Zimmermann, Laura
Working Paper
The Dynamic Electoral Returns of a Large Anti-
Poverty Program
GLO Discussion Paper, No. 506
Provided in Cooperation with:
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
Suggested Citation: Zimmermann, Laura (2020) : The Dynamic Electoral Returns of a Large
Anti-Poverty Program, GLO Discussion Paper, No. 506, Global Labor Organization (GLO),
Essen
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/215482
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THE DYNAMIC ELECTORAL RETURNS OF A
LARGE ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAM
Laura Zimmermann
∗
University of Georgia
Abstract
Short-term re-election strategies are widely used by governments around the world.
This is problematic if governments can maximize their re-election chances by priori-
tizing short-term spending before an election over long-term reforms. This paper tests
whether longer program exposure has a causal effect on election outcomes in the context
of a large anti-poverty program in India. Using a regression-discontinuity framework,
the results show that length of program exposure lowers electoral support for the gov-
ernment. The paper discusses a couple of potential explanations, finding that the most
plausible mechanism is that voters hold the government accountable for the program’s
implementation quality.
Keywords: election outcomes, voting behavior, accountability, India, anti-poverty
programs
JEL Codes: D72, H53, I38
∗
Department of Economics, Amos Hall, 620 South Lumpkin Street, Athens, GA 30602. email: lvzim-
mer@uga.edu. I thank Manuela Angelucci, Raj Arunachalam, Arnab Basu, Jacob Shapiro, Jeffrey Smith,
Rebecca Thornton, Dean Yang and participants at the CSAE Conference, the Annual Conference on Eco-
nomic Growth and Development in Delhi, the Delhi School of Economics Winter School, Cornell University
and the University of Michigan for valuable comments, feedback and suggestions. Nabaneeta Biswas, Taylor
Gates, Hanna Han, and Jenica Moore provided excellent research assistance. Earlier versions of the paper
were circulated under the title ‘Jai Ho? The Impact of a Large Public Works Program on the Government’s
Election Performance in India’ and ‘May There Be Victory: Government Election Performance and the
World’s Largest Public-Works Program’.
1
1 Introduction
Governments around the world make extensive use of short-run re-election strategies before
an election, and a large literature suggests that this is often a successful strategy.
1
This
is a problematic phenomenon for three reasons: First, election outcomes may be heavily
influenced by luck or strategic short-run spending before the election rather than by the
incumbent’s level of competence.
2
Second, governments will have an incentive to focus on
policies with quick payoffs over potentially more ambitious policies whose benefits only ma-
terialize in the medium to long run.
3
And third, if programs are announced and implemented
relatively shortly before an election, voters may be unable to find out how large the benefits
actually are.
4
All of these issues taken together mean that the accountability mechanism of
elections in democratic settings breaks down.
While these issues affect democracies worldwide, they are of particular importance in
developing countries: Developing countries face large-scale socio-economic problems, so con-
sistent long-term policies are especially important. At the same time, many government
programs suffer from low program awareness and problems with implementation quality,
and research shows that short-run re-election strategies tend to be particularly successful.
5
It is therefore crucial to understand if developing country governments can derive medium-
run benefits from the introduction of ambitious anti-poverty programs.
How longer exposure to a government program affects election outcomes is a priori
unclear. Two plausible explanations that predict an increase in government support are
1
See e.g. Akhmedov and Zhuavskaya (2004), Alesina et al. (1989), Brender and Drazen (2005), Healy and
Lenz (2014), and Shi and Svensson (2006). See Drazen (2000) and Healy and Malhotra (2013) for literature
overviews.
2
Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that US voters have sometimes elected presidents who managed
the economy less well overall because of slightly higher income growth in election years (Alesina et al., 1993;
Bartels, 2008).
3
Majumdar and Mukand (2004) set up a theoretical model that predicts that governments can be too
conservative or too reckless early on during the election term but display inefficient policy persistence later
on. They also provide case studies that are consistent with this model.
4
See e.g. Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) for a theoretical model that incorporates this factor.
5
See e.g. Akhmedov and Zhuavskaya (2004), Brender and Drazen (2005), Brender and Drazen (2008),
Drazen and Eslava (2010), and Finan and Schechter (2012).
2
reciprocity for experienced program benefits and higher program awareness (Finan and
Schechter, 2012). Longer exposure allows program benefits to be more fully realized and
for more potential voters to experience the program. If beneficiaries reciprocate by vot-
ing for the incumbent, electoral support for the government increases over time. Similarly,
awareness of a new policy may initially be low. Over time, households are more likely to
learn of the scheme through word of mouth, other beneficiaries or the media. This may allow
them to become beneficiaries themselves or to hold a more informed opinion on the program.
But the medium-run effects of a government program could also be negative. For a pro-
gram to have a longer-lasting impact on electoral support, program salience has to remain
high. If voters become used to the program benefits or if they are less important than other
issues, electoral support for the government will decline as the newness of the program wears
off. A discrepancy between promised and actual program benefits could similarly lead to a
decline in voter support over time. Longer exposure gives beneficiaries more time to experi-
ence the actual program benefits and to adjust their initial expectations. If implementation
quality is low or if the program is less effective than expected, this disappointment will be
reflected in falling government support.
Lastly, length of program exposure may not affect election outcomes at all. In countries
with a long history of failed government initiatives, voter interest in a new anti-poverty
program may be low. Similarly, voters may be disillusioned with their ability to hold a
government accountable for its performance, or may be skeptical about finding a better
alternative among the opposition. Many voters in developing countries also consider the
importance of social group identities such as caste or religion when making their decision
(Chandra, 2004). If identity trumps performance, government programs will have little
influence on the election outcome.
To test the empirical impact of longer program access on voting behavior, a government
program needs to be rolled out in a manner that can be exploited in a causal analysis.
Such a setup is difficult to find in practice since many large government programs are im-
3
plemented quickly and non-randomly. This paper contributes to addressing the gap in the
literature by focusing on the introduction of the world’s largest public-works program, In-
dia’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). NREGS legally guarantees
each rural household up to 100 days of manual public-sector work per year at the minimum
wage. It is supposed to be a demand-driven program under which households self-select
into employment at any time during the year. The goal of the program is to provide a
predictable and flexible safety net for the rural poor and to reduce rural to urban migration.
NREGS take-up is highest during the agricultural off-season, when there are few alternative
employment opportunities in rural labor markets. NREGS was rolled out between 2006 and
2008 in three implementation phases before the government stood for re-election in 2009.
By the time of the general election, districts from the earliest implementation phase (Phase
1) had had access to NREGS for two full agricultural off-seasons. Phase 2 and Phase 3 dis-
tricts had experienced NREGS for one and zero full agricultural off-seasons, respectively. To
analyze whether there are medium-run election benefits from NREGS, the paper therefore
concentrates on comparing election outcomes in Phase 1 and Phase 2 districts.
The empirical analysis exploits information about the assignment algorithm of Indian
districts to program phases. Each state first received a quota of treatment districts propor-
tional to the prevalence of poverty in that state. In the second step, the state quota was
then filled with the poorest districts according to a poverty ranking. This algorithm gener-
ates state-specific treatment discontinuities with respect to the length of program exposure,
which can be exploited in a regression-discontinuity (RD) design. The analysis also makes
use of a newly digitized dataset of polling-station wise election results for the 2009 Indian
general election with close to 600,000 observations.
The main RD results show that votes for the government in Phase 1 implementation
areas are substantially lower than in Phase 2 areas. The probability of winning the race at
a polling station decreases by 19 percentage points in areas with longer NREGS exposure at
the cutoff. This effect is robust across different empirical specifications, and the results are
4
