Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 1995"

Reconceptualizing Deterrence: An Empirical Test of Personal and Vicarious Experiences

Abstract: In a recent article, Stafford and Warr (1993) presented a reconceptualization of the deterrence doctrine where general deterrence is taken to be the result of persons' vicarious experiences. Such vicarious experiences include, among other things, knowledge of the criminal activity of others and the consequences or lack of consequences of that activity. Specific deterrence is taken to be the result of persons' own personal experiences. These personal experiences include, among other things, own experience with punishment and punishment avoidance. In their reconceptualized deterrence theory, persons may concurrently be subject to both general and specific deterrent effects, some persons may be affected more by one type of deterrence than the other, and the two types of deterrent effects may reinforce one another. In addition, they argue that their version of deterrence theory promises some insight into current controversies in the literature. In this article, the authors first review and expand Stafford and...

China's New "Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited Deterrence

Abstract: In the last five to ten years, Chinese military strategists have developed a concept of limited deterrence that is now used to describe what China`s nuclear forces ought to be able to do. Limited deterrence rests on a limited war-fighting capability aimed at communicating China`s ability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at every rung on the escalation ladder and thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war. It is this capability, Chinese strategists argue, that will deter such a war in the first place. Limited deterrence therefore requires the development of a greater number of tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear weapons that are accurate enough to hit counterforce targets, are mobile, can be used in the earliest stages of a nuclear crisis, and in a world of THAAD are capable of penetrating ballistic missile defense systems. These forces would thus require effective space-based early warning, and some configuration of BMD capabilities. Given that China does not now have such capabilities, the straight-line prediction would be that over the next decade or so, we should expect to see a discernible effort to shift the forces away from a minimum strike-back assured destruction posture, which China now has, towardmore » limited war-fighting. This may or may not entail a dramatic short-run increase in the absolute numbers of warheads and delivery systems: the pace will depend in part on whether the United States proceeds with TMD deployment. The speed of change in China`s nuclear capabilities will also depend in part on whether the implementation of START II leads to a steep relative increase in the size of the Chinese arsenal and reduces the relative number of counterforce targets. The primary constraints on any such efforts are exogenous, namely, budgetary and arms control constraints. It is an open question whether endogenous constraints-a shift in doctrine toward minimum deterrence-might be encouraged. 120 refs.« less

Chapter 9 Terrorism: Theory and applications

Abstract: This chapter reviews game-theoretic and choice-theoretic depictions of terrorist behavior. A simple game-theoretic framework is presented to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. In another game model, we analyze whether two governments (nations) that are targeted by the same terrorist group would overdeter or underdeter terrorist attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate that piecemeal policy, which allows the governments to share intelligence but not deterrence decisions, can be worse than no coordination. Choice-theoretic models identify substitution and complementarity possibilities among diverse modes of terrorist attacks as terrorists respond optimally to government actions. A host of time-series techniques are used to study the effectiveness of alternative antiterrorism policies. Vector-autoregression intervention procedures are particularly suited. Time-series analyses are also used to identify cycles, trends, and irregular components for forecasting purposes.

Terrorism: Theory and applications

Abstract: This chapter reviews game-theoretic and choice-theoretic depictions of terrorist behavior A simple game-theoretic framework is presented to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy In another game model, we analyze whether two governments (nations) that are targeted by the same terrorist group would overdeter or underdeter terrorist attacks Moreover, we demonstrate that piecemeal policy, which allows the governments to share intelligence but not deterrence decisions, can be worse than no coordination Choice-theoretic models identify substitution and complementarity possibilities among diverse modes of terrorist attacks as terrorists respond optimally to government actions A host of time-series techniques are used to study the effectiveness of alternative antiterrorism policies Vector-autoregression intervention procedures are particularly suited Time-series analyses are also used to identify cycles, trends, and irregular components for forecasting purposes

Dynamic Deterrence Theory

Abstract: Economic theories of deterrence have primarily been built on static models. A common and serious shortcoming of the existing dynamic deterrence models is the assumption of a twoperiod structure that ignores recidivism. The aims of this paper are to formulate and solve a general dynamic deterrence model that incorporates recidivistic behaviour, to explore its implications, and to derive some testable predictions. The analysis shows how the value and the intensity of engaging in illegal activity change over time, highlights the weaknesses of twoperiod deterrence models and compares the deterrent effectiveness of increasing the likelihood of punishment versus the severity of punishment. Finally, the recidivistic model provides a structural foundation for the widely used stochastic-process models of crime in operations research and criminology.

