Showing papers on "Counterfactual conditional published in 2003"

Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account

Abstract: [Introduction] The nomothetic conception of explanation, according to which all successful explanations must appeal to laws, has dominated the discussion of scientific explanation in the second half of the twentieth century. The best known formulation of the nomothetic conception of explanation is, of course, Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological theory of explanation. While few philosophers today accept the D-N theory of explanation in its original formulation, there is widespread consensus that laws play a central role in explanation, even among prominent critics of the D-N model such as Wesley Salmon (see, e.g., Salmon 1984, p. 262).

Statistics and Causal Inference: A Review

Abstract: This paper aims at assisting empirical researchers benefit from recent advances in causal inference. The paper stresses the paradigmatic shifts that must be undertaken in moving from traditional statistical analysis to causal analysis of multivariate data. Special emphasis is placed on the assumptions that underly all causal inferences, the languages used in formulating those assumptions, and the conditional nature of causal claims inferred from nonexperimental studies. These emphases are illustrated through a brief survey of recent results, including the control of confounding, the assessment of causal effects, the interpretation of counterfactuals, and a symbiosis between counterfactual and graphical methods of analysis.

Counterfactuals, emotions, and context.

Abstract: Participants recalled either a negative academic or interpersonal experience, and the relations among counterfactual thinking, negative emotions, and attributions of blame and control were examined. Situational context effects on attribution, counterfactual thinking, and emotion were observed, indicating a greater tendency toward self-focused cognition and emotion in the academic context than in the interpersonal context. Consistent with recent theorising, upward counterfactual thinking was associated with negative emotions of guilt, shame, regret, disappointment, and sadness. However, there was no indication that downward counterfactual thinking regulated emotion as previous literature suggests. Implications for functional and process theories of counterfactual thinking are discussed.

Counterfactual Thinking, Blame Assignment, and Well-Being in Rape Victims

Abstract: Blame assignment and well-being among women who had been raped (N = 85) were investigated as a function of counterfactual thinking. The more upward counterfactuals (i.e., ways the rape might have been avoided) victims concurred with where some aspect of the self was mutated, the poorer their well-being. The effect of such upward counterfactual thinking on well-being was mediated by increases in self-blame. The amount of blame assigned to both the rapist and society did not mediate the effect of counterfactual thinking on well-being. These observed effects of counterfactual thinking on blame assignment are consistent with those obtained with uninvolved observers and with victims of other types of trauma. Models testing other possible relationship orderings were not supported. Implications for intervention strategies with rape victims are considered.

Presuppositions and Implicatures in Counterfactuals

Abstract: In this article, I propose a semantic account of temporally mismatched past subjunctive counterfactuals The proposal consists of the following parts First, I show that in cases of temporal mismatch, [past] cannot be interpreted inside the proposition where it occurs at surface structure Instead, it must be interpreted as constraining the time argument of the accessibility relation This has the effect of shifting the time of the evaluation of the conditional to some contextually salient past time Second, I will propose specific felicity conditions (presuppositions) for subjunctive conditionals and I will argue that there is a strict correspondence between the time of evaluation in the truth conditions of a conditional and the time relevant for the felicity conditions In other words, if the time relevant for the accessibility relation has been shifted to the past, then the conditional's presupposition will make reference to a past context On the other hand, if no past is constraining the time argument of the accessibility relation, the conditional's felicity will make reference to the current (main) context Third, I will argue that the intuition that the antecedent of mismatched counterfactuals is not true is a scalar implicature arising from a competition not between assertions but between presuppositions Finally, I will investigate the repercussions of my proposal for the general theory of modality

Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains

Abstract: Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children’s developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998). In the study reported here, groups of 3- and 4-year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3-year-olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four-year-old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.

“Blaming The Victim” Under Memory Load

Abstract: When presented with negative outcomes, people often engage in counterfactual thinking, imagining various ways that events might have been different. This appears to be a spontaneous behavior, with considerable adaptive value. Nevertheless, counterfactual thinking may also engender systematic biases in various judgment tasks, such as allocating blame for a mishap, or deciding on the appropriate compensation to a victim. Thus, counterfactuals sometimes require thought suppression or discounting, potentially resource-demanding tasks. In this study, participants made mock-jury decisions about control and counterfactual versions of simple stories. The judgments of two groups of participants, differing in their respective levels of working memory capacity, were compared. In addition, all participants held memory loads during various stages of the primary task. Lower-span individuals were especially susceptible to bias associated with the counterfactual manipulation, but only when holding memory loads during jud...

