Showing papers on "Agency (philosophy) published in 1987"

On ethics and economics

Abstract: Foreword: John M. Letiche. Preface. 1. Economic Behaviour and Moral Sentiments. Two Origins. Achievements and Weakness. Economic Behaviour and Rationality. Rationality as Consistency. Self-interest and Rational Behaviour. Adam Smith and Self-interest. 2. Economic Judgements and Moral Philosophy. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. Pareto Optimality and Economic Efficiency. Utility, Pareto Optimality and Welfarism. Well-being and Agency. Valuing and Value. Agency and Well-being: Distinction and Interdependence. Utility and Well-being. Achievements, Freedom and Rights. Self-interest and Welfare Economics. Rights and Freedom. 3. Freedom and Consequences. Well-being, Agency and Freedom. Plurality and Evaluation. Incompletenes and Overcompleteness. Conflicts and Impasse. Rights and Consequence. Consequential Assessment and Deontology. Ethics and Economics. Welfare, Goals and Choices. Conduct, Ethics and Economics. References. Author Index. Subject Index.

The interaction order sui generis: goffman's contribution to social theory

Abstract: Goffinan is credited with enriching our understanding of the details of interaction, but not with challenging our theoretical understanding of social organization. While Goffman's position is not consistent, the outlines for a theory of an interaction order sui generis may be found in his work. It is not theoretically adequate to understand Goffinan as an interactionist within the dichotomy between agency and social structure. Goffman offers a way of resolving this dichotomy via the idea of an interaction order which is constitutive of self and at the same time places demands on social structure. This has significant implications for our understanding of social organization in general.

Morals, reason, and animals

Abstract: Preface Acknowledgments Part I: The Moral (In)Significance of Reason 1. Why Should I Be Rational? "Rationality" and Its Alternatives * The Methodological Counterattack * The Moral of the Story 2. Where Reason Enters In--and Where It Doesn't Incidentally Good Actions * Ulterior Motives * Acting Out of Context * Moral Agents, Philosophers, and Judges * Summary and Conclusion 3. Being Rational and Acting Morally What "Rational" Refers To * Can Only Rational Beings Be Moral Agents? * Acting for the Right Reason * Acting on Principle and Acting Morally * The Free, the Rational, and the Moral * Everyday Freedom * Pursuing Ideals vs. the Value of Virtue 4. People and Persons Metaphysical vs. Moral Persons * The Humanist Principle * The Logico-linguistic Defense of Humanism * The Phenomenological Defense of Humanism * The Transcendental Defense of Humanism * The Consequential Defense of Humanism * Conclusion Part II: "Animal Rights"? 5. What Liberating Animals Is and Isn't About The Moral Sense of "Animal" * Applying the Rhetoric of Liberation to Animals * Applying the Concept of Equality to Animals * Applying the Rhetoric of Rights to Animals * Is Animal Liberation an Affront to Human Liberation? * Summary 6. Three Reasons for Liberating Animals Liberating Animals and Developing Moral Character * Liberating Animals and Making the World a Happier Place * Liberating Animals and Being Fair * Conclusion Part III: Answering Some Objections to Liberating Animals 7. Can Animals Have Interests? Language and Interests * "Having an Interest" * Language and Desire * Language and Belief * The Psychological (In)Significance of Grammar * Language and Truth * Language and Self-Consciousness * Conclusion * Reason and the Moral Significance of Interests * Being Rational and Having Interests * Having Interests and Moral Standing 8. Moral Community and Animal Rights The Reciprocity Requirement * The Agency Requirement * The Relations Requirement * The Humanist Requirement * Conclusion 9. The Misfortune of Death Why (Supposedly) Only Rational Beings Can Have a Right to Life * Having vs. Taking an Interest in Life * Having Interests and Having Rights * Having an Interest in Life and the Right to Life * Suffering a Loss and the Awareness of Loss * Summary and Conclusion 10. The Replacement Argument The (In)Significance of the Replacement Argument * Six Ways of Evaluating Moral Standing * Describing the Six Ways * Six Evaluations of the Replacement Argument * Total Population vs. Prior Existence Utilitarianism * Prior Existence Utilitarianism and Obligations to Future Generations * Summary Part IV: A Few Consequences 11. Vegetarianism The Simple Answer * Exploiting, Slaughtering, and Harvesting * Exploiting, Killing, and Scavenging * Starvation 12. Whither Animal Research? Can Animals Consent to Research'? * Should Research Be Done Only with Those Who Consent? * Are Humans a Superior Form of Life? * Should Superiors Exploit Their Inferiors? * Summary and Conclusion 13. Saving the Rabbit from the Fox The Variety of Absurdity * Ought Implies Can * "Avoidable" Suffering * Conclusion 14. Plants and Things Environmental Ethics and Inherent Value * Environmental Crisis and the (Supposed) Necessity of Inherent Value * The Variety of Goodness and the (Supposed) Necessity of Inherent Value * Conclusion * Environmental Ethics and Ecological Holism * The Biotic "Community" vs. Animal Liberation * The Arbitrariness of Total Holism * Environmental Ethics vs. Personal Preferences * Morality and the Affirmation of Life * Summary * The Good of Nonsentient Things * The Environmental Ethics of Animal Liberation Notes Bibliography Index

Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory

Abstract: Preface Introduction to the Second Edition Introduction Chapter 1 Subjects and Agents 1.1. There concepts of agency 1.2. The orthodox conception of agents 1.3. Human nature: the need for a philosophical anthropology 1.4. Human nature: morality, justice and virtue. 1.5. Practical reason and social structures Chapter 2 Structure and Action 2.1. The concept of social structure 2.2. The basic concepts of historical materialism 2.3. Orthodox historical materialism 2.4. Rational-choice Marxism 2.5. Structural capacities and human action 2.6. What's left of historical materialism? Chapter 3 Reasons and Interests 3.1. Expressivism and the hermeneutic tradition 3.2. Interpretation and social theory 3.3. Charity, truth and community 3.4. The Utilitarian theory of action 3.5. Interests and powers Chapter 4 Ideology and Power 4.1. Collective agents 4.2. Falsehood and ideology, I 4.3. Falsehood and ideology, II 4.4. Nation, state and military power 4.5. A note on base and superstructure Chapter 5 Tradition and Revolution 5.1. Revolution as redemption: Benjamin and Sartre 5.2. Marxism and the proletariat 5.3. The rationality of revolution 5.4. Revolution and repetition 5.5. The tradition of the oppressed Conclusion Index

Agency and necessity

Abstract: Rene Descartes asserted in the 17th century that human beings have free will. Unlike automata they are the authors of their actions and can rightly be praised or blamed for them. A century later David Hume said that human actions are determined with the same necessity as are events in the natural world and set about reconciling liberty and necessity. This debate has been continuously pursued by philosophers of the modern period who argue variously that the issues cannot be reconciled or who assert, as in the case of behaviourism, the primacy of necessity. Antony Flew and Godfrey Vesey share the view that agency and personal responsibility are vital in the debate but disagree profoundly about how this claim can be defended and on what grounds it has priority. Did Hume err in being an empiricist (Vesey's line) or in not being an empiricist (Flew). Is determinism wholly false (Flew) or neither true nor false (Vesey). The development of this disagreement is informed by an awareness of the contributions of philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Wittgnestein and Strawson.

Computers and the constitution - a helpful, harmful or harmless relationship

Abstract: Early in 1986, while discussing the lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law, Congressman Michael Synar, primary sponsor of the suit, said he was compelled to challenge the law because he believed Congress may not delegate its constitutional responsibility to a computer. With the enactment of general revenue sharing in 1972, and with each successive renewal of aid over the following decade, critics decried the "politics by printout" arising from district-by-district computer printouts showing aid distribution based on complex formulas. And with the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, scholars argue that Congress has, in effect, reversed the 1974 Privacy Act by requiring all states to participate in file merging, matching, and linking programs to verify the eligibility of beneficiaries of social welfare programs.' Despite such concerns, the tendency towards computerization continues unabated with federal agency budgets for information technology reaching $15.2 billion in fiscal year 1986, and forecast to reach $23.8 billion by 1988.121 Computers have taken on a highly visible role as tools of government and as symbols in the ongoing debate about how government ought to function. Far to one side in this debate, computers form part of a demonic vision; an Orwellian nightmare in which autocrats eliminate democratic government and individual freedom through computerized surveillance. This view has been prominent over the years, beginning in 1964 with Vance Packard's popular book, The Naked Society, and it remains a strong theme in both popular literature and scholarly works such as Kenneth Laudon's recent book, Dossier Society. 3 Far at the other side of the debate, computers form part of a beatific vision of efficient, effective, and truly democratic government. While seldom articulated in a single place, this vision is incumbent in works that laud the computer's role in eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse; streamlining the functions of government; and permitting electronic voting and plebiscites.4 These end points embrace a spectrum of widely divergent views about the role of computers in democratic government and raise the basic question of whether computers and computerization are altering or will alter the functioning of American constitutional government. A less common