Chapter 6 Arms races and proliferation

Abstract: Previous analyses of arms races and proliferation are integrated and extended, building from a treatment of the behavioral foundations of weapons acquisitions to a general theory of arms races, with implications for the role of negotiations, the balance of power, the timing of crises, and nuclear proliferation. Recent developments in economic theory are also applied here to the problems of the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and the outbreak of war, yielding a deeper treatment of these phenomena by directly or indirectly treating asymmetric information in bargaining, repeated games that involve threats, and principal-agent problems in decisions on technology and weapons accumulation.

Price Discrimination and Mergers

Abstract: The authors demonstrate how purely anticompetitive horizontal mergers can produce larger gains for merging firms than for nonmerging firms. Moreover, these anticompetitive mergers do not promote entry. These findings, which eliminate a long-standing free-rider problem from the previous merger literature, stem from the ability of firms to price discriminate under asymmetric competition. To illustrate, the authors use a spatial model of consumer preferences. Their results suggest that merger may significantly reduce consumer surplus in markets with certain characteristics, such as those where bidding occurs. The authors' model also shows that price discrimination facilitates entry deterrence in spatial markets.

Deterrence and the Cold War

Abstract: The role of nuclear weapons in Soviet-American relations has been hotly debated. Politicians, generals, and most academic strategists believe that America's nuclear arsenal restrained the Soviet Union throughout the cold war. Critics maintain that nuclear weapons were a root cause of superpower conflict and a threat to peace. Controversy also surrounds the number and kinds of weapons necessary to deter, the political implications of the strategic balance, and the role of nuclear deterrence in hastening the collapse of the Soviet imperium. These debates have had a distinctly theological quality. Partisans frequently defended their positions without recourse to relevant evidence. Some advocated strategic doctrines that were consistent with military postures that they supported. "War-fighting" doctrines were invoked by the air force to justify silo-busting weapons like the MX missile. 1 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was espoused by arms controllers to oppose the deployment of particular weapons systems. More careful analysts have been alert to the difficulty of making definitive judgments about deterrence in the absence-of valid and reliable information about Soviet and Chinese objectives and calculations. McGeorge Bundy, in his masterful Danger and Survival, tells a cautionary tale of the impatience of leaders to acquire nuclear weapons, their largely futile attempts to exploit these weapons for political purposes and, finally, their efforts through arms control, to limit the dangers

The Amateur Strategist: Intuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Arms Race

Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. A primer on the Cold War nuclear debate 3. An introduction to intuitive deterrence theories 4. Competing hypotheses about nuclear thinking 5. The novice strategists 6. The intuitive calculus of nuclear deterrence 7. Statistical tests of the intuitive nuclear calculus 8. Expert nuclear reasoning 9. The factional politics of strategy and the end of the Cold War arms race 10. Nuclear thinking after the cold war.

Nuclear deterrence in a regional context

Abstract: : This report examines the broad outlines of U.S. strategies of deterring nuclear use by regional adversaries and, when deterrence may be ineffective, for defeating such threats. It represents an application of the concepts contained in a companion document (Watman and Wilkening, 1994), in which the basic ideas underlying deterrence have been reformulated to make them more applicable to regional conflicts. Regional nuclear confrontations will involve brinkmanship, i.e., a competition in risk-taking in which the side that is more risk acceptant and that can credibly make sufficiently devastating threats has the upper hand. Credibility, in turn, is determined by the balance of resolve and the balance of power between the contestants.