Counterfactual cognitive deficit in persons with Parkinson’s disease

Abstract: Background: Counterfactuals are mental representations of alternatives to past events. Recent research has shown them to be important for other cognitive processes, such as planning, causal reasoning, problem solving, and decision making—all processes independently linked to the frontal lobes. Objective: To test the hypothesis that counterfactual thinking is impaired in some patients with Parkinson’s disease and is linked to frontal dysfunction in these patients. Methods. Measures of counterfactual processing and frontal lobe functioning were administered to 24 persons with Parkinson’s disease and 15 age matched healthy controls. Results. Patients with Parkinson’s disease spontaneously generated significantly fewer counterfactuals than controls despite showing no differences from controls on a semantic fluency test; they also performed at chance levels on a counterfactual inference test, while age matched controls performed above chance levels on this test. Performance on both the counterfactual generation and inference tests correlated significantly with performance on two tests traditionally linked to frontal lobe functioning (Stroop colour–word interference and Tower of London planning tasks) and one test of pragmatic social communication skills. Conclusions: Counterfactual thinking is impaired in Parkinson’s disease. This impairment may be related to frontal lobe dysfunction.

AGAINST LEWIS's NEW THEORY OF CAUSATION: A STORY WITH THREE MORALS

Abstract: A recent paper by David Lewis, “Causation as Influence”, provides a new theory of causation. This paper presents an argument against the theory, using a series of counterexamples that are, I think, of independent interest to philosophers of causation. I argue that (a) the relation asserted by a claim of the form “C was a cause of E” is distinct from the relation of causal influence, (b) the former relation depends very much, contra Lewis, on the individuation conditions for the event E, and (c) Lewis’s account is unsatisfactory as an analysis of either kind of relation. The counterexamples presented here provide, I suggest, some insight into the reasons for the failure of counterfactual accounts of causal relations. David Lewis’s new account of causation (Lewis 2000) is, I believe, mistaken, but it is mistaken in instructive ways. In what follows, I present an argument against the account, based on a scenario that I claim constitutes a simple counterexample to all three of Lewis’s counterfactual accounts of causation, and I draw several broad morals for the study of the truth conditions of claims of the form “C is a cause of E”.

If Only I Hadn't Smoked: The Impact of Counterfactual Thinking on a Smoking-Related Behavior.

Abstract: The role of counterfactual thinking as an effective antismoking communications strategy is examined. Specifically, this study investigates how various types of counterfactual thoughts, generated in response to a detrimental smoking scenario, impact individuals' affective evaluations of the scenario, as well as their willingness to participate in a smoking-related behavioral test, a lung-capacity test. This is tested in three experiments, which differ in the timing of gathering individuals' willingness to participate in the lung-capacity test. Experiment 1 collected individuals' willingness to participate in the test shortly after the counterfactual task, whereas Experiments 2 and 3 made this assessment 2 and 7 days following the counterfactual task (respectively). The results of all three experiments indicated that although upward counterfactuals had a negative impact on individuals' affective evaluations of the scenario, they had no effect on participants' willingness to schedule a lung- capacity test. Alternatively, additive counterfactuals did have a significant impact on individuals' preparative actions, despite having no influence on their affective evaluations. This effect, however, decreased with time. By demonstrating that counterfactual thinking may significantly influence smoking-related behaviors, this study's findings contribute to and extend prior counterfactual and antismoking research. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Bayesian networks and traffic accident reconstruction

Abstract: The attempt to draw rational conclusions about a road accident can be viewed as a problem in uncertain reasoning about a particular event, to which developments in the modeling of uncertain reasoning for artificial intelligence can be applied. Physical principles can be used to develop a structural model for the accident, and this model can then be combined with an expert assessment of prior uncertainty concerning the model's variables. Posterior probabilities, given evidence collected at the accident scene, can then be computed using Bayes theorem. Truth conditions for counterfactual claims about the accident can then be defined using a "possible worlds" semantics, and used to rigorously implement a "but for" test of whether or not a speed limit violation could be considered a cause of the accident.

Counterfactuals for Consequentialists

Abstract: That all subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and trueconsequents are themselves also true is implied by every plausibleand popularly endorsed account. But I am wary of endorsing thisimplication. I argue that all presently endorsed accounts fail tocapture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contextsof consequentialist reasoning. I attempt to show that we must allowfor the possibility that some subjunctive conditionals with trueantecedents and true consequents are false, if we are to believethat certain types of straightforward consequentialist reasoningare coherent. I begin by evaluating a pair of morally releventcounterfactuals in a case via David Lewis's account. I then turnto a slight modification of the case, arguing that Lewis'ssemantics fails to generate the correct truth values of thesubjunctive conditionals in the modified case. Finally, I presenta modified version of Lewis's semantics that generates the correctresults in all of the cases.

