Noticeably
absent
are theistically
based
values.
Pragmatic and humanistic views manifest a relative
indifference to God.
the
relationship of
human
beings
to God,
and
the possibility
that
spiritual factors
influence behavior. A survey of
the
leading reference
sources
in
the
clinical field reveals little literature on
such subjects, except for naturalistic accounts. An
examination of
30
introductory psychology texts
turned
up no references to
the
possible reality of spiritual
factors. Most did not have
the
words God or religion in
their indexes.
Psychological writers have a tendency to censor or
taboo in a casual
and
sometimes arrogant way
something
that
is sensitive
and
precious to most
human
beings (Campbell. 1975).
As Robert Hogan. new section editor of
the
Journal
of
Personality
and
Social Psychology.
stated
in a
recent
APA
Monitor interview,
Religion is
the
most important social force in
the history;
of
man
....
But in psychology,
anyone who gets involved in
or
tries to talk
AMCAP JOURNAL/APRIL 1980
in an analytic, careful way
about
religion
is
immediately branded a meathead; mystic; an
intuitive, touchy-feely sort
of
moron.
(Hogan, 1979, p.4).
Clinical pragmatism and humanistic
ide~lism
t~us
exclude what is one of
the
largest sub-IdeologIes,
namely religious or theistic approaches espoused by
people 'who believe
in.
God and. try to.
gUi.de
their
behavior
in
terms
of
then
perceptIOn
of
hIS
WIll.
Other
alternatives
are
thus
needed.
Just
as
psychotherapy
has
been enhanced by
the
adoption of
multiple techniques. so also
in
the values
real~~
our
frameworks can be improved by the use of addItIonal
perspectives. .
..
The alternative I wish to
put
forward
IS
a sptrltual
one.
It
might
be
called theistic realism. I propose to
show that this alternative
is
necessary for ethical and
effective help among religious people, who constitute
300/0
to 90% of
the
U.S. population (more than 90%
expressed belief, while about 30% expressed strong
conviction about their belief. American Institute of
Public Opinion.
1978). I also
argue
that
the
values on
which
this
alternative
is
based
are
important
ingredients
in
reforming and rejuvenating our society.
Pragmatic and humanistic values alone, although they
have substantial virtues. are often part of the problem
of our deteriorating society.
What are the alternative values? The first and most
important axiom is that God exists, that human beings
are the creations of God.
and
that there are unseen
spiritual processes by which the link between God
and
humanity
is
maintained.
As
stated in the Book of
Job
(32:8),
There is a spirit
in
man and
the
inspiration
ofthe Almighty giveth them understanding.
Table 1
Theistic Versus Clinical and Humanistic Values
Theistic
God
is
supreme. Humility. acceptance
of
(divine) authority. and
obedience(to the will
of
God) are virtues.
Personal identiy
is
eternal and derived from the divine. Relation-
ship with
God
defines self-worth.
Self-control
in
terms
of
absolute values. Strict morality. Universal
ethics.
Love. affection. and self-transcendence are primary. Service
and
self-sacrifice
are
central to personal growth.
Committed to marriage. fidelity and loyalty. Emphasis
on
pro-
creation and family life as integrative factors.
Personal responsibility for own harmful actions and changes
in
them. Acceptance
of
guilt, suffering,
and
contrition keys to
change. Restitution for harmful effects.
Forgiveness
of
others who cause distress (including parents)
completes the therapeutic restoration
of
self.
Knowledge
by
faith and self-effort. Meaning and purpose
derived from spiritual insight. Intellectual knowledge
inseparable from the emotional
and
spiritual insight.
Intellectual knowledge inseparable from the emotional
and
spiritual. Ecology
of
knowledge.
AMCAP JOURNAL/APRIL 1980
6
This approach, beginning with faith in God, assumes
that spiritual conviction gives values an added power to
influence life.
With respect to such belief. Max Born.
the
physicist.
said,
"There
are two objectionable kinds of believers.
Those who believe the incredible
and
those who believe
that belief
must
be
discarded in favor
of
the
scientific
method"
(cited in Menninger. 1963, p. 374). I
stand
in
opposition to placing
the
scientific method
in
the
place
of God. an attitude akin to Bakan's (1972) notion of
"methodo)atry"
that
has
become common in our
culture.
Abraham Maslow, though viewed
as
a humanist,
expressed
concepts
in
harmony
with
the
views
presented
here. He said,
"It
looks
as
if
there
is a single,
ultimate value for mankind - a far goal toward which
men
strive"
(cited in Goble. 1971. p. 92).
He
believed
that to study human behavior
means
never to ignore
concepts of right
and
wrong:
If
behavioral scientists are to solve human
problems,
the
question of right
and
wrong
behavior
is
essential.
It
is
the
very
essence
of
behavioral science. Psychologists who
advocate moral
and
cultural relativism are
not coming to grips with
the
real problem.
Too
many
behaviorial
scientists
have
rejected not only
the
methods of religion
but
the values
as
well. (Maslow. cited in Goble,
1971. p. 92).
To
quote further.
"Instead
of
cultural relativity, I
am
implying that
there
are basic underlying human
standards
that
are cross
cultural"
(Maslow, cited in
Goble.
1971, p. 92). Maslow advocated
the
notion
of
a
synergistic culture in which
the
values
of
the
group
make demands on
the
individual
that
are
self-fulfilling.
The
val
ues
of
such
a
culture
are
considered
transcendent
and
not relative.
Clinical-Humanistic
Humans
are supreme.
The
self
is
aggrandized.
Autonomy
and
rejection
of
external
authority
are virtues.
Identity
is
ephemeral and mortal. Relationships with others define
self-worth.
Self-expressions in terms
of
relative values. Flexible morality.
Situation Ethics.
Personal needs
and
self-actualization
are
primary. Self-
satisfaction
is
central
to
personal growth.
Open marriage
or
no
marriage. Emphasis
on
self-gratification
or
recreational sex without long-term responsibilities.
Others
arc
responsible for
our
problems
and
changes. Minimizing
guilt
and
relieving suffering before experiencing its meaning.
Apology for
harmful
effects.
Acceptance and expression
of
accusatory feelings arc sufficient.
Knowledge
by
self-effort alone. Meaning and purpose derived
from reason and intellect. Intellectual knowledge for itself.
Isolation
of
Ihe mind from the rest
of
life.