Showing papers on "Foreign policy published in 1982"

Groupthink : psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes

Abstract: PrefaceThe main theme of this book occurred to me while reading Arthur M. Schlesinger's chapters on the Bay of Pigs in A Thousand Days. At first, I was puzzled: How could bright, shrewd men like John F. Kennedy and his advisers be taken in by the CIA's stupid, pat ch work plan? I began to wonder whether some kind of psychological contagion, similar to social conformity phenomena observed in studies of small groups, had interfered with their mental alertness, I kept thinking about the implications of this notion until one day I found myself talking about it, in a seminar of mine on group psychology at Yale University. I suggested that the poor decision-making performance of the men at those White House meetings might be akin to the lapses in judgment of ordinary citizens who become more concerned with retaining the approval of the fellow members of their work group than with coming up with good solutions to the tasks at hand.Shortly after that, when I reread Schlesinger's account, I was struck by some observations that earlier had escaped my notice. These observations began to fit a specific pattern of concurrence-seeking behavior that had impressed me time and again in my research on other kinds of face-to-face groups, particularly when a qwe-feelingq of solidarity is running high. Additional accounts of the Bay of Pigs yielded more such observations, leading me to conclude that group processes had been subtly at work, preventing the members of Kennedy's team from debating the real issues posed by the CIA's plan and from carefully appraising its serious risks.Then in Joseph de Rivera's The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, I found an impressive example of excluding a deviant from Truman's group of advisers during the period of the ill-fated Korean War decisions. De Rivera's comments about the group's behavior prompted me to look further into that series of decisions and soon I encountered evidence of other manifestations of group processes, like those apparently operating in the Bay of Pigs decision.By this time, I was sufficiently fascinated by what I began to call the groupthink hypothesis to start looking into a fairly large number of historical parallels. I selected for intensive analysis two additional United States foreign-policy decisions and again found consistent indications of the same kind of detrimental group processes. Later I added a case study of a president's criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice, which I now regard as the most impressive example of groupthink.This book presents five case studies of major fiascoes, resulting from poor decisions made during the administrations of five American presidents' Franklin D. Roosevelt (failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor), Harry S Truman (the invasion of North Korea), John F. Kennedy (the Bay of Pigs invasion), Lyndon B. Johnson (escalation of the Vietnam War), and Richard M. Nixon (the Watergate cover-up). Each of these decisions was a group product, issuing from a series of meetings of a small body of government officials and advisers who constituted a cohesive group. And in each instance, the members of the policy-making group made incredibly gross miscalculations about both the practical and moral consequences of their decisions.The second section, for comparative purposes, presents two case studies of well worked out decisions made by similar groups whose members made realistic appraisals of the consequences. One of these is the course of action chosen by the Kennedy administration during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. This decision, made by almost the same cast of characters that had approved the Bay of Pigs invasion plan in 1961, was arrived at very carefully, in a group atmosphere conducive to independent critical thinking, unlike that which prevailed in the earlier decision. Similarly, the second counterpoint example deals with the hardheaded way that planning committees in the Truman administration evolved the Marshall Plan in 1948. These two case studies indicate that policy-making groups do not always suffer the adverse consequences of group processes, that the quality of the group's decisionmaking activities depends upon current conditions that influence the group atmosphere.n n n n n n n n n

