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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm and structure of residual rights

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TLDR
In this paper, a general equilibrium model with consumer-producers, economies of specialization, and transaction costs is developed to investigate the emergence of firms from the division of labor and the function of a structure of residual rights.
Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model with consumer-producers, economies of specialization, and transaction costs to investigate the emergence of firms from the division of labor and the function of a structure of residual rights. It is shown that the institution of the firm can be used to get intangible intellectual property involved in the division of labor while avoiding its direct pricing and marketing, so that the division of labor can be promoted by saving on transaction costs.

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Journal ArticleDOI

Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management

TL;DR: In this article, the authors illustrate fundamental theoretical principles derived from these three theories by analyzing the business case of oil field unitization and show how property rights theory is well suited to explain business situations where inefficient economic outcomes persist.
Book ChapterDOI

Specialization and Division of Labour: A Survey

Xiaokai Yang, +1 more
TL;DR: The authors survey the literature on specialization and the division of labour in society and present new classical equilibrium models of specialization based on corner solutions and inframarginal analysis, as well as new trade and growth theory based on marginal analysis.
Posted Content

Formalizing Internationalization in the Eclectic Paradigm

TL;DR: In this paper, a simple general equilibrium model that formalizes internationalization in the Eclectic Paradigm based on a reconfiguration of concepts taken from the new classical economics literature is presented, which enables us to address simultaneously the role of ownership, location and internalization advantages, and their interaction, in the emergence of the multinational enterprise through a set of mathematical inequalities.
Journal ArticleDOI

Formalizing internationalization in the eclectic paradigm

TL;DR: This article presented a simple general equilibrium model that formalizes internationalization in the eclectic paradigm based on a reconfiguration of concepts taken from the new classical economics literature, enabling them to address simultaneously the role of ownership, location and internalization advantages, and their interaction, in the emergence of the multinational enterprise through a set of mathematical inequalities.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

The Nature of the Firm

Ronald H. Coase
- 01 Nov 1937 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Posted Content

Production, information costs, and economic organization

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a set of reprint articles for which IEEE does not hold copyright. Full text is not available on IEEE Xplore for these articles, but full text can be found on the Internet Archive.
Journal ArticleDOI

Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process

TL;DR: In this paper, the potential of post-contractural apportunistic behavior for improving market efficiency through intra-firm rather than interfirm transactions is examined under the assumption that vertical costs will increase less than contracting costs as specialized assets and appropriable quasi rents increase.