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The Economic Role of Political Institutions

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TLDR
This article studied the role of federalism in the development of markets in both England and the United States and found that federalism proved fundamental to the impressive economic rise of England in the 18th century and United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Abstract
Thriving markets require not only an appropriately designed economic system, but a secure political foundation that limits the ability of the state to confiscate wealth. This requires a form of limited government, that is, political institutions that credibly commit the state to honor economic and political rights. This paper studies how limited government arose in the developed west, focusing on the critical role of federalism for protecting markets in both England and the United States. Federalism proved fundamental to the impressive economic rise of England in the 18th century and the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The paper also shows that federalism underpins the spectacular economic growth in China over the past fifteen years.

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Why Do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output Per Worker than Others

TL;DR: This paper showed that differences in physical capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in output per worker, and that a large amount of variation in the level of the Solow residual across countries is driven by differences in institutions and government policies.
MonographDOI

Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State

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Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style

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Journal ArticleDOI

Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint

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Posted Content

Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter

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