Reinventing grounded theory: some questions about theory, ground and discovery

TLDR: In this paper, it is argued that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions constrain and distort qualitative inquiry, and that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention.

Abstract: Grounded theory's popularity persists after three decades of broad-ranging critique. In this article three problematic notions are discussed—‘theory,’ ‘ground’ and ‘discovery’—which linger in the continuing use and development of grounded theory procedures. It is argued that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions—embodied in continuing reinventions of grounded theory—constrain and distort qualitative inquiry, and that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that ‘ground’ is a misnomer when talking about interpretation and that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention. The procedures admittedly provide signposts for qualitative inquirers, but educational researchers should be wary, for the significance of interpretation, narrative and reflection can be undermined in the procedures of grounded theory.

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University of Birmingham
Reinventing grounded theory: some questions
about theory, ground and discovery
Thomas, Gary; James, D
DOI:
10.1080/01411920600989412
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Thomas, G & James, D 2006, 'Reinventing grounded theory: some questions about theory, ground and
discovery', British Educational Research Journal, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 767.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01411920600989412
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
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REINVENTING GROUNDED THEORY: SOME QUESTIONS
ABOUT THEORY, GROUND AND DISCOVERY
Reference as:
Thomas, G. & James, D. (2006) ―Re-inventing grounded theory: some questions about theory, ground
and discovery‖ British Educational Research Journal, 32, 6, 767–795.
Gary Thomas and
David James
School of Education
University of Birmingham
Birmingham B15 2TT
0121 414 4836
mob: 0770 347 9052
g.thomas.3@bham.ac.uk
Faculty of Education
University of the West of England
Bristol

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REINVENTING GROUNDED THEORY: SOME QUESTIONS
ABOUT THEORY, GROUND AND DISCOVERY
ABSTRACT: Grounded theory‖s popularity persists after three decades of broad-ranging
critique. We discuss here three problematic notions – “theory,” “ground” and “discovery” –
which linger in the continuing use and development of grounded theory procedures. We argue
that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions –
embodied in continuing reinventions of grounded theory – constrain and distort qualitative
inquiry. We argue that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that
“ground” is a misnomer when talking about interpretation and that what ultimately
materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to
invention. The procedures admittedly provide signposts for qualitative inquirers, but
educational researchers should be wary, for the significance of interpretation, narrative and
reflection can be undermined in the procedures of grounded theory.

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REINVENTING GROUNDED THEORY: SOME QUESTIONS
ABOUT THEORY, GROUND AND DISCOVERY
Grounded theory was developed and established nearly forty years ago by Barney Glaser and Anselm
Strauss. Their 1967 book The Discovery of Grounded Theory laid out a set of procedures for the
generation of theory from empirical data. There can be little doubt that it has been a major – perhaps
the major – contributor to the acceptance of the legitimacy of qualitative methods in applied social
research.
The origins and context of this seminal work are important. It was conceived at time when symbolic
interactionism was suffering a decline, partly due to what some saw as its celebration of liberal
individualism, but principally due to pincer-like pressure from, as Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) put
it, “the ―hard‖ methods such as statistical method and structural functionalism on the one hand, and
competition from the ―soft‖ side in the form of ethnomethodology … on the other” (p. 13). Seen
historically, grounded theory represented a resolution of different epistemological positions
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and a
solution to a broader problem about perceptions of the status of qualitatively based knowledge in the
social sciences.
Four decades on, grounded theory continues to be used in a wide range of research settings, and is
especially highly regarded as a method of social analysis in fields such as education and health studies
2
.
Despite much critique, it continues to enjoy great kudos amongst educators, to the extent that its use
can still seemingly validate the publication of a study‖s findings (see, for example, Harry et al, 2005).
Strauss and Corbin (1997) summarize the contemporary status of grounded theory when they say that
grounded theory‖s methods are “… now among the most influential and widely used modes of carrying
out qualitative research when generating theory is the researcher‖s principal aim” (p. vii).
There can be little doubt that Strauss and Corbin are accurate when they make this large assertion. As
Miller and Fredericks (1999) put it, the grounded theory approach has become the “paradigm of
choice” for qualitative researchers in education and other disciplines. And as Denzin (1994, p. 508) has
noted, “The grounded theory perspective is the most widely used qualitative interpretive framework
in the social sciences today.”
Grounded theory, and other techniques of analysis in qualitative inquiry, are bound to be popular,
because they meet a need. For while qualitative inquiry is absolutely valid, it is difficult to do. In
education it may involve talking – as naturally as possible – with students, parents, teachers; it may
entail taking part, watching and listening, in schools and other environments. But when all this is

