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Journal ArticleDOI

Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead

Lee Epstein, +1 more
- 01 Sep 2000 - 
- Vol. 53, Iss: 3, pp 625-661
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TLDR
In this article, the authors investigate the strategic revolution in the field of judicial politics and provide an intellectual history of the field, with special emphasis on why judicial specialists resisted strategic analysis for so long and why they are now turning to it in ever increasing numbers.
Abstract
As papers presented at recent disciplinary conferences and articles published in major political science journals reveal, the field of judicial politics is undergoing a sea change. Variants of the social-psychological paradigm, which have long dominated thinking about law and courts, are giving way to approaches grounded in assumptions in rationality. More to the point, ever-growing numbers of scholars are now invoking the strategic account to understand judicial politics. In what follows, we investigate this "strategic revolution." We begin by providing an intellectual history of the field, with special emphasis on why judicial specialists resisted strategic analysis for so long and why they are now (re)turning to it in ever-increasing numbers. Next, we consider the ways that analysts have begun to put the strategic account to work. This is an important task, for debates are already emerging over the "best" way to invoke the account to study judicial politics. We take the position that there is no one "right" way but rather four different approaches--all of which have the potential to provide us with important insights into law and courts.

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Citations
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The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government

TL;DR: In this article, a model that draws on existing substantive literature and on theories that assume strategic behavior on the part of judges, executives, and legislatures is proposed to understand the behavior of the Russian Constitutional Court (Konstitucjonnyj sud).
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When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures

TL;DR: In this article, a theoretical and empirical analysis of legal endogeneity is presented, showing that organizational structures become symbolic indicators of rational governance and compliance with antidiscrimination laws, first within organizations, but eventually in the judicial realm as well.
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Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile

Lisa Hilbink
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the institutional construction and the judicial role in Chile, and discuss the role of the judiciary in the rule of law and democracy in the country's history.
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Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose an approach to recalibrate interpretive power between states and tribunals by increasing consideration of such evidence, which is similar to our approach.
References
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Book

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TL;DR: Douglass C. North as discussed by the authors developed an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time.
Posted Content

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Journal ArticleDOI

A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System

TL;DR: The method of measuring power, based on a technique of the mathematical theory of games, is presented here to a number of illustrative cases, including the United States Congress, and is intended as a first step in the attack on these problems.