Counselling, Advocacy and Negotiation

Abstract: Two powerful paradigms of the social worker have dominated the profession's self-image. The first is that of a counsellor—skillful, attentive, accurately empathie and accepting of the client's individuality. The second is that of the advocate, who champions the oppressed, and turns the tables on those who exploit or exclude the client. Both reflect social work's longing for some of the status of the ancient professions, like medicine and the law, combined with the added glamour and mystery of being outside the establishment—a role more like that of healer on the one hand, or poor man's lawyer on the other. It is with some embarrassment that I recognize that my own writings may have appealed to students partly because they seem to reflect both these yearnings—to be a sort of witch doctor on some days of the week, and a Perry Mason for the poor on others (Jordan, 1979). Yet in reality we are all aware that both these activities are uncharacteris tic of everyday social work. Neither the concentrated intensity of focus that is the attractive feature of the counsellor's role, nor the unambiguous championship of the oppressed, are at all typical; rather they represent limiting forms of social work at either end of a long continuum. Indeed, under pressure of the sheer volume of 'ordinary' work it might well be that social workers would regard both of these as time-consuming luxuries and might refer any client or family in need of extended counselling to a more specialized agency or professional, and one in need of expert advocacy to a law centre or welfare rights organization. What then makes up the rest of the continuum—of client's problems on the one hand, and of social work activities on the other? The standard

The Individual and Society in Biological and Cultural Anthropology

Abstract: My argument in this article may be briefly outlined as follows: I will show that the parallel developments in cultural and biological anthropology emphasizing individuals as strategizing agents offer a favorable climate for an attempt at reconciliation between the two subfields. Then I will lay out, as best I can, the point of view prevalent in current evolutionary biology about how the posited central goal of individual strategizing, namely inclusive reproductive fitness, is to be understood. The reader must understand that in my exposition of this material I intend neither to espouse nor criticize it, but rather simply to grasp it. Finally, I will present arguments to show why the evolutionary argument, though plausible and valid in part, cannot in principle account exhaustively for social and cultural facts; while at the same time showing that considerations of reproductive strategizing cannot, in principle, be excluded from the understanding of social and cultural facts either. One of the enduring differences of opinion among anthropologists, as among all students of human life, concerns the degree to which society is understood to be an entity in itself, with some power to determine the behavior of its constituent members, as opposed to a position according to which society is nothing other than the product of the summed behavior of a number of individuals. The matter is very concisely stated by Holy and Stuchlik (1983:2) as a fundamental disagreement over the "autonomy of agency":

Exploitation in the new Marxism of collective action

Abstract: The ‘new Marxism of collective action’is a term Lash and Urry have recently used to describe a new intellectual current in Marxism which seeks to apply rational choice theory, and particularly game theory, to key Marxian concepts like collective action, class, revolution and exploitation. This current is seen as part of a general shift within social science away from structure towards agency. This paper focuses on a concept which Lash and Urry's outline ignored: namely, exploitation. Granting the concept this attention is useful for a number of reasons. Firstly, by summarizing the general debate on the concept, both within the new Marxism of collective action and outside, the paper allows the discussion of exploitation to be placed in the context of the more general debate between structuralist and humanistic versions of Marxism; especially in the context of the debate about whether there can be a Marxist theory of ethics and injustice. Secondly, by outlining how the concept is understood by advocates of the new Marxism of collective action, the paper accords the concept the central status which advocates reserve for it. In consequence, the paper identifies differences between advocates of the new Marxism of collective action with respect to how exploitation is to be understood, which suggest that the intellectual current is not as homogeneous as Lash and Urry imply. Moreover, the paper stresses that the differences between them with regard to exploitation are more than just unhelpful disagreements over matters of definition, but represent fundamental disagreements about the validity of Marx's original formulations in contemporary society.

Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory

Abstract: The law of undisclosed agency has long been considered an anomaly of contract theory. While few disapprove of its content, this body of law does not appear to square with our theoretical understanding of contractual obligation. In this Article, ProfessorBarnett appliesa "consent theory of contract" to explain and critically evaluate the law of undisclosed agency. After showing why standard contract theories have been unable to explain the established doctrine in this area, he analyzes the nexus ofobligations arising from the consensual "triangular flow of'rights" among the three parties to the paradigm undisclosed agency relationship. He then extends this analysis to treat several "hard cases." ProfessorBarnett concludes that the bulk of this spontaneously evolved body of law is theoretically sound; that the source of the long-standing apparent anomaly is the predominance of the promise-based theory underlying the action of assumpsit; and that judges' ability to develop good law in spite of the deficiencies in the prevailing contract theories provides an insight into the appropriate roles of tradition and reason in generating law.

The Essence and Soul of Seventeenth-Century Scientific Revolution

Abstract: The inclusion of an item within a theory may be essential or accidental, and if the former then the explanation of its meaning and of its inclusion in the theory cannot be by accidental events and circumstances. Since all events and circumstances – be they social, political, religious, psychological, etc. – are accidental vis-a-vis the ideas they occasion, they cannot serve as explanation of these ideas. The only way to explain the ideas is by showing their essentiality to the theory rather than their importance to the people. Thus, the place of spirits and souls within seventeenth-century science is explained by Platonic ideology.This demands a concept of nature which is thoroughly efficient causative, and a concept of explanation which is thoroughly informative. This means that theories must explain any given effect by a cause which is separable from it and is conceptually heterogeneous to it. Such a nature and such an explanation are inherently paradoxical and irrational, which explains the preponderance of these traits in seventeenth-century science as created by Kepler, through Galileo and Descartes to Newton.The primary efficient-causal and explanatory agency is force, which is ontically distinct from matter and from the motion it causes in matter. Soul, spirit and active principle are mere variants of force. Thus, their presence in seventeenth-century science is explained only by their being conceptually essential to any Platonic philosophy of nature.

Cosmogony and creation

Abstract: It is convention, which is rarely broken in science, that references to First Causes should be omitted. Pragmatically, this convention enables agnostics, theists and atheists to work together in common scientific tasks. Even the theist, who might be expected to have a vested interest in referring to God, can view the convention as a positive advantage. For, without it, a consistent theist would always have to give accounts of events in terms of divine agency as well as proximate physical causes; and this would be extremely cumbersome. Unless the policy be consistently applied, the theist risks giving the impression that God is at work only in some situations and not in others. This may develop into the theological confusion of the 'god-of-the-gaps', which portrays God as active only in areas where there are at present no scientific explanations. So, if this convention of silence about God can be viewed as having advantages all round, why break it? Part of the answer to this question is: because there is a growing tendency for others to do so in certain branches of physics and in so doing to make assertions which stand in need of comment. Another part of the answer is that, despite the convention that talk of God has no place in science, theistic questions do arise within an educational context. Pupils and students ask questions about science-and-religion from time to time and they expect nonevasive answers. Their informal learning, arising out of television and the popular writings of experts, often has a component of philosophical and religious ideas. This is particularly so with science fiction.

Reply to J M Stanley: fiddling and clarity.

Abstract: at present have any reliable criterion by which to detect the presence of widespread and irreversible neocortical damage. However, this is a pragmatic matter and may well yield to imaging techniques at present under development. In that my paper was an attempt to ground certain clinical decisions other than on considerations of a purely social or pragmatic nature I shall now turn to those other grounds. What I claimed was that our ethically significant concept of a person was so because we imputed those objects which instantiated it with personal identity (and thus an interest in their life as an integrated whole involving past and future), consciousness or quality of life (which involved a sensitivity to and the awareness of human experiences and their significance), and agency (which involves acting for one's own reasons). It is these 'marks' of the concept person which the patients we are discussing no longer demonstrate and thus they have lost that which gives them the special place that a person has in our complex of ethical attitudes. In his first paragraph Professor Stanley imputes to me the intention of revising our 'working definition of death' by talking about ethically significant life. My remarks were indeed suggestive rather than transparently clear. There are in fact several important distinctions to be drawn. There is on the one hand a living and fully functioning human person who enjoys the unique ethical status we confer on such. There are also living and fully functioning non-human and non personal beings. These would include healthy animals whom we do not wantonly destroy or torment but to whom we do not ascribe the rights and interests of human beings. There are pieces of living human tissue which, though human, do not get treated as persons, for example ovaries, legs, temporal lobes and gall