Changes in Americans' Policy Preferences, 1935–1979

Abstract: Using responses to 3,315 survey questions asked of national samples, we examine how policy preferences of Americans have changed over the last 45 years. The data indicate that there has been considerable stability in public opinion: responses to half the 613 repeated policy items show no significant change at all; approximately half the detectable changes were less than 10 percentage points; and rarely did preferences fluctuate significantly back and forth within a short time period. Foreign policy changes were no larger or more frequent than domestic, but they did tend to occur more abruptly. When opinion shifts occurred, they were not random or capricious; they were usually related to important changes in citizens' social and economic environments. Rapid shifts generally coincided with major events in international affairs or the economy. Benjamin I. Page is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and a Senior Study Director at the National Opinion Research Center. Robert Y. Shapiro is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Chicago and an Associate Study Director at NORC. The authors are grateful for research support from the National Science Foundation, Grant #SES-7912969 AOI, and wish especially to thank Tom Smith, Patrick Bova, Michael Galati, and John Gillroy for their advice and help. Eric Schmaler, Kathleen Bawn, and Leah Knowlton provided capable assistance. The data were originally collected by the National Opinion Research Center and the American Institute of Public Opinion, or were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research; the responsibility for analysis and interpretation is our own. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Association for Public Opinion Research, December 5, 1980, Chicago, Illinois. Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46 24-42 ? 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University Published by ElIeviei North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-24/$2.50 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.112 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 04:26:41 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES, 1935-1979 25 In the literature of public opinion, some scholars have maintained that opinions are highly labile, especially concerning foreign policy matters (Almond, 1950; but cf. Caspary, 1970). Such a view seems consistent with the notion that the average person is uninterested in politics, unaware of what is going on, and subject to influence by a host of arbitrary forces. Others have suggested that although the opinions of individuals may be volatile (Converse, 1964), the aggregate distributions of preferences are generally quite stable and change slowly (Key, 1961; Erikson and Luttbeg, 1973; Monroe, 1975; Erikson et al., 1980). Generalization has been hampered, however, by reliance on fragmentary or unsatisfactory data. Journalistic accounts have often stressed the instability of public opinion while reporting sudden jumps in the president's popularity rating or wild fluctuations in preelection polls.2 But these data do not gauge changes in polity preferences; the stimuli are not fixed policy alternatives but rather ever-changing politicians about whose latest words and actions new information is constantly available. When policy preferences are actually discussed, alleged fluctuations often represent only sampling error, or are artifacts of variations in question wording, sample design, or the research procedures followed by different polling organizations (see Lipset, 1976). The comparison of responses to even slightly different questions is hazardous; yet scholars have not generally had access to any comprehensive collection of responses to identical policy preference questions, asked repeatedly over time by the same survey organizations (see Cantril, 1951; Hastings and Southwick, 1975; Smith, 1980; Miller et al., 1980, for helpful but limited collections).

Force and statecraft : diplomatic problems of our time

Abstract: The international system from the seventeenth century to the present: The emergence of the great powers Eighteenth-century diplomacy Balance of power, 1815-1914: three experiments System-building, 1919-1939 Public opinion and foreign policy Economics and foreign policy Totalitarian and democratic diplomacy, 1919-1939 A post-war system of security: great-power directorate or United Nations The cold war as international system Detente and its problems The evolving international system Maintaining the system: problems of force and diplomacy: Negotiation Deterrence Coercive diplomacy Crisis management War termination Ethical imperatives and foreign policy: U.S.-Soviet security co-perating in an evolving international system The Christian statesman: Bismarck and Gladstone The problem of ethical and moral constraints on the use of force in foreign policy.

Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union

Abstract: Preface Introduction Part I. Stalinism and the Soviet Political System: 1. The mature Stalinist system 2. Stalin and the Soviet Political elite 3. Stalinism and the evolution of the Soviet polity Part II. Succession and Turnover of Soviet Elites: 4. The approaching succession: the top leader 5. The approaching succession: leadership and elite turnover 6. The approaching succession: generational change Part III. The Nature and Extent of Soviet Political Stability: 7. Stability: analytical considerations 8. Soviet stability and its sources 9. Soviet political stability and the question of legitimacy 10. Soviet stability and the national problem Part IV. Soviet Perceptions of International Affairs and Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy: 11. The Centrality of US-Soviet relations 12. The arms race and the correlation of forces 13. The role of the military factor in international relations 14. The Third World and the translation of power into influence Part V. Prospects for the 1980s: 15. The politics of stringency Index.

Cooperation and Conflict in Foreign Policy BehaviorReaction and Memory

Abstract: This study examines the dynamics of international cooperation and conflict in the foreign policy of a selected number of nations during the contemporary era Two specific types of conceptions are developed and examined empirically The first of these is based on the idea that conflict and cooperation behaviors are involved in separate dynamics, based upon long- and short-term institutional memory and upon reactivity The second broad model examines hypotheses that cooperation and conflict interact with one another as the evolve over time The first model, the behavior-begets-behavior conception, is more substantially supported by empirical evidence than is the mix of behaviors-begets-mix of behaviors model In large part, these results are upheld across two major collections of event interaction data, the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Thus, it appears that adequate understanding of contemporary foreign policy should be based upon the high degree of reactivity which exists among contemporary nation-states

Human Rights and Foreign Policy

Abstract: Five recent books reveal the beginnings of important new work in conceptualizing the place of human rights concerns in national foreign policies. The moral force of claims of human rights requires that they be given serious consideration in foreign policy. Philosophical analysis also shows that categorical moral distinctions between personal (or civil and political) and economic and social rights must be abandoned. Any justifiable priority for one class of rights must rest on strategic or political, not conceptual or moral, grounds. Since human rights are only one of many foreign policy concerns, tradeoffs with other goals, interests, and values will be necessary. However, human rights and the national interest are often complementary. The “tradeoffs” actually made should be principled, instrumental decisions, rather than apparently ad hoc or cynical sacrifices of human rights.

Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World

Abstract: This book, originally published in 1982, analyzes the process of radical foreign policy change – how states restructure their foreign relations, and why they do so. Using a common analystical framework, the authors examine Bhutan, Burma, Canada, Child, China and Tanzania. They distinguish between piecemeal foreign policy change and adaptation, and the fundamental re-ordering of foreign policy. Their analysis underlines the extent to which non-military and sometimes imagined threats, such as dependency and external economic and cultural penetration, can constitute an important cause of radical realignment activity.

Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics

Abstract: Those who wonder if any "theory" informs the practice of the Reagan administration will greet this collection of essays with considerable interest. Like other volumes that include disparate works published over a twenty-year period, this one has a disjointed quality. The organizing principle of "rationalism" in foreign and domestic affairs does not really unify the vast field of politics that the current U.N. ambassador seeks to illuminate. Yet her blunt prose and no-nonsense style propels the text forward. The book should really be subtitled "Memoirs of a Disaffected Democrat." Much of it is an unremitting diatribe against the electoral reforms of the Democratic party that the author blames for the subsequent disarray of party politics in the United States. Her already familiar attack on the naivete of the Carter entourage for its handling of foreign policy rests in part on a dubious distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes, a distinction that many have found dangerous rather than simply pedantic or eccentric. Indeed, events in El Salvador, among other places, do little to enhance the credibility of this allegedly crucial difference, as the Republicans struggle with many of the same intractable conflicts that plagued the Democrats. After the debacles in Iran and Nicaragua, observers may initially sympathize with the author's insistence that the United States should refrain from destabilizing certain governments in the mistaken view that they will be succeeded by presumably more "moderate" elements favorable to American interests. But practitioners especially will be disappointed if they expect to find in her ruminations a thorough analysis of the local conditions in much of the world that frustrate American objectives, regardless of the party in power in Washington. Equally, commentators may applaud her statement that "bad ideas have bad consequences" (p. 8), while they find that the present administration is even more devoid of good ideas than the predecessor she excoriates here. Kirkpatrick's denunciation of President Carter's appeal to moral verities would be more convincing if she explored in some detail the domestic turmoil that made the American public receptive to such pleas after the Nixon era, even though these "hometruths" proved so debilitating subsequently. She partially redeems herself by noting that "in undertaking the use of power to enhance freedom or equality, modesty and caution are surely the appropriate posture" (p. 214). Since the Reagan administration need yield to none in its "ideological" orientation toward a host of foreign and domestic issues like arms control, inflation, toxic waste, or international trade, readers must hope that, once out of office, Kirkpatrick will turn her caustic eye on the policymakers who are now her colleagues and superiors.

Trade politics in the Third World: a case study of Mexican GATT decision

Abstract: In 1980 Mexico decided not to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Certain objective conditions formed a positive environment for Mexican adherence, but President L6pez Portillo postponed Mexican entry indefinitely. This critical decision is examined from two perspectives: a left-leaning foreign policy, and domestic constraints in the Mexican political system. Major foreign policy factors were a growing resentment of U.S. dominance combined with a preference for conducting relations with the U.S. on a bilateral basis. Internal political pressures reflected the continued reform of the Mexican political system at the upper levels and the relative autonomy of some elite groups from the state. L6pez Portillo's decision did not constitute an outright rejection of trade liberalization. However, the decision could have international repercussions in ‘politicizing’ U.S.-Mexican trade relations, in slowing trends toward freer trade (especially in Latin America), and in strengthening multilateral organizations like UNCTAD in which Third World countries exercise considerable power.

