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Showing papers on "Constitution published in 1995"


Book
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: The history of modern constitutionalism and its relationship with cultural diversity can be traced back to the discovery of cultural diversity in the early 19th century as discussed by the authors, when the Aboriginal and common law system and the convention of continuity were proposed.
Abstract: Part I. Demands for Constitutional Recognition: 1. The constitutional question raised by the politics of cultural recognition: six examples and three similarities 2. The mutual recognition of cultural diversity: three features of the common ground and three historical movements 3. The spirit of Haida Gwaii as a symbol of the age of cultural diversity 4. A constitutional dialogue in The spirit of Haida Gwaii Part II. Diversity and Contemporary Constitutionalism: 5. Anwering the constitutional question: an outline 6. Two languages of contemporary constitutionalism and the three schools of modern constitutionalism 7. The challenge of post-modernism and cultural feminism 8. The challenge of interculturalism Part III. The Historical Formation of Modern Constitutionalism: The Empire of Uniformity: 9. Constitutions ancient and modern 10. Seven features of modern constitutionalism 11. Example of forging the seven features: Locke and Aboriginal peoples 12. Vattel, Kant and their followers 13.The reform of diversity in Europe and the colonies 14. The American revolution and the guardians of empire today Part IV. The Historical Formation of Common Constitutionalism: The Rediscovery of Cultural Diversity, Part I: 15. The hidden constitutions of contemporary societies 16. Understanding constitutionalism: Wittgenstein and Hale 17. Examples of the three conventions: the Aboriginal and common-law system and the conventions of mutual recognition and consent 18. The Aboriginal and common law system and the convention of continuity 19.The Aboriginal and common law system and constitutional dialogue Part V. The Historical Formation of Common Constitutionalism: The Rediscovery of Cultural Diversity. Part II: 20. Diverse federalism and the conventions of mutual recognition, continuity and consent 21. Diverse federalism and continuity: the Quebec act and the ancient constitution 22. Diverse federalism, the three conventions and the American revolution 23. The modern attack on diverse federalism: the Durham report and its followers 24. Linguistic minorities and the three conventions: the form of reasoning appropriate to mutual recognition and accommodation 25. Intercultural citizens, gender differences and the three conventions Part VI. Constitutionalism in an Age of Cultural Diversity: 25. A summary of contemporary constitutionalism 26. Replies to four objections to contemporary constitutionalism 27. Two public goods of contemporary constitutionalism: belonging and critical freedom Conclusion: the philosophy and practice of contemporary constitutionalism Notes Bibliography Index.

997 citations


Book
19 Oct 1995
TL;DR: Dictionary Staff Consultants and Contributing Editors Foreword Guide to the Dictionary Guide to Pronunciation Dictionaries of English by Sidney I Landau Webster's New World College Dictionary World Atlas Rules of Punctuation Nations of the World World City Populations US States US Cities by Population US Metropolitan Core Areas by Population Mexico Geographical Data Monetary Units Roman Numerals Books of the Bible Calendars American Sign Language (ASL) Commonly Used Weights and Measures Periodic Table of Chemical Elements Alphabetical List of the Chemical Elements Geologic Time Chart Astronomical Data Meterology Presidents of
Abstract: Dictionary Staff Consultants and Contributing Editors Foreword Guide to the Dictionary Guide to Pronunciation Dictionaries of English by Sidney I Landau Webster's New World College Dictionary World Atlas Rules of Punctuation Nations of the World World City Populations US States US Cities by Population US Metropolitan Core Areas by Population Mexico Geographical Data Monetary Units Roman Numerals Books of the Bible Calendars American Sign Language (ASL) Commonly Used Weights and Measures Periodic Table of Chemical Elements Alphabetical List of the Chemical Elements Geologic Time Chart Astronomical Data Meterology Presidents of the United States The Declaration of Independence Constitution of the United States Amendments to the Constitution of the United States Index

563 citations


Book
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: Holmes as discussed by the authors argues that the aspirations of liberal democracy are best understood in relation to two central themes of classical liberal theory: the psychological motivations of individuals and the necessary constraint on individual passions provided by institutions.
Abstract: A collection of essays on the core values of liberalism which challenges assumptions about liberal theory. By placing it into its original historical context, this text presents an interconnected argument meant to fundamentally change the conception of liberalism. According to Holmes, three elements of classical liberal theory are commonly used to attack contemporary liberalism as antagonistic to genuine democracy and the welfare state: constitutional constraints on majority rule; the identification of individual freedom with an absence of government involvement; and a strong emphasis on the principle of self-interest. Holmes argues that the aspirations of liberal democracy - including individual liberty, the equal dignity of citizens, and a tolerance for diversity - are best understood in relation to two central themes of classical liberal theory: the psychological motivations of individuals and the necessary constraint on individual passions provided by institutions. By restricting the arbitrary powers of government officials, Holmes states, a liberal constitution can increase the state's capacity to focus on specific problems and mobilize collective resources for common purposes.

