Dans le cadre du colloque consacre a l'essai de Wittgenstein sur «La certitude», organise par H. E. Mason a l'universite du Minnesota en octobre 1996, l'A. etudie la conception du non-sens developpee par Wittgenstein en reponse a la refutation du scepticisme entreprise par Moore. Soulignant l'incompatibilite de la proposition et du contexte de son utilisation, et examinant l'interpretation proposee par M. McGinn, l'A. montre que le probleme souleve dans «La certitude» releve de la definition de la signification chez Frege, d'une part, et montre comment la philosophie tardive de Wittgenstein realise une generalisation du principe fregeen du contexte a l'ensemble des jeux de langage, d'autre part

Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use

Contemporary Responses to Radical Skepticism

Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy as First Philosophy

Authenticity and Social Critique

There are currently two readings of Tractatus, the metaphysical and the therapeutic. I argue that neither of these is satisfactory. I develop a third reading, the elucidatory reading. This shares the therapeutic interpretation’s emphasis on the idea that Wittgenstein’s remarks are intended to work on the reader, but instead of seeing these remarks as directed (problematically) at revealing their own nonsensical status, I take the remarks to be aimed at bringing a certain order to the reader’s perception of language. The point of this order, and the only test of it, is that it enables the philosophical problems to disappear. In particular, it dispels philosophical puzzlement concerning the status of logic, the relation between language and the world, and the relation between thought and language.

Between Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Alice Crary claims that “the standard view of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics” is dominated by “inviolability interpretations”, which often underlie conservative readings of Wittgenstein. Crary says that such interpretations are “especially marked in connection with On Certainty”, where Wittgenstein is represented as holding that “our linguistic practices are immune to rational criticism, or inviolable”. Crary's own conception of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics, which I call the “intrinsically‐ethical reading”, derives from the influential New Wittgenstein school of exegesis, and is also espoused by James Edwards, Cora Diamond, and Stephen Mulhall. To my eyes, intrinsically‐ethical readings present a peculiar picture of ethics, which I endeavour to expose in Part I of the paper. In Part II I present a reading of On Certainty that Crary would call an “inviolability interpretation”, defend it against New Wittgensteinian critiques, and show that this kind of reading has ...

Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use

Citations

Contemporary Responses to Radical Skepticism

Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy as First Philosophy

Authenticity and Social Critique

Between Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Wittgenstein, Ethics and Basic Moral Certainty

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