Opportunity cost, excess profit and counterfactual conditionals

Abstract: Counterfactual conditionals are cognitive tools that we incessantly use during our lives for judgments, evaluations, decisions. Counterfactuals are used for defining concepts as well; an instance of this is attested by the notions of opportunity cost and excess profit, two all-pervasive notions of economics: They are defined by undoing a given scenario and constructing a suitable counterfactual milieu. Focussing on the standard paradigm [Peasnell, 1981, 1982; Peccati, 1987, 1990, 1991; Ohlson, 1995] and Magni’s [2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006] alternative paradigm this paper shows that the formal translation of the counterfactual state is not univocal and that Magni’s approach retains formal properties of symmetry, additive coherence, homeomorphism, which correspond to properties of frame-independence, time invariance, completeness. Two introductory studies are also presented to illustrate how people cope with these counterfactuals and ascertain whether either model is seen as more “natural”. A brief discussion of the results obtained is also provided.

The grounding objection to middle knowledge revisited

Abstract: The Molinist doctrine that God has middle knowledge requires that God knows the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom, propositions about what free agents would do in hypothetical circumstances. A well-known objection to middle knowledge, the grounding objection, contends that counterfactuals of freedom have no truth-value because there is no fact to the matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in counterfactual circumstances. Molinists, however, have offered responses to the grounding objection that they believe are adequate for maintaining the coherence of middle knowledge. I argue that these responses to the grounding objection are not adequate, and that what I call the ‘generic grounding objection’ still poses a serious challenge to middle knowledge.

‘Afterword’: Counterfactual Histories of the Great Depression

Abstract: As Dr Balderston notes in his introduction to this volume, history is necessarily written in terms of a model, whether implicitly or explicitly, and a model invariably suggests counterfactuals. In this note, we first review our model of the Great Depression (‘the ET model’ as it is referred to by Balderston) and then explore the counterfactuals that flow from its application to the monetary, macroeconomic and political history of the 1930s.

The Morphosemantics of Warlpiri Counterfactual Conditionals

Abstract: Iatridou (2000) presents a morphosemantic theory of counterfactual conditionals in which past tense morphology is crucially implicated. Some subsequent work investigates how counterfactuality is realized in languages that lack tense (see Rackowski 1998 for Tagalog and Nevins 2002 for Chinese). In this squib I address a different issue: the morphosemantics of counterfactuality in Warlpiri, a language that has past morphology, but fails to use it in counterfactuals. I show that despite this prima facie challenge, the Warlpiri data provide additional support for Iatridou's theory

David Lewis’s Counterfactual Arrow of Time

Abstract: David Lewis (1979) has argued that according to his possible worlds analysis of counterfactuals, "backtracking" counterfactuals of the form "If event A were to happen at tA, then event B would happen at tB" where tB precedes tA, are usually false if B does not actually happen at tB. On the other hand, there are plenty of such counterfactuals true with tA preceding tB; for instance it is true that were I to drop the glass now, it would hit the ground at some point in the future, even if in fact it does not do so. Assuming some contingent facts about the arrangement and laws of our universe, this time-reversal asymmetry, Lewis claims, follows from a possible worlds analysis of counterfactuals despite the fact that this analysis of counterfactuals is entirely time symmetric. Lewis argues, further, that this asymmetry gives meaning to the common notion of the future as "open" and the past as "closed", even if determinism both of the future by the past and of the past by the future is true, which for the purposes of the analysis he assumes it to be and in which assumption I will follow him in this paper. With Lewis, and also contrary to my own views, I will assume physicalism. Much of the argument of Lewis's (1979) paper is a reply to an objection that had been raised by Fine and others against his analysis of counterfactuals. I shall argue that Lewis's reply succeeds in some interesting special cases but fails in others to demonstrate the asymmetry he seeks. But even more seriously, I shall show that the asymmetry Lewis finds, if there actually is one to be found there, is grounded in the fact that there is a time-reversal asymmetric preselection in the kinds of events that figure as antecedents of ordinary language counterfactuals. We do not in practice ask: "What would happen if p held?" for every proposition p, but only for some. I argue that this preselection of some antecedents of counterfactuals but not others in everyday counterfactuals is based in part on the commonsensical notion that generally it is past events that are the causes of future