298 citations


Journal ArticleDOI

296 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The entrepreneurial management model outlined first in Osborne and Gaebler's popular book, Reinventing Government, and later in the Vice President's National Performance Review Report as mentioned in this paper seemed to many practitioners and major professional organizations of public administration, not as a challenge to fundamental values, but simply as the next logical step in the grand synthesis of management science.
Abstract: Over the past five decades, the field of public administration has gradually lost its theoretical distinctiveness. Today, public administration has largely abandoned or forgotten its roots in public law - in the Constitution, statutes, and case law - and has accepted, to varying degrees, the generic behavioral principles of management as taught in schools of business. In this intellectual climate, those who study government and those who are practitioners of governmental management were understandably caught off guard by the sheer audacity of the entrepreneurial management advocates, actively led by no less a personage than the Vice President of the United States. The entrepreneurial management model outlined first in Osborne and Gaebler's popular book, Reinventing Government,[1] and later in the Vice President's National Performance Review Report,[2] seemed to many practitioners and major professional organizations of public administration, not as a challenge to fundamental values, but simply as the next logical step in the grand synthesis of management science. The difficulty is that this grand synthesis does not comport with the daily experience of managing government agencies and programs. This discontinuity between the contemporary management theory synthesis and reality has been difficult for Public administrators to articulate since most have lost touch with the theoretical foundation of their field's intellectual tradition. That foundation is in public law, not in behavioral theories of management.[3] Ironically, the legal constraints and demands in the governmental work environment are evident enough. To a considerable extent they are evident in the business world as well. Nonetheless, the fact is that the private and governmental sectors are based on fundamentally different streams of legal doctrine: one traditionally rooted in judge-made common law, protecting rights and asserting duties in the relations of private individuals; the other founded on the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and articulated by a truly enormous body of statutory, regulatory, and case law to ensure continuance of a republican form of government and to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens at the hands of an all-powerful state. The intent of the authors is to revisit the protective purposes of the Constitution as designed by the framers and the basic tenets of our administrative state as adapted by their successors (legislators, presidents, jurists, and other government officials) to meet contemporary administrative realities. It is our understanding that the basic theory guiding governmental organization and management - structures, processes, and procedures - is to be found in public law, that it is valid today, and that it will remain so as long as the Republic endures. The principles that make up this theory can in many settings embrace useful precepts such as those of "management by objectives" (MBO) or "total quality management" (TQM) and they can accommodate and be enhanced by an almost infinite variety of technological innovations. But such techniques and advances are not - and cannot be - a substitute or replacement for the traditional, constitution-based method of doing the public's business. To accept such a substitution would be to trade away the constitutionally protected, known means of ensuring accountability for yet to be established measures of government performance. Protective Purposes of the Constitution As a matter of cultural preference, intensified by the experiences of colonial dependency, the Revolutionary War, and the operation of fledgling states during the Confederation period thereafter, the framers of the Constitution consciously designed a government better suited to frustrate the concentration of political power than to govern effectively. As James Madison expressed the common assumption that led to this result: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands . …

209 citations


Book
01 Aug 1995
TL;DR: A Conceptual History of Civil Society The Hegelian, Marxian and the Gramscian Tradition Civil Society Reconsidered The Constitution of the Civil Sphere Civil Society as the Arena of Contestation Restating the Need for Civil Society as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Of States and of Civil Societies Thinking about the State Civil Society A Conceptual History Civil Society The Hegelian, Marxian and the Gramscian Tradition Civil Society Reconsidered The Constitution of the Civil Sphere Civil Society as the Arena of Contestation Restating the Need for Civil Society

