Journal ArticleDOI
The Effects of Co-Payment on the Poor
TLDR
In this paper, the effects of co-payments on the use of physicians' services by poor families were investigated. Butler et al. found that co-payment is associated with an 18 percent reduction in utilization by the poor in 1968.Abstract:
This paper presents estimates of the effects of co-payments upon the use of physicians' services by poor families. The study is based upon pooled cross-section random samples of the population of the Province of Saskatchewan. Data for the period 1963 to 1968 are analyzed. A dummy variable is used to capture the effects of introducing co-payment in 1968. Estimates are presented for various types of service in an attempt to observe differences between patient-elective and physician-elective services. The results indicate that co-payment is associated with an 18 percent reduction in utilization by the poor in 1968.read more
Citations
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Posted Content
Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment.
Willard G. Manning,Joseph P. Newhouse,Naihua Duan,Emmett B. Keeler,Arleen Leibowitz,M S Marquis +5 more
TL;DR: This work estimates how cost sharing, the portion of the bill the patient pays, affects the demand for medical services and rejects the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure.
Journal ArticleDOI
Some Interim Results from a Controlled Trial of Cost Sharing in Health Insurance
Joseph P. Newhouse,Willard G. Manning,Carl N. Morris,Larry L. Orr,Naihua Duan,Emmett B. Keeler,Arleen Leibowitz,Kent H. Marquis,M. Susan Marquis,Charles E. Phelps,Robert H. Brook +10 more
TL;DR: Interim results indicate that persons fully covered for medical services spend about 50 per cent more than do similar persons with income-related catastrophe insurance, which leads to more people using services and to more services per user.
Book ChapterDOI
The Anatomy of Health Insurance
TL;DR: The anatomy of health insurance can be found in this article, where the authors consider the optimal design of a health insurance policy that makes tradeoffs appropriately between risk sharing on the one hand and agency problems such as moral hazard and supplier-induced demand on the other.
Book ChapterDOI
Moral Hazard and Consumer Incentives in Health Care
Peter Zweifel,Willard G. Manning +1 more
TL;DR: There may be a dynamic moral hazard effect (choice biased in favor of new, usually more expensive medical technology) and another promising field for future research is the interplay between consumer incentives and rationing by the physician in managed care.
Posted Content
The Anatomy of Health Insurance
TL;DR: The anatomy of health insurance is described, by relating health insurance to the central goal of medical care expenditures - better health, which is the central policy concern in health economics.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health
TL;DR: A model of the demand for the commodity "good health" is constructed and it is shown that the shadow price rises with age if the rate of depreciation on the stock of health rises over the life cycle and falls with education if more educated people are more efficient producers of health.
Journal ArticleDOI
Problems in the Analysis of Survey Data, and a Proposal
James N. Morgan,John A. Sonquist +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, an approach to survey data is proposed which imposes no restrictions on interaction effects, focuses on Importance in reducing predictive error, operates sequentially, and is independent of the extent of linearity in the classifications or the order in which the explanatory factors are introduced.
Journal ArticleDOI
Economic class and access to physician services under public medical care insurance.
TL;DR: It is concluded that public medical care insurance does result in increased relative accessibility to physicians for the low-income classes.