Causality. models, reasoning, and inference

Abstract: This book seeks to integrate research on cause and effect inference from cognitive science, econometrics, epidemiology, philosophy, and statistics It puts forward the work of its author, his collaborators, and others over the past two decades as a new account of cause and effect inference that can aid practical researchers in many fields, including econometrics Pearl adheres to several propositions on cause and effect inference Though cause and effect relations are fundamentally deterministic (he explicitly excludes quantum mechanical phenomena from his concept of cause and effect), cause and effect analysis involves probability language Probability language helps to convey uncertainty about cause and effect relations but is insufficient to fully express those relations In addition to conditional probabilities of events, cause and effect analysis requires graphs or diagrams and a language that distinguishes intervention or manipulation from observation Cause and effect analysis also requires counterfactual reasoning and causal assumptions in addition to observations and statistical assumptions Chapter 1 sketches some of the ingredients of the new approach to cause and effect inference: probability theory, graphs, Bayesian causal networks, causal models, and causal and statistical terminology Chapter 2 builds the elements of Chapter 1 into a theory of inferred causation Chapter 3 focuses on causal diagrams and identifying causal effects Chapter 4 studies intervention or manipulation and direct causal effects Chapter 5 considers causality and structural equation models Chapter 6 examines Simpson's paradox and confounding Chapter 7 blends structural modeling with counterfactual reasoning Chapter 8 is an approach to imperfect random assignment experiments through bounding effects and counterfactuals Chapter 9 analyzes notions of necessary cause and sufficient cause Chapter 10 explicates a concept of single event causality The epilogue is a public lecture that Pearl gave at UCLA that, in mostly not too technical language, places the new approach to causality within the long history of thought on the subject The interdisciplinary nature of the book, a great strength, at times makes it difficult to read because its theory of inferred causation blends the languages

Capacities, explanation and the possibility of disunity

Abstract: Nancy Cartwright argues that so-called capacities, not universal laws of nature, best explain the often complex way events actually unfold. On this view, science would represent a world that is fundamentally "dappled", or disunified, and not, as orthodoxy would perhaps have it, a world unified by universal laws of nature. I argue, first, that the problem Cartwright raises for laws of nature seems to arise for capacities too, so why reject laws of nature? Second, that in so far as there is a problem, it concerns the role of counterfactuals in explanation; I then briefly propose a simple model of counterfactual explanation. Finally, I investigate how a sophisticated version of the regularity theory of laws of nature (that of Ramsey-Lewis) can be neutral between the empirical hypotheses that the world is unified, and that the world is disunified.

Temporal dynamic semantics of factual counterfactuals

Abstract: This paper discusses the fake past tense morphology used for present state in Japanese (Teramura 1984; Iatridou 2000). Unlike Korean and other languages, the past tense marker "ta" can express an unexpected finding or remembrance at the time of speech (Inoue and Ubukoshi 1997). I claim that this construction corresponds to subjunctive conditionals with a covert negative antecedent, and that counterfactuality is involved in such non-past past tense, even though the proposition expressed is factual. It is comparable to the counterfactual analysis of factive emotive predicates such as "sorry"and "glad" (Heim 1992; Giorgi and Pianesi 1997). I show that non-past past construction updates the information state, and revises the context.