157 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an empirical model based on several current theories of executive-legislative bargaining is developed to measure the influence of the president in the legislative process, and the model is a generalized version of the legislative agenda control model.
Abstract: One of the most important American political institutons is the executive veto. The Founding Fathers sought to create an institution that would both protect the executive branch from encroachments of the legislature as well as provide an additional safeguard against "unwise" measures that might be passed. These concerns were weighed against concerns about executive usurpation of legislative power. The extent to which the veto serves to preserve this delicate balance is a question that remains largely unanswered. Few will dispute that the president plays a role in the legislative process. The question remains one of extent. Is the legislative role of the presidentwithin the confines of the formal powers enumerated in the constitution, or have additional informal powers emerged? In this analysis, we try to measure the influence of the president in the legislative process. We develop an empirical model based on several current theories of executive-legislative bargaining. The model we estimate is a generalized version of the legislative agenda control model. While we find strong evidence for the basic structure of the legislative agenda control model, we reject several of its predictions. We argue that many of these rejections may be due to presidential influence on the agenda and/or to incomplete information.

152 citations


BookDOI
31 Jan 1995
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors bring together essays by leading legal authorities and political scientists on a range of questions from whether the U.S. Constitution is subject to amendment by procedures other than those authorized by Article V to how significant change is conceptualized within classical rabbinic Judaism.
Abstract: An increasing number of constitutional theorists, within both the legal academy and university departments of government, are focusing on the conceptual and political problems attached to the notion of constitutional amendment. Amendments are, among other things, recognitions of the imperfection of existing schemes of government. The relative ease or difficulty of amendment has significant implications for the ways that governments respond to problems that call either for new structures of governance or new powers for already established structures. This book brings together essays by leading legal authorities and political scientists on a range of questions from whether the U.S. Constitution is subject to amendment by procedures other than those authorized by Article V to how significant change is conceptualized within classical rabbinic Judaism. Though the essays are concerned for the most part with the American experience, other constitutional traditions are considered as well. The contributors include Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Reed Amar, Mark E. Brandon, David R. Dow, Stephen M. Griffin, Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, Sanford Levinson, Donald Lutz, Walter Murphy, Frederick Schauer, John R. Vile, and Noam J. Zohar. Sanford Levinson holds the St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr., Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin, with a joint appointment in the Department of Government there. He is also the author of Constitutional Faith (Princeton).

130 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: One impoverishes the question of power if one poses it simply in terms of legislation and constitution as mentioned in this paper, the state and the state apparatus. Power is more complicated, dense and pervasive.
Abstract: One impoverishes the question of power if one poses it simply in terms of legislation and constitution … the state and the state apparatus. Power is … more complicated, dense and pervasive…. It's i...

127 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the central question of power in (inter) national politics has been re-posed in the aftermath of the ending of the Cold War and the dissolution of the postwar order.
Abstract: The constitution of (inter) national political order is undisputedly a creation of power. But how? And can raising the central question of power, once more, cast any new light on the condition of (inter) national politics now that the question of (inter) national order as such has been so forcefully re-posed in the aftermath of the ending of the Cold War and the dissolution of the postwar order?1 I think the answer to this second question is, "yes it can," and that that answer serves to clarify the first. If we look outside of the canon of international political theory, I also think we can find an understanding of power that will afford some new interpretive purchase upon contemporary (inter) national politics. This understanding is made available in Continental European philosophy, specifically in the work of Michel Foucault.

120 citations


Book
06 Nov 1995
TL;DR: In this paper, the functions of government and the modern British state are discussed, including the role of Parliament, the Executive, the Civil Service, the Courts and the Administration of Justice.
Abstract: Preface. Acknowledgements. 1. The Constitution. 2. The Functions of Government and the Modern British State. 3. The Executive. 4. The Civil Service. 5. Parliament. 6. The Political Parties (1). 7. The Political Parties (2). 8. The Electoral System. 9. Voting Behaviour, Public Opinion and the Mobilization of the Electorate. 10. Pressure Groups. 11. Government on the Ground: The Local Dimension. 12. The Diversity of the UK. 13. The Courts and the Administration of Justice. 14. Control of Government and the Redress of Grievances. 15. Beyond the Nation State. Conclusion. Further Reading. Index.

