Journal ArticleDOI
Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games
TLDR
In this article, the authors study a repeated game in which a long-run player without discounting faces another long run player with strict discounting, and the game is perturbed so that there is uncertainty in the patient player's strategy choice: she may be a rational player, but she may also be one of many irrational types who are committed to various repeated game strategies.About:
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 1996-11-01. It has received 44 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Strategy & Repeated game.read more
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MonographDOI
Repeated Games and Reputations
TL;DR: Abreu et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed a foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory, and showed that finite social memory is a necessary condition for a Markov equilibrium in the Prisoners' dilemma.
Journal ArticleDOI
Bargaining and reputation
Dilip Abreu,Faruk Gul +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a reputation-based theory of bargaining is developed to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining "postures" on bargaining outcomes, and a strong "independence of procedures" result is derived: after initial postures have been adopted, the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently.
Journal ArticleDOI
Repeated games with differential time preferences
Ehud Lehrer,Ady Pauzner +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a simple characterization of the sets of Nash and of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games, and show that the set of feasible repeated game payoffs is typically larger than the convex hull of the underlying stage-game payoffs.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Game-theoretic randomization for security patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty
TL;DR: This work presents a general Bayesian Stackelberg game model for security patrolling in dynamic uncertain domains, in which the uncertainty in the execution of patrols is represented using Markov Decision Processes and shows that patrol schedules generated using this approach outperform schedules generated with a previous algorithm that does not consider execution uncertainty.
Journal ArticleDOI
Game-theoretic security patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty and a case study on a real transit system
Francesco Maria Delle Fave,Albert Xin Jiang,Zhengyu Yin,Chao Zhang,Milind Tambe,Sarit Kraus,John P. Sullivan +6 more
TL;DR: This paper presents a novel general Bayesian Stackelberg game model for security resource allocation in dynamic uncertain domains, and presents results from a real-world experiment on Metro trains in Los Angeles validating the MDP-based model, and most importantly, concretely measuring the benefits of SSGs forSecurity resource allocation.
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Posted Content
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed reputation in a game between a patient player and a nonmyopic but less patient opponent, player 2, where players do not directly observe each other's action but rather see an imperfect signal of it.
Related Papers (5)
Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent
Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player
Drew Fudenberg,David K. Levine +1 more