Rational Deterrence Theory Revisited: A Progress Report

Abstract: Progress in the debate over rational deterrence has always depended on the ability of scholars to identify a body of evidence that would be appropriate for testing a wide range of propositions derived from the theory. Notwithstanding the tremendous amount of time and energy spent on producing a suitable list of cases, and several noteworthy surveys of the literature, cumulative knowledge about deterrence, both as a theory and as a strategy, remains elusive. It still is unclear whether decision makers have acted according to the logic derived from standard applications of the theory. Moreover, the most prominent testing strategy, originally designed by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, and later criticized and revised by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, continues to be plagued by ongoing disputes over methods and case listings. Although debates over the accuracy of historical accounts are constructive, lingering divisions over coding of deterrence successes and failures have become counterproductive, primarily because each side has produced evidence to support their interpretation of events. Very little effort, by comparison, has been directed towards (a) developing alternative testing strategies that lie outside the success/failure framework, or (b) looking at a wider range of propositions derived from the theory. This analysis attempts the task, analyzing in the aggregate 28 cases of superpower rivalry.

Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of “Flexible Response”

Abstract: A two-stage Asymmetric Escalation Game is developed to explore the connection between stage credibility and deterrence stability. There are two players in the model: Challenger and Defender. Challenger may initiate or not. If Challenger initiates, Defender may do nothing, respond in kind, or escalate; Challenger may then escalate or counterescalate, and so on. Each player is uncertain about the other's intentions at the final stage of the game. Escalation represents a choice that both players believe is qualitatively different from other available responses. Thus the model applies to any situation in which Defender may respond by crossing a threshold, thereby inducing a (psychologically) distinct level of conflict.The Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are identified and interpreted, and inferences are drawn about the viability of limited war options and various competing flexible response deployment policies. In general, the model reveals that substrategic deployments add little to overall deterrence stability. Under certain relatively rare conditions, a policy called no-first-use in the super power context offers Defender advantages that might conceivably warrant the deployment stance associated with it. But a war fighting deployment never benefits Defender. Within the confines of the model, therefore, limited or substrategic wars are possible but unlikely.

U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies

Abstract: : With the Cold War over, U.S. national security strategy has shifted away from its focus on the former Soviet Union and toward possible U.S. regional involvements. As a consequence, the applicability to regional adversaries of virtually all the fundamental elements of U.S. strategy-which were developed during the Cold War with the Soviet Union-must be reevaluated. Among these fundamentals is the role of deterrence. Deterrence was the heart of U.S. strategy for countering the Soviets, both because the United States believed the Soviets were deterrable and because war with the Soviets was unacceptably dangerous. Much of what is called 'deterrence theory' was developed specifically for this function. Therefore, regional strategy requires revisiting basic questions about deterrence. This report represents an attempt to come to grips with fundamental questions. As such, it should be of interest to policy makers, strategists, and military planners interested in the conceptual requirements for effective deterrence, as well as the operational and force structure implications that emerge should the United States make regional deterrence one of the pillars of its national military strategy.

Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?

Abstract: INTRODUCTION Rational deterrence theory provides scholars with an explanatory framework which specifies the requirements for the success and failure of deterrence. (1) Yet, conclusive empirical evidence that deterrence successes occur has eluded deterrence theorists. (2) According to Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, the main critics in the most recent challenge to deterrence theory, (3) the empirical evidence suggests that deterrence rarely succeeds. (4) They argue that a review of international incidents over the last ninety years reveals only three cases of extended immediate deterrence success. Based on this review, as well as on their own empirical investigations, Lebow and Stein conclude that deterrence rarely succeeds and that leaders, because of political vulnerabilities, challenge deterrence even when the defender's threats are credible. Lebow and Stein argue that "among the most important findings with respect to the dependent variable is the seemingly elusive and fragile nature of the success of immediate deterrence." (5) If Lebow and Stein's interpretation of events is correct, then the "weakness thesis," a variation on the "scapegoat hypothesis" or the "diversionary theory of war," (6) poses a serious challenge to deterrence theory. If a challenger is compelled by domestic or international weakness to challenge deterrence despite the credibility of the defender's threat, or to stand firm and not back down during a crisis for fear of losing face, then deterrence policies are indeed irrelevant and even counter-productive; instead of preventing war they lead to war. Under such circumstances deterrence theory would fail to account for deterrence outcomes and would be a poor conflict management tool. This conclusion, if supported by a closer analysis of the evidence, would pose a serious dilemma for decision-makers in status-quo states. It suggests that the international system contains a group of "non-deterrable" states and that a defender's use of deterrence is unlikely to succeed. The implications of this conclusion for U.S. policy makers in the post Cold War era would be serious because the United States is most likely to be confronted, in the immediate future, by so called "non-deterrable" conventional regional powers. Lebow and Stein's conclusion is based to a large extent on their investigation of cases of deterrence failure in the Middle East--the 1969 War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel. This paper examines Lebow and Stcin's conclusion that deterrence successes rarely occur and that leaders challenge deterrence, despite the defender's credible threats, because of political vulnerabilities. It argues that a flawed research design is the reason for Lebow's and Stein's inability to find support for the postulates of deterrence theory. The phenomenon of deterrence, which is temporal, dynamic, and causal, has to be tested by a longitudinal research design and not by research designs that focus on "snapshots" of single deterrence episodes. Stein's analysis of the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War ignores the important period between the June 1967 Six Day War and the War of Attrition as well as the larger, enduring Egyptian-Israeli rivalry which goes back to the 1948 War. By investigating the role that deterrence played in the enduring conflict between Egypt and Israel from 1948 to 1977, and by focusing on the role that reputation and learning play in overcoming the credibility problem, one can demonstrate that, contrary to Lebow and Stein's claim, deterrence stability can be created even in the more difficult cases in which both challenger and defender "seriously" intended to attack and defend. (7) Leaders challenge deterrence, or go to war, when there are uncertainties about the capability or will of the defender; and, once these uncertainties are reduced through the creation of specific reputations for capability and will, deterrence stability is created even when political pressures to challenge deterrence continue to exist. …