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define the concept of authority as "the right to command and correlatively, the right to be obeyed" and explore some variations of this concept.
Abstract: Most citizens of most states recall, in eulogy or in censure, a founding moment when battles, heroes, speeches, debates and compromises brought about a new constitution, an enduring new orthodoxy of political authority and principles. They speak of 1776, 1789 and 1917, of preserving the spirit of the revolution and the intentions of its founders. Rarely, though, do such sentiments apply to international relations. Occasionally scholars write of our "Westphalian system," but only cooly to categorize and chronicle not to pronounce or polemicize. Why the reticence? It probably has much to do with the dominance of the realist tradition, according to which the history of international relations is an endless competition between armies and economies; rules, constitutions and notions of political authority, then, are only deceptive, forgettable surface reflections. I will argue for the reality of these reflections. International relations, too, has something akin to a constitution, embodied in what I will call "norms of sovereignty," and this constitution is formed through revolutions: Tumult yields novel orthodoxy. Today sovereignty is again the issue. There is evidence that another revolution is afoot. Against the spirit of "the end of history," new actors are claiming new forms of authority. The European Union and the United Nations endorse the right to independence of secessionist Yugoslavian republics; the U.N. and its proxy armies intervene in Somalia, Iraq and Rwanda for humanitarian reasons and apply sanctions on Haiti on behalf of democracy, all without the consent of local parties; legal scholars note an "emerging right to democratic governance" which makes domestic government a matter of international concern; and E.U. states make new progress toward the "pooling" of authority in a common institution.[2] These trends are still partial; whether they will become durable norms in the new world order is not yet certain. But if they do, together they will amount to one of the rare international revolutions in sovereignty since medieval times. If the current relevance of the state is our question, then these emerging norms of sovereignty are noteworthy. They are not, however, all that is important to the state. Increased flows of trade, money, information and armaments, and changes in laws governing ownership and citizenship dramatically alter the state's functions and efficacy, but have little to do with sovereignty, which itself is purely a matter of legitimate authority. Although revolutions in norms of sovereignty are only part of important political change, they are an inestimably important part, and we ought to know something about their nature and history. I seek, then, to introduce sovereignty in two stages. First, I offer a sorely needed definition and explore some of its variations. I then offer a brief history of its crucial historical junctures and founding moments. International lawyers have so thoroughly delineated, demarcated, explicated, qualified and categorized sovereignty that the term's continued useful precision is open to question.[3] Yet, because sovereignty has so often been appealed to or claimed, in both polemics and preambles, by statespeople, diplomats and members of parliament concerned about the integrity of their authority, and because it comprises the struts and joists without which statecraft would not exist, it cannot be scuttled. But sovereignty needs definition. Precisely because of its complex historical evolution, finding a definition encompassing every usage since the 13th century is a pipe dream.[4] However, there is a broad concept - not a definition, but a wide philosophical category - which unites most of sovereignty's past, and with which we can begin: authority. Authority is "the right to command and correlatively, the right to be obeyed."[5] It is legitimate when it is rooted in law, tradition, consent or divine command, and when those living under it generally endorse this notion. …

Book
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: A biography of Tom Paine, the author of "Rights of Man" and "Common Sense", is described in this article. But the focus of the book is on his early life in England as well as his role as a key pamphleteer in the American Revolution.
Abstract: A biography of Tom Paine, the author of "Rights of Man" and "Common Sense". It describes his early life in England as well as his role as a key pamphleteer in the American Revolution. It also covers his part in the drafting of France's 1772 constitution and his narrow escape from the guillotine.

Book
15 Nov 1995
TL;DR: This article examined the attitudes of the founding "fathers" toward slavery and found that slavery fatally permeated the founding of the American republic and the original constitution was, as the abilitionists later maintained, "a covnenant with death".
Abstract: This text studies the attitudes of the founding "fathers" toward slavery. Specifically, it examines the views of Thomas Jefferson reflected in his life and writings and those of other founders as expressed in the Northwest Ordinance, the Constitutional Convention and the Constitution itself, and the fugitive slave legislation of the 1790s. The author contends: slavery fatally permeated the founding of the American republic; the original constitution was, as the abilitionists later maintained, "a covnenant with death"; and Jefferson's anti-slavery reputation is undeserved and most historians and biographers have prettified Jefferson's record on slavery.