Counterfactual Reasoning: How to Organize a Possible World

Abstract: Counterfactual reasoning appears to be a universal phenomenon of human inference from childhood to adulthood, yet, the prevailing explanations seem able to capture only a limited aspect of the process and are in need of an overarching framework. We propose that David Lewis’ possible worlds analysis offers a first approximation to such a framework and gives a psychologically plausible account of counterfactuals. It identifies the unique properties of our ability to reason from false assumptions—whether talking about pretense or revising our beliefs. Three experiments are offered to suggest the plausibility of this account. Counterfactual Reasoning Counterfactual or hypothetical reasoning is ubiquitous in human interaction. It ranges from children’s pretense (Scott, Baron-Cohen, & Leslie, 1999), everyday regret for the past, planning for the future (Roese & Olson, 1995), revising our knowledge base (e.g., Elio & Pelletier, 1997), to testing hypotheses (Farris & Revlin, 1989). Theories or descriptions of how this type of reasoning is actually accomplished are as varied as the situations they describe. Models of pretense rely on broadly specified processes, such as activation of “possible world box”, input from “belief box”, etc. (e.g., Nichols & Stich, 2000). Social psychologists describe tendencies to uphill vs. downhill reasoning when considering how events could have been different (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Models of belief revision range from minimizing the number of discarded propositions (e.g.,Elio & Pelletier, 1997) to preferences for certain types of sentences (e.g.; Revlis, Lipkin, & Hayes, 1971). Models of reasoning emphasize semantic and inference procedures (e.g., Walsh & Byrne, 2002) or modal logic categories (e.g., Revlin, Cate, & Rouss, 2001). A proposal for the process of counterfactual reasoning that has only slightly been represented in research paradigms is one offered from philosophical writings by David Lewis (1973, 1986) in his proposal of Possible Worlds. Our purpose here is to explore the consequences of Lewis’ possible worlds treatment for counterfactual judgments in a belief-revision paradigm. We begin by describing the paradigm and why it might be useful as well as some basic findings. Then we turn to a description of Lewis’ possible worlds and how it might be useful in understanding the findings of at least the beliefrevision paradigm. Belief Revision Paradigm When we conjecture about some hypothesis, whose truth is in doubt or when we consider the consequences of some conjecture for what we already know or believe, we are doing counterfactual or hypothetical reasoning (Revlis & Hayes, 1972). A formal definition would be reasoning from false assumptions (Chisholm, 1946; Rescher, 1964). Let us suppose that you have discovered a new creature--it lays eggs and can live under water for prolonged periods of time and has no external mammary teats. On the face of this evidence you believe the animal is a reptile and treat it that way. However, someone proposes that you should assume, for the sake of argument, that it is a mammal”. To evaluate this conjecture, you might assemble some pertinent facts from your belief portfolio and add the new “fact” to it 1 : (1) (a) All mammals have live births (b) This creature lays eggs (c) This creature is a reptile (not a mammal) (d) Assume: this creature is a mammal There are two inconsistencies here. First the assumption directly contradicts statement (c), which must now be labeled “false”. Second, the assumption, when joined with statement (a), contradicts statement (b) [If all mammals have live births and this creature is a mammal, then this creature must not lay eggs]. Later we will refer to this as the Generalist Path. Alternately, if we join the assumption with statement (b), the two jointly contradict statement (a) [This mammal lays eggs so not all mammals have live births]. This will be referred to as the Particularist Path. Given that these assembled “facts” are the pertinent ones to be considered, how shall we resolve the inconsistency introduced by this assumption, which contradicts our beliefs (at least it contradicts the belief that this creature is a reptile)? This is not a toy problem. The characteristics of the creature in question in (1) are among those of the platypus whose inclusion in the category of mammals was 1 Technically, the suppositions described here are beliefcontravening in that they contradict an accepted assertion, but do not necessarily deny a long held statement of fact. The paradigmatic problems are called belief-contravening problems by Rescher (1964).

Discussion: Time-Symmetric Quantum Counterfactuals

Abstract: There is a trend to consider counterfactuals as invariably time-asymmetric. Recently, this trend manifested itself in the controversy about validity of counterfactual application of a time-symmetric quantum probability rule. Kastner (2003) analyzed this controversy and concluded that there are time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals which are consistent, but they turn out to be trivial. I correct Kastner's misquotation of my defense of time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals and explain their non-trivial aspects, thus contesting the claim that counterfactuals have to be time-asymmetric.

Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations

Abstract: This article critically examines the use of single-observation case studies to develop causal explanations for significant legal events, detailing the evidential and inferential problems inherent in this methodology Most significant among these problems is that focus on a single case necessitates the use of counterfactual thought experiments to test causal hypotheses The pitfalls of such thought experiments are illustrated through discussion of recent attempts to explain the collapse of Enron Corporation using this approach Application of a set of normative criteria to the products of these Enron thought experiments reveals the suspect nature of causal explanations and policy prescriptions drawn from single-observation case studies

Counterfactual Analyses of Causation: The Problem of Effects and Epiphenomena Revisited