The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure

Abstract: Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction War Planning The Short War Dogma Austria-Hungary's War Plans Prewar Military Collaboration between Austria-Hungary and Germany The July Crisis A Terrorist Attack in Sarajevo Austria-Hungary and Germany Decide for War Russia's Decision for War Vienna and Berlin Order General Mobilization East or West in Germany's Deployment Britain's Decision for War Conclusion: Why Deterrence Failed in 1914 Appendix I: Austria-Hungary's Mobilization Calendar Appendix II: Tabular Overview of the Movement of the "B"-Staffel in 1914 Appendix III: Staabs' Deployment East Bibliography Index

Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff: The Role of the United States

Abstract: The nuclear interaction between India and Pakistan depicts a classical two -party hostile-pair relationship in the international system In this volume Prof Chari discusses several issues What has been the role of US to retard the nuclear race in the two countries? Is a state of deterrence obtaining between them IS this relationship stable?

Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control

Abstract: : At the requests of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, OTA undertook an assessment of the opportunities and risks involved in an accelerated program of research on new ballistic missile defense technologies, including those that might lead to deployment of weapons in space. The resulting report,'Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies', is being published concurrently with this volume. This report on 'Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control' discusses additional implications of the same or similar technologies. Closely related to BMD technology, system survivability, and arms control issues are questions about the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Whether or not the United States decides to deploy BMD systems in space, other military uses of space will continue to grow in importance. How can the United States respond to the potential threat to its military capabilities posed now and in the future both by Soviet military satellites and by Soviet anti-satellite weapons (ASAT)? This report examines U.S. options for countering Soviet military satellite capabilities and explores both unilateral and cooperative measures for limiting the ASAT threat. Possible unilateral steps include active and passive countermeasures as well as deterrence; possible cooperative steps include a variety of arms control agreements. The report examines the pros and cons of several illustrative "arms control regimes" for space weapons, ranging from lesser to greater limitations than now exist. It suggests that some combinations of unilateral and cooperative measures might provide more military security than either type alone. It should be recognized that the relative roles of anti-satellite weapons, countermeasures, and arms control will be strongly affected by the course followed in the development and deploymen

Crisis Initiation and Misperception

Abstract: This paper applies a theory-of-moves game model to analyze the effects of misperception on crisis initiation. The analysis indicates that the effects of misperception on initiation vary across player types and their level of dissatisfaction with the status quo: the initiation behavior of hard-line and middle-line players is adversely affected - they initiate crises they would otherwise avoid - at low and moderate levels of dissatisfaction, but not at high levels, where dissatisfaction is a sufficient condition for initiation; softline initiators, on the other hand, are nearly always adversely affected. Misperception may also result in noninitiation, which may be detrimental to satisfied players who wish to protect the status quo but beneficent to would-be targets. These conclusions, which support prior game-theoretic work, have important implications for deterrence and crisis-prevention strategies.

Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism

Abstract: We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political ‘‘entry’’ is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by overinvesting to raise the rival’s welfare in the event of entry. Empirical evidence on releases of toxic chemicals shows that an increased threat of regulation (as proxied by increased membership in conservation groups) indeed induces firms to reduce toxic releases. We establish conditions under which self-regulation, if it occurs, is a Pareto improvement once costs of influencing policy are included. While some of the environmental changes now emerging in corporate America are genuine and welcome, a good many are superficial, some are downright diversionary, and a few are being specifically designed to preempt more stringent public policies from emerging. [Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth] 1

Deterrence Stability with Smaller Forces: Prospects and Problems

Abstract: Many scholars and policy-makers have assumed that reduction of US and Russian strategic nuclear forces to the lowest possible levels, perhaps to zero, is contributory to deterrence and crisis stability. This study tests a variety of reduced US and Russian nuclear forces, including hypothetical forces and START configurations, for their relative force advantage and for their ability to fulfil previously accepted standards of assured retaliation. It turns out that, as forces decrease towards very low levels, the Russian force falls behind the US force in operational flexibility and becomes much more vulnerable to surprise strikes without warning. Both forces maintain the ability to inflict historically unprecedented retaliatory damage even at the 1,000 warhead level, the lowest included here. The good news is that minimum deterrent forces rapidly run out of plausible targets, making them irrelevant for counterforce first strikes or for escalation dominance. The bad news is that minimum forces can become exclusively city attacking forces by default. Former adversaries now turned into potential partners in search of regional and global stability, the USA and Russia must safeguard the transition from a nuclear deterrence regime to a more disarmed world. The reduction of US and Russian arsenals to several hundreds of weapons is contributory to stability on the assumption that the British, French and Chinese nuclear weapons inventories undergo proportionate reductions also. A second assumption built into favorable prognoses for US and Russian reductions well below START levels is that nuclear proliferation can be constrained. Absent constrained proliferation and cooperative European and Asian nuclear powers, US and Russian force reductions below 1,000 warheads are ambiguously stable. Neorealist arguments in favor of well-managed proliferation understate the extent to which Cold War stability was overdetermined. US-Soviet nuclear deterrence rested on a substructure that included bipolarity and learned behavior modification for crisis management.

Multipolar deterrence in a dynamic environment

Abstract: The theory of matrix games of deterrence, initially developed to account for deterrence in a bipolar framework, is extended to the case of N players and multi-stage dynamics. The results are then applied to industrial competition, and nuclear deterrence.

From MAD to MAD

Abstract: The Cold War has left the world with a doctrine of nuclear deterrence known as MAD, or Mutual Assured Deterrence, sometimes called Mutual Assured Destruction.

Strategic stability in the post-cold war world and the future of nuclear disarmament

Abstract: Preface. 1. Consensus report. 2. Contributing papers. Deterrence, disarmament, and post-cold war stability: enhancing security for both 'haves' and 'have nots' R.F. Lehmann II. 2.1: Qualitative - global. On deterrence, balance of power, and geopolitics R.W. Chandler. Proliferation stability and instability: conditioning factors F. Ermarth. Verifying the future: towards and international conventional arms control and conversion regime for the 21st century R. Giles. Crisis stability in a multipolar world R. Linhard. 2.2: Qualitative - European. Russia and the west: a partnership? R. Braithwaite. Possibilities for cooperation of Russia and the USA in designing, correction and realization of national security doctrines D.S. Chereshkin. Deterrence and stability V.I. Krivokhizha. 2.3: Qualitative - Asian. Geo- political stability and the balance of power in East Asia A. Farrar-Hockley. Strategic stability in the early 2000s: an Indian view of a south Asian model K. Sundarji. Non-nuclear proliferation and strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region Xia Liping. 2.4: Quantitative: geopolitical stability and balance of power. Balance of power versus collective security: a game-theoretic analysis E.M.S. Niou. Russia's nuclear strategy: 90s and after A. Piontkowsky, A. Skorokhodov. 2.5: Quantitative: deterrence, crisis stability and first strike stability. Multipolar nuclear stability: incentives to strike and incentives to preempt J. Bracken. Controlling instabilities caused by rogue governments G.A. Kent. From MAD to MAD M. Rudnianski. FSSI as a universalmeasure of stability: from MAD-stability toward MAP-stability A. Piontkowsky, A. Skorokhodov. 2.6: Quantitative: arms race. Analyzing three-way arms races F.S. Nyland. New patterns in the arms race: some guidelines C. Schmidt. Approaches to mathematical modeling of the process of world-wide strategic nuclear conflict used in the former USSR A.V. Surikov. 2.7: Quantitative: proliferation. Stability, reassurance and non-proliferation I. Amit. Index.

Deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction: Lessons from history

Abstract: The identification of “how to deter” the use of WMD, in practice, is a question of how to deter an opposing leadership from extreme provocations under specific circumstances. The size and type of the U.S. threat, and how, when and to whom it should be communicated will be shaped by the context and the character of the opponent. The initial question of interest is whether an opponent can be subjected to deterrence pressure. In addition, a significant set of contextual factors will determine the likely effectiveness of deterrence policies. The notion, widespread during the Cold War, that deterrence is simply a function of force characteristics, will be a risky basis for deterrence thinking in the future.

The British Nuclear Deterrent After the Cold War

Abstract: : The Trident nuclear deterrent program is one of the United Kingdom's largest-ever military acquisitions. Planned and initiated in the depths of the Cold War, it is now coming to fruition, when the most obvious justification for it--the Soviet threat to Western Europe--has disappeared. The continuation of the program is not in doubt; the money is largely spent or committed, and the main political parties agree on deploying the force. But the rationale needs refurbishment. Britain has traditionally preferred to represent her nuclear capability primarily as a contribution to NATO's collective deterrence. The "second center of decisionmaking" concept defined a particular value for that contribution. This rationale seized the moral high ground (by associating Britain's deterrent with NATO's strategy to prevent war), guarded the proliferation flank, and underpinned Anglo-American relations.

US military strategy and the Cold War endgame

Abstract: The Cold War armed forces of the United States - atypical past and uncertain future the paradox of escalation - a heterodox view of Cold War stability defensive strategy and military choices - Russia and Europe after the Cold War European security after the Cold War nuclear proliferation and civil-military relations - managing old risks in new environments deterrence stability with smaller forces - prospects and problems conclusions - stability after the Cold War.

Facing a Nuclear Armed Adversary in a Regional Contingency: Implications for the Joint Commander.

Abstract: : Among the many challenges facing the United States in the post-Cold War world, none will be more difficult or complex than facing a nuclear armed adversary in a regional contingency. One need only read today's headlines to acknowledge the validity of this threat and to contemplate the awesome responsibilities and risks that would be borne by a joint commander tasked to engage such an adversary. Despite years of experience conducting conventional operations and planning for Cold War nuclear contingencies, the nature of the new threat coupled with the unique destructive power and political implications of nuclear weapons will pose problems whose synergistic affect on the campaign is not yet clearly understood, and for which the commander is unprepared. The possibility of nuclear use will complicate campaign planning, affect course of action development and selection, and alter conventional war fighting doctrine and operations. The time is now for joint commanders to seriously consider and prepare for the nasty business of engaging a nuclear-armed regional adversary. Presidential tasking and deterrence credibility demand it. (MM)

Bound to fail: Regional deterrence after the cold war

Abstract: A variety of growing political, economic, and military constraints on the prompt exercise of U.S. influence during international crises suggests worsening prospects for the successful practice of d...

The British Military View of European Security, 1945–50

Abstract: From the mid-1950s to the end of the cold war, Britain’s ‘Atlanticist’ approach to Western European security revolved around three assumptions.1 The first was that the political and military involvement of the USA should be nurtured. Second, there was the acceptance of nuclear weapons in operational planning, for defence and deterrence. The final assumption was that the defence of Western Europe should be a matter for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Along with the USA, West Germany and other allies, Britain committed conventional troops and air forces to NATO’s European command, to be stationed permanently in Germany. Britain’s faith in the Atlanticist approach has been tenacious.2