Book
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: Bogdanor as discussed by the authors argues that far from undermining democracy, the monarchy sustains and strengthens democratic institutions; that constitutional monarchy is a form of government that ensures not conservatism but legitimacy.
Abstract: In the increasingly questioning world of the 1990s, the role of the monarchy in a democracy is again coming under scrutiny. Its critics argue that the monarchy is a profoundly conservative institution which serves to inhibit social change; that it has outlived its usefulness; that it symbolizes and reinforces deference and hierachy; and that its radical reform is therefore long overdue. Rejecting these arguments Vernon Bogdanor makes a powerful case for the positive role that monarchy plays in modern democratic politics. Ranging across law, politics, and history he argues that far from undermining democracy, the monarchy sustains and strengthens democratic institutions; that constitutional monarchy is a form of government that ensures not conservatism but legitimacy. The first serious examination of the political role of the monarchy to appear in many years, this book will make fascinating reading for all those interested in the monarchy and the future of British politics.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that shared, pre-constitutional cultural norms of political legitimacy among rational individuals provide the foundations of effective self-government, and examine the performance of contemporary Apache and Sioux economies on Indian reservations governed by common federally imposed constitutions.
Abstract: Governments are public goods that provide the organizational and legal structures by which societies arrange and enforce “rules of the game” that enable divisions of labor, exchange, and collective action. We argue that shared, pre-constitutional cultural norms of political legitimacy among rational individuals provide the foundations of effective self-government. The performance of contemporary Apache and Sioux economies on Indian reservations governed by common federally imposed constitutions is examined to test the framework. Unlike the impoverished Sioux, the relatively successful Apaches are found to have pre-existing political norms that (serendipidously) match the structure of their formal constitution.

Book
05 Oct 1995
TL;DR: In this paper, classical humanism and republicanism in England before the Civil War are discussed. But the continuity of the humanist tradition in early Caroline England Epilogue Bibliography.
Abstract: Introduction: classical humanism and republicanism in England before the Civil War 1. Classical humanism restated 2. Classical republicanism in the margins of Elizabethan politics 3. Civic life and the mixed constitution in Jacobean political thought 4. Francis Bacon, Thomas Hedley and the true greatness of Britain 5. Thomas Scott: virtue, liberty and the 'mixed Gouernement' 6. The continuity of the humanist tradition in early Caroline England Epilogue Bibliography.


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that similar welfare improvements as in economic affairs could be reached in political affairs as well, provided the European Constitution allows for, and actively supports, competition between governments at all levels.
Abstract: The single European economic market has been a great success. The four freedoms relating to the movement of goods, services, labour and capital have without doubt significantly increased the welfare of the citizens within the European Union. With respect to politics, including economic policy, the picture is rather different. Essentially, one institution, the European Commission and its bureaucracy, has established itself as a monopoly government for European affairs, despite its so far limited powers. This paper argues that similar welfare improvements as in economic affairs could be reached in political affairs as well, provided the European Constitution allows for, and actively supports, competition between governments at all levels. The competition between already existing governments must be preserved but in addition a future European Constitution should foster the emergence of competitive new jurisdictions best serving individual preferences. These new governmental units are called FOCJ. The acronym relates to its four major characteristics: F = functional, i.e. the new political units extend over areas defined by the tasks to be fulfilled; O = overlapping, i.e. in line with the many different tasks (functions) there are many different governmental units extending over different geographical areas; C = competing, i.e. individuals and/or communes may chose to what governmental unit they want to belong, and they have political rights to express their preferences directly via initiative and referenda; J = jurisdictions, i.e. the units established are governmental, they have enforcement power and can, in particular, raise taxes.

Book ChapterDOI
01 Dec 1995
TL;DR: In 1649, the Rump's political timidity restricted constitutional innovation even as it pursued a vigorous foreign policy with the conquest of Ireland and Scotland, and its proposals for Anglo-Dutch union as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In 1649 republicanism became available as a comprehensive political programme. With King Charles dead, the ancient constitution suspended, and ‘a Commonwealth or Free State’ declared, here was a moment to be seized for new-modelling the constitution at home and prosecuting grand designs abroad. Yet, as is well known, the Rump's political timidity restricted constitutional innovation even as it pursued a vigorous foreign policy with the conquest of Ireland and Scotland, and its proposals for Anglo-Dutch union. Republicanism was not responsible for internal renewal, but it did help to inspire external aggrandisement, with paradoxical effects: ‘Nourished by constitutional failure at home, republicanism throve too on military and naval success abroad.’ England may not have become a new Rome by virtue of its constitution, but the infant commonwealth certainly looked set fair to imitate the martial achievements of the ancient republics. The republican moment of 1649–53– from the declaration of the Commonwealth to Cromwell's forcible dissolution of the Long Parliament – inspired a variety of Englishmen to apply the lessons learnt from the classical republics to their own political situation. John Lilburne, in exile, first read Machiavelli, Livy and Plutarch in these years. In the same period, Marchamont Nedham's The Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated (1650) and his editorials for the government organ Mercurius Politicus in 1651–2 applied ancient history to modern politics, and drew upon a wide range of classical and contemporary sources to celebrate the successes of the Rump and to point the way forward for republican regeneration.