Mass and Elite Foreign Policy Opinions

Abstract: THE CONFLICT between strong executive direction and building the necessary consensus for action makes the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy extremely difficult. The expression of public support for foreign policy initiatives is a source of strength in diplomacy, but such support is difficult to gain because the mass public is generally regarded as less informed and unconcerned about foreign policy problems than about domestic issues (Almond, 1950; Caspary, 1970). In fact, the distinction between the foreign and domestic spheres is seen as so great by some scholars that the office of the American chief executive has been described as two presidencies-one oriented to domestic policy and one for foreign policy (Wildavsky, 1966; Cronin, 1980). According to this perspective, the president chooses to exercise initiatives on foreign policy questions precisely because the public is relatively unconcerned and the extreme conflict which erupts between various domestic factions can be avoided. Furthermore, the mass public is viewed as teachable in foreign policy matters; the president can set the agenda, persuade opinion leaders, and lead the

Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War

Abstract: How and why did the Cold War arise out of wartime entente? Here, in a study focused on Soviet foreign policy from 1941 to 1953, William Taubman describes an intermediate stage of detente that Stalin abandoned reluctantly only after the Western powers did. Stalin, seen here as cautious and even conservative, viewed America as hostile and devious. His detente was designed to undermine Western interests.

The Spanish-American War and President McKinley

Abstract: This succinct, readable outgrowth of the author's highly-acclaimed volume The Presidency of William McKinley, deserves widespread adoption in courses on late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century U.S. diplomatic history and foreign policy. It substantially supersedes other accounts of the coming of the Spanish-American War, the war itself, and the aftermath of the conflict. Based on the most up-to-date research available, it provides a new and refreshing perspective on McKinley's handling of the war. According to Gould, McKinley's expansive view of presidential power had a significant effect on his role as commander-in-chief during the war years and on his efforts to make the White House a command post. McKinley laid the foundation of the modern presidency by his courageous and principled presidential leadership during the coming of the war, by the way he conducted and oversaw the war itself, and by the manner in which he made peace with Spain, acquired the Philippines, and gained approval of the Treaty of Paris in the Senate.

Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection

Abstract: I America's drift to counterforce nuclear strategies is neither perverse nor accidental. The emphasis on counterforce became a notable aspect of the nuclear strategy of the Carter Administration, at least in its promulgation of Presidential Directive 59 in July 1980 and its promotion of the MX intercontinental missile; and it continues in the strategy of the Reagan Administration, embodied in the weapons system decisions of October 2, 1981. To grasp the rationale of counterforce, it is necessary to understand the logic of extended deterrence. For ultimately it is its adherence to alliance commitments that skews the United States' strategy toward counterforce weapons and targeting and warps American doctrines of response toward the first use of nuclear weapons, prejudicing crisis stability and increasing the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war. Few realize how intertwined American weapons and strategies are with American commitments. And few understand how integral to the entire foreign policy stance of the United States has been the strategic paradigm of deterrence and alliance that the U.S. has maintained for thirty-five yearsand therefore, how much would have to change, if we set about to achieve an alternative, more stable, nuclear stance that might provide greater safety for Americans in an age of pervasive nuclear danger. But also, few see how much is actually changing, under the surface of the familiar strategic and diplomatic arrangements, precisely because the objective conditions that are the requisites of America's present stance are not being fulfilled.

The Research Universities and Their Patrons

Abstract: America's research universities - some fifty leading intellectual centers - have assumed a unique set of responsibilities. In addition to educating undergraduates, they house most of the nation's basic research and train virtually all new scientists and scholars. The health of these institutions is critical to the nation's intellectual life as well as to its economic well-being, military posture, and foreign policy. Robert Rosenzweig, reporting on a project sponsored by the Association of American Universities, examines the core functions of the research universities and explores how they might best relate to their powerful patrons: the national government, foundations, business, and industry.

Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Detente as a Problem of Stabilization

Abstract: What determines the occurrence, the scope, and the timing of major changes in foreign policy? In approaching this question, the author focuses on the “stabilizers” of foreign policy-that is, on the factors blocking, reducing the scope of, or delaying adaptation to new conditions, learning from negative feedback, or change in response to other disturbances. A framework for the analysis of stability in foreign policy is proposed. Several hypothetical stabilizers of foreign policies are discussed; they are grouped into administrative, political, cognitive, and international categories. Finally, the framework is applied to the problem of East-West detente.

The United States and the World Economy

Abstract: The United States has become heavily dependent on the world economy. At the same time, the ability of the United States to dictate the course of international economic activities has declined sharply. Hence the United States is caught in a scissors movement of growing importance, with major implications for the management of both its economy and its foreign policy. As a result, a paradox emerges concerning the conduct of U.S. international economic policy. On the one hand, the growing importance of both exports and imports increases pressures on the United States to pursue a liberal trade and international investment policy. On the other, the growing penetration of its economy by foreign goods often increases the pressure to retreat from such open approaches to international exchange. The advent of new domestic pressures in the 1980s, deriving in large part from slower economic growth and higher rates of unemployment, sharpens this tension. And the budgetary constraints that must accompany any effort to r...