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done, what comes next? Such ways of doing research can lead to a floating feeling, a lack of direction.
What does one do with one‖s data? Surely one can‖t just talk about it. Grounded theory offers a
solution: a set of procedures, and a means of generating theory. As such, it has become widely used
and its reputation as an accessible and thoroughly explained method in qualitative inquiry has grown
and grown.
The purpose of this article is to challenge the continuing legitimacy of grounded theory and the lofty
place its methods have come to hold in social and institutional analysis. We dispute grounded theory‖s
status as theory, and the assertion that it can be ―discovered‖; we contest its claim to be consistent with
the tenets of qualitative inquiry, and we question its claims to produce better predictive and
explanatory outcomes than other methods.
Certain of these criticisms develop out of the work of others, and it is necessary first to acknowledge
existing critiques of grounded theory and to note our points of similarity and difference with them. In
brief, these criticisms centre on three broad themes: first, that grounded theory oversimplifies complex
meanings and interrelationships in data; second, that it constrains analysis, putting the cart (procedure)
before the horse (interpretation), and third that it depends upon inappropriate models of induction
and asserts from them equally inappropriate claims to explanation and prediction. Let us look at some
of the critical literature which exemplifies this debate, and indicate both our points of agreement and
suggested foci for development.
Layder (1993) identifies four limitations. First, he says, a grounded theory approach has the effect of
highlighting the immediately apparent and observable at the expense of attending to the interweaving
of structural features of social situations with activities. Second, he argues that the focus on the “here
and now of everyday encounters” limits the concept of power that is possible in the approach. Third,
he contends that the development of theory in a grounded theory approach should be more guided by
data than limited by it. And last, he suggests that the insistence that grounded theory should be
recognizable to the people studied (encapsulated in the notions of “fit” and “relevance”) places
unhelpful constraints on analysis because it rules out features and interpretations which they could not
be expected to have considered.
Others, such as Haig (1995), have queried grounded theory‖s reliance on a naïve model of scientific
induction, inappropriate to the tenets of qualitative inquiry. Haig, together with others such as Miller
and Fredericks (1999) point to what one might call the “everydayness” of inductive reasoning. The
thrust of their argument is that this common, everyday induction is better described as “inference to

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What are the contributions in "University of birmingham reinventing grounded theory: some questions about theory, ground and discovery" ?

The authors discuss here three problematic notions – “ theory, ” “ ground ” and “ discovery ” – which linger in the continuing use and development of grounded theory procedures. The authors argue that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that “ ground ” is a misnomer when talking about interpretation and that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention. The procedures admittedly provide signposts for qualitative inquirers, but educational researchers should be wary, for the significance of interpretation, narrative and reflection can be undermined in the procedures of grounded theory. 

Q2. What is the argument that a grounded theory can help to validate?

Their argument is that the success of grounded theory – its success in helping to validate qualitative inquiry – depended on something of a sleight of hand in reasoning about inquiry. 

Q3. What does Ryle say about the inference tickets?

But Ryle goes on to point out that these inference tickets – pointing to causality and its direction – depend for their validity on the quality of the associated fact-finding and reasoning. 

Q4. Why does Charmaz want to continue to interpose an additional element in the process of understanding?

Perhaps because of her allegiance to the tenets of grounded theory, Charmaz seems to want in her most recent version to continue to interpose an additional element in the process of understanding. 

Q5. What is the widely used qualitative interpretive framework in the social sciences today?

And as Denzin (1994, p. 508) has noted, “The grounded theory perspective is the most widely used qualitative interpretive framework in the social sciences today. 

Q6. What is the claim that the professional methodologists armoury contains?

4Especially peculiar and, in their view, objectionable, is the claim that the professional methodologist‖s armoury contains a set of procedures and techniques (such as “saturation,” and “theoretical sampling”) that will transform an understanding of narratives or events into some kind of inductive “theory.”