Posted Content
Andrew Arato1
TL;DR: For example, the authors argued that the process of making a constitution is a task that belongs to the political, of political politics, and of le pouvoir constituant.
Abstract: There are those who still think that constitution making is a task that rests wholly within the realm of lawyers. Indeed, all constitutional texts in modern times have been drafted by lawyers. Behind the texts, however, are the most important political actors and forces of a given society, persuading some interpreters to take the view that constitution making represents the work of the political, of political politics, and of le pouvoir constituant. In such a conception, whoever holds the "constituent power," or acts in its name, hires the lawyers. But does the method of constitution making really matter? Either way, the method itself may be deemed epiphenomenal - a formalistic facade either for the activity of experts or for the fundamental self-expression of an unlimited sovereign power.Yet, from the point of view of democratic theory, the type of process that establishes the rules of the game for democratic politics can hardly be seen as irrelevant. Given the compromises with non-democratic concerns that are involved in "normal" politics, under liberal democracies, it is especially important that the constituent process itself be democratic in a relatively strong sense. However, since any democracy is conceivable only according to specific rules and guidelines, one easily runs into the problem of circularity when demanding constitutions be made democratically.

MonographDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors deal with the social legislation of Zhu Yuanzhang, who founded the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), following the era of Mongol rule in China.
Abstract: This volume deals with the social legislation of Zhu Yuanzhang, who founded the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), following the era of Mongol rule in China. It recounts the circumstances under which the laws were enacted and what the Emperor claimed he was trying to accomplish - a restoration of traditional Chinese social norms. The contents of several codes are discussed in terms of the groups to which they applied and the range of activities they purported to regulate. The early Ming codes formed one of the most comprehensive and cohesive bodies of law in all of Chinese history. Taken as a group, they constituted an autocrate's blueprint for the ideal society. The texts of three codifications - an imperial clan constitution, a general summary of the laws, and guidelines for village life - are translated as appendixes.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse the changes in the economic constitution of the European Community since its foundation in 1958 and show that the process of European integration was largely based on the introduction of non-market elements.
Abstract: The present paper analyses, from an economic point of view, the changes in the economic constitution of the European Community since its foundation in 1958. In order to identify the various changes, we start by developing an economic frame of reference. Our proposition is that the constitution of the European Community (EC) came closest to this frame of reference: an economic constitution for a market system. In the subsequent parts, we try to show that the process of European integration was largely based on the introduction of non‐market elements. Our final argument will be that as far as the economic constitution is concerned, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is dominated by traits which are Characteristic of modern welfare states.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a novel perspective by emphasizing the significance of ritual in the national public sphere, and the relationship between ritual, rumor and the dialectics of state expansion in Mexico.
Abstract: This paper provides a novel perspective by emphasizing the significance of ritual in the national public sphere, and the relationship between ritual, rumor and the dialectics of state expansion in Mexico. It considers the historical development of political regions in Mexico; outlines the development of local public and national public spheres; then discusses the role of ritual in Mexican political geography. The author provides theoretical and methodological innovations, clarifying the connection between political ritual and the constitution of political communities in the national space

Book
24 Feb 1995
TL;DR: The Uneasy status of public administration has been discussed in the context of rationalist and anti-rationalist public administration as discussed by the authors, with a focus on the checking of power.
Abstract: Preface 1. Introduction: The Uneasy Status of Public Administration 2. Rationalist and Anti-rationalist Worldviews 3. The Worldviews of Public Administration and the Constitution 4. On the Checking of Power: The Logic of a Constitution 5. Visions of Public Administration 6. An Anti-rationalist Vision of Public Administration 7. The Ethics of Administrative Discretion 8. Summary and Conclusion References Index