Nationalist Indian Attitudes Towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy

Abstract: ONE PERSISTING article of faith among nationalist Indians during the decades of the independence struggle was the belief in an inherent unity of Asian countries-a common identity stemming from a shared aspiration of their peoples for political independence from the West and rooted in their cultural and religious similarities. The idea of Asian unity evolved late in the nineteenth century conjointly with the emergence of Asian nationalist movements. Indeed, Pan-Asianism was basically the international expression of incipient domestic demands for freedom and of the growing consciousness of Eastern peoples of their intrinsic Asian identity. Thus, the theme of the unity of Asian states was by no means solely an Indian conception. In fact, not surprisingly, its initial prominent flowering was in Japan, the first Oriental country to reassert its political independence from the West. In particular, the 1905 Japanese victory over Russia was seen in Japan and elsewhere in Asia as symbolic of the regeneration of the East.' Politically, it gave rise to the Japanese cry of "Asia for the Asiatics," and to the idea of a united Asia, under Japanese leadership, cooperating in the liquidation of Western imperialism. The Japanese resurgence was also responsible for encouraging the notion of an Asian unity that transcended the common political bond of subjection and was founded on the alleged mutual concern of Asian countries with spiritual values and the attainment of global peace and harmony. Japanese scholars, of whom Okakura Kakuzo had the highest reputation in India, began to write at this time that Asia was a single entity, since "love for the ultimate and universal" was "the common

The domestic‐international conflict nexus: New evidence and old hypotheses

Abstract: The extent to which domestic political disputes erupt into larger, generally regional, interstate conflicts is examined for the period 1948–1976. Two broad categories of behavior are possible: 1) the externalization of domestic instability and conflict in order to reduce difficulties at home and 2) the internalization of regional or interstate conflict through external penetration or internal politicization of foreign policy. Both alternatives turn out to be myths. Empirically, over the range of post‐1948 experience, there is no evidence to support the notion that as a consequence of high levels of domestic turmoil and conflict, a nation‐state will export foreign conflict behavior in the form of involvement in a serious international dispute. Neither is the internalization hypothesis supported for the bulk of the cases considered. We do find, however, that more powerful nations are more likely to be involved in a serious international dispute while at the same time experiencing a high level of domestic co...

China's Foreign Trade

Abstract: This chapter highlights the key elements of the foreign trade of China. China's political and economic relations with foreign countries are based on the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. China's foreign trade policies are also governed by the same principles. Specifically, the key emphasis is on independence and self-reliance and equality and mutual benefit. With China's decision to expand the role of foreign trade, changes were made to the structure and management of foreign trade. Since 1978, the country has undertaken a series of reforms designed to improve the efficiency and performance of foreign trade and its structure and management. In 1978, China established a number of domestic corporations under the respective ministries. These corporations determined what equipment to purchase. In 1979, the two provinces of Guangdong and Fujian and the three cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin were granted greater autonomy for the conduct of foreign trade. The foreign trade corporations at these provincial and municipal levels are empowered to conduct foreign trade directly and may conclude contracts and agreements valued under $3 million without Foreign Investment Commission approval. In October 1977, Foreign Trade Minister Li Qiang announced China's decision to establish “special economic zones” in certain designated regions in the country to expand China's trade with foreign countries.

What U.S. Foreign Policy Faces in Rural El Salvador: An Eyewitness Account

Abstract: The ideological hegemony of Cold War analysis blinds U.S. foreign-policy makers to the reality they are determined to eradicate. Ever since the Truman administration, foreign- policy rhetoric (and practice) has been redundantly consistent. U.S. leaders are victims of their own propaganda. They categorically assert that all Third World national liberation movements are devoid of genuine, indigenous, popular support. Revolutions are automatically treated as plots masterminded—or at least manipulated—by a clique in the Kremlin.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

The destabilisation controversy: an analysis of a high‐risk foreign policy option for South Africa

Abstract: In recent months relations between the states of the Southern African region have been racked by reciprocal and continuing accusations of destabilisation. This article is concerned first, with the definition of this evocative and loosely used concept and secondly, with the analysis of regional political and economic circumstance, underscoring the author's conclusion that mutual suspicion of attempts at destabilisation is plausible and valid.