Abstract: Nearly all recent discussion of counterfactual analyses of causation has focussed on redundant causation: various forms of preemption, chance lowering cause and trumping.1 Few have attended to the problem of effects or the problem of epiphenomena. These problems are about ensuring that the counterfactual analysis does not certify that event e causes event c where either the causation is in the opposite direction-the problem of effectsor e and c have a common cause but neither causes the other-the problem of epiphenomena. I argue that these latter problems, when properly examined, reveal a very serious dilemma for the counterfactual analysis. The dilemma in a nutshell is this. In entertaining a counterfactual supposition that an event c had not occurred, we conceive of the removal of c from the actual world and necessarily countenance further disturbance of that world in securing the removal of c. These disturbances can generate counterfactual dependencies that entail causation where there is none. I argue that these commitments to bogus causal judgments cannot all be explained away by refining what we mean by an event. Furthermore, attempts to eradicate these unwanted counterfactual dependencies by altering the similarity metric governing the counterfactual dependence only undermines the capacity of the counterfactual analysis to explain real causation elsewhere. The dilemma holds for both straight and probabilistic counterfactual analyses.2

Does economic theory need more evidence?: a balancing of arguments

Abstract: This article seeks to provide a characterization of theory prevalent in economics and found in many areas of social and natural science, particularly those that make increasing use of rational choice perspectives. Four kinds of theoretical project are identified in which empirical evidence plays a relatively small role in theory acceptance. The paper associates the minor role of evidence in theory formation and acceptance to a need to answer counterfactual questions and argues that is not necessarily incompatible with accounts of science that emphasise truth in the development of theory. However, this view of economics does highlight factors that play a central role in theory acceptance which have not featured very strongly, if at all, in the philosophy of science literature. The article goes on to discuss four areas of economics that illustrate the consequences of using theory acceptance procedures which give relatively little weight to empirical testing. Benefits and costs of counterfactual science as it has developed in economics are discussed. It is concluded that there are good reasons why scientists may not use evidence in theory acceptance, even if an unintended consequence has been to strip economics of valuable empirical sensibilities still evident in natural sciences.

A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation

Abstract: If we seek to analyse causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals then we must assume that there is a class of counterfactuals whose members (i) are all and only those we need to support our judgements of causation, (ii) have truth-conditions specifiable without any irreducible appeal to causation. I argue that (i) and (ii) are unlikely to be met by any counterfactual analysis of causation. I demonstrate this by isolating a class of counterfactuals called non-projective counterfactuals, or NP-counterfactuals, and indicate how counterfactual analyses of causation must appeal to them to account for the correct causal judgements we make. I show that the truth-conditions of NP-counterfactuals are specifiable only by irreducible appeal to causation. A dilemma then holds: if counterfactual analyses of causation eschew appeal to NP-counterfactuals they are empirically inadequate, but if they appeal to NP-counterfactuals they are circular and thus conceptually inadequate.

Quantification over Times in Subjunctive Conditionals

Abstract: In this paper I will propose a compositional semantics for counterfac­ tuals motivated by the need to solve some puzzles that I will shortly discuss. The main thesis is that the puzzles of counterfactuals can be understood once we unveil the hidden quantification over times . I will propose that the essential feature of a counterfactual is the presence above the modal operator of temporal and aspectual operators manipulating the time argument of the accessibility relation. In section I will discuss the puzzles of counterfactuals ; and in sections ( 1 2) and (23) I will present my proposal .

Closeness of worlds

Abstract: An objection is presented to Lewis’s analysis of counterfactual conditionals in terms of relative closeness of possible worlds The objection depends on no special assumptions about the ‘closer-than’ relation The argument also casts doubt on Lewis’s claim that Antecedent Strengthening fails for counterfactuals

On the Counterfactual Dimension of Negative Liberty

Abstract: This article explores some implications of the counterfactual aspect of freedom and unfreedom Because actions can be unprevented even if they are not undertaken, and conversely because actions can be prevented even if they are not attempted and are thus not overtly thwarted, any adequate account of negative liberty must ponder numerous counterfactual chains of events Each person's freedom or unfreedom is affected not only by what others in fact do, but also by what they are disposed to do Their dispositions play a key role in determining whether the abilities and inabilities of each person would continue as such if the person's conduct or situation were altered in various respects Until one knows whether people would or would not have acted in certain ways if a given person had sought to do something, one cannot know whether that person was free to do that thing Nor can one know whether the person was free to perform that action in combination with manifold subsequent actions Thus, whether tacit or

Using Counterfactuals in Knowledge-Based Programming

Abstract: This paper adds counterfactuals to the framework of knowledge-based programs of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi. The use of counterfactuals is illustrated by designing a protocol in which an agent stops sending messages once it knows that it is safe to do so. Such behavior is difficult to capture in the original framework because it involves reasoning about counterfactual executions, including ones that are not consistent with the protocol. Attempts to formalize these notions without counterfactuals are shown to lead to rather counterintuitive behavior.