Journal ArticleDOI
Arnaldo Testi1
TL;DR: Men and women's acquisition of suffrage in 1920 cannot be considered as simply the extension of voting rights to individuals who were previously denied them as discussed by the authors, and yet it seems reasonable to suppose that the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the long journey to get it, by upsetting the gender base of politics, had important implications for the whole political system.
Abstract: The entrance of women into the political arena and the ensuing passage from an exclusively male political universe to one in which both men and women participated raise neglected questions of general historical significance. These changes still wait to be incorporated into a comprehensive analysis of the transformation of American democracy between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1920s. Women's acquisition of suffrage in 1920 cannot be considered as simply the extension of voting rights to individuals who were previously denied them. Such an approach would be inconceivable in any serious investigation of the advent of universal male suffrage in theJacksonian age or of subsequent extensions of citizenship rights to immigrants and former slaves and, in the 1960s, to disfranchised southern blacks. Historical common sense considers these events epochal turning points in the property, ethnic, and racial bases of politics that substantially changed local, regional, and national public life. Such changes had dramatic visible effects. They produced vivid images that are still with us: the storming of the White House by a democratic crowd at the 1829 presidential inauguration; the birth of popular political parties in the 1830s; the invention of ethnic and immigrant-based urban politics; the dramatic emergence of emancipated slaves as legislators during black Reconstruction; the breakup of the lily-white Democratic South and the emergence of a new Republican party after the civil rights revolution. Apparently nothing like that happened with women in the 1920s: no storming of symbolic locations by crowds of women, no building of new-style political organizations, no women-dominated machines, no sudden upsurge of women legislators, no partisan realignments. And yet it seems reasonable to suppose that the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the long journey to get it, by upsetting the gender base of politics, had important implications (invisible because unexplored as well as unexplored because invisible) for the whole political system.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Henrion de Pansey (1742-1829) is an important but neglected constitutional historian whose views on the French past served as a commentary on the unwritten and written constitutions of his own age as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Henrion de Pansey (1742–1829) is an important but neglected constitutional historian whose views on the French past served as a commentary on the unwritten and written constitutions of his own age. A feudal lawyer before the revolution and an appeal judge under Napoleon and the restored Bourbons, he published a variety of works combining liberal sentiment with judicial traditionalism. His career illustrates the shift of moderate conservative opinion across the revolutionary divide. The alteration in his political thought is best understood through its conjunction with the three historical modes prevalent in his time: a discontinuous approach, accepting the past as a series of different regimes interrupted by revolutions; a developmental view, charting the progressive growth of institutions from seeds planted in antiquity; and a fundamentalist habit of thought that saw change as decline from pristine perfection. The jurists of sixteenth-century France remained Henrion's most admired models, and he used his roseate vision of the early modern French monarchy as a sometimes critical commentary on the constitutions designed in his own day. In prerevolutionary days he recast the ideas of the sixteenth-century rationalizer of feudalism, Charles Dumoulin, into Enlightenment terms. After the revolution, De l'Autoritejudiciaire (1810) depicted the moderating role of the judiciary as defenders of past constitutions, and formed an oblique commentary on Napoleon's civil code. Des Pairs et de l'ancienne constitution (1816) appraised the charter of 1814. It accepted a measure of popular participation in government, but held judicial expertise essential in legislation. Des Assemblees nationales (1826) shifted the emphasis from judicial oversight to the separation of powers and representative government, although Henrion, like Guizot and the doctrinaires, remained critical of popular democracy.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that there are grounds for guarded optimism over Ethiopia's leap in the dark, arguing that a new constitution like Ethiopia's must seem to be all things to all people and, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, the end of the Cold War has seen an explosion of ethnic nationalisms similar to the one occurring in Europe late in the 19th century.
Abstract: Benjamin Disraeli took a calculated “leap in the dark” in 1867, when he extended the right to vote to almost all British men. With hindsight, his leap can be seen to have been a necessary (but not sufficient) means of defusing discontent and promoting democratization. Ethiopia seems poised for an even bigger constitutional leap into a murkier realm, into an ethnicized attempt at democratization. To gain acceptance, a new constitution like Ethiopia's must seem to be all things to all people and, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, the end of the Cold War has seen an explosion of ethnic nationalisms similar to the one occurring in Europe late in the 19th century. Without benefit of hindsight one can only make informed guesses about the effects of a new Ethiopian “constitutionalism” on events which are largely beyond the drafters’ control. I will argue that there are grounds for a guarded optimism over Ethiopia's leap.