From 'Society' To the Social Actor: a Reconsideration of Agency and Its Determinants in Sociological Analysis

Abstract: Sociology has created the social and has acted as its interpreter but has introduced an untenable simplification of the human The image of society has replaced reality. To regain the dignity of science, contemporary sociology has to reintroduce the complexity of the acting subject — as both starting and ending points in any interactional relation - into the complexity of the situation The acting subject should be re-examined to take into account the complexity both of psychological attitude in social relationships and the definition of preconditions and prefigurations of action Collective imagery, individual prefigurations and experience should be considered in order to correlate pre- and back-regions of social action In doing so, sociologists should be aware that what we can really observe and the very elements of our experiencing are but fragments of a real process whose unity is not accessible to us and which we can only reconstruct through the imagination. The natural sciences reconstruct seemingly sy...

Review article: the politics of famine—some recent literature

Abstract: THE REPORT BY Leftwich and Harvie is a most useful survey of the present state of research into famine. 1 Famine studies raise issues of major significance for social theory, the authors suggest, but so far these issues have not been absorbed within the social science mainstream. They note, with surprise) that 'some of the major social sciences disciplines (economics, political science, sociology and anthropology) are represented in the [famine] literature very zveakly indeed' (p. 20, my emphasis). Partly this reflects the fact that much famine research is of urgent practical import and is relatively inaccessible to academic researchers (some of the best material is locked up in relief agency reports of limited circulation). Nor is the frenetic ambience of famine relief best calculated to encourage reflection or careful comparative study. Despite the present hostile financial climate, some university institutions in Britain have managed to provide sabbatical spaces where famine fieldworkers can compose their thoughts and establish links with the mainstream social sciences (the refugee studies programme at Queen Elizabeth House in Oxford is notable in this respect), but the position is much less favourable in famine afilicted areas themselves. There is scope here for major new international initiative (perhaps a Pan-African Institute of Famine Studies, supported by the relief agencies under the auspices of a major research foundation or the United Nations University). The other ma jor reason for the academic marginalization of famine studies is that the topic cuts across one of the most heavily fortified of all intellectual frontiers the Berlin Wall between the biological and social sciences. Biologists and technologists who feel they know already what to do to relieve hunger are sometimes quite critical of the amount of time needed to explore social aspects of food systems (cf. Simmonds on social anthropologists in farming systems research).2 Conversely, some social scientists appear to presume that an emphasis on biological or environmental causes of famine

Sarvodaya in Crisis: The Gandhian Movement in India Today

Abstract: At the dawn of India's independence the new republic was filled with hope and aspirations to meet the social, political, and economic challenges that lay ahead. There was optimism that under the leadership of Nehru, and the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi, India would march ahead as one of the most potent democracies in the world. Gandhi, under the banner of Sarvodayal (welfare of all), appealed to the leaders of the Congress party to disband and create a nonpolitical moral force supported by spiritual ideas to guide the new nation. Their reluctance to heed his advice on the grounds it would create a power vacuum in the country set into motion an ideology of nation-building which is still being challenged by the leaders of Sarvodaya forty years later. Today, Sarvodaya is faced with many challenges, some of a serious nature that threaten its very survival. A movement that once was considered the guiding star for the future of India has been practically reduced to the status of a voluntary social work agency. It is split into various factions. Its constructive work programs are suffering. Its ideology for nation-building is ignored. Its leadership belongs to an older generation, and it desperately needs new blood. Most of all, it is losing credibility with the general public as an alternative philosophy to save India from social, economic, and political disparities. The nation, with its emphasis on a modern secular approach to life, seems to have adapted Western paradigms to lead India into the 21st century. The crisis of Sarvodaya is that in India Gandhi has been defeated

Brute Animals and Legal Rights

Abstract: Various proponents of animal rights—for example, H. J. McCloskey— maintain that while brute animals (henceforth ‘animals’) cannot have; moral rights they can have legal rights. Indeed, McCloskey himself goes so far as to maintain that even inanimate objects are able to have legal rights.1 And why should not inanimate objects be able to? After f all, for there to be a legal right is anything more required than that whatever agency is empowered to issue legal rights simply legislate or proclaim that so-and-so has that legal right?