Showing papers on "Identity (philosophy) published in 1998"

Identity Escrow

Abstract: We introduce the concept of escrowed identity an application of key escrow ideas to the problem of authentication In escrowed iden tity one party A does not give his identity to another party B but rather gives him information that would allow an authorized third party E to determine A s identity However B receives a guarantee that E can indeed determine A s identity We consider a number of possible features of escrowed identity schemes and describe a variety of implementations that achieve various subsets of these features In par ticular we observe that group signature schemes can be used to escrow identities achieving most though not all of the desired features The most interesting feature we consider is separability The escrow agency is not involved in the day to day operation of the identi cation system but is only called in when anonymity must be revoked In the extreme case there exist identity escrow schemes in which an arbitrary party possessing a public key can be designated an escrow agent without any knowledge or participation on their part until they are asked to revoke someone s anonymity

From Civilian Power to Superpower?: The International Identity of the European Union

Abstract: List of Figures and Tables - List of Abbreviations - Acknowledgements - Defining International Identity - PART 1: IDENTIFYING THE INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY - The Development of the Framework of the International Identity: I) External Relations - The Development of the Framework of the International Identity: II) From EPC to CFSP - PART 2: THE FACETS, AND SOURCES OF INFLUENCE UPON, THE INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY - The External Sources of Influence: The European Union in the International System - The Legal Dimension as a Source of Influence - The Integrative and Member State Sources - The European Parliament: Less Source More Identity - Conclusion - Index

Object representation, identity, and the paradox of early permanence

Abstract: The sensorimotor theory of infancy has been overthrown, but there is little consensus on a replacement. We hypothesize that a capacity for representation is the starting point for infant development, not its culmination. Logical distinctions are drawn between object representation, identity, and permanence. Modern experiments on early object permanence and deferred imitation suggest: (a) even for young infants, representations persist over breaks in sensory contact, (b) numerical identity of objects (Os) is initially specified by spatiotemporal criteria (place and trajectory), (c) featural and functional identity criteria develop, (d) events are analyzed by comparing representations to current perception, and (e) representation operates both prospectively, anticipating future contacts with an O, and retrospectively, reidentifying an O as the \"same one again.\" A model of the architecture and functioning of the early representational system is proposed. It accounts for young infants' behavior toward absent people and things in terms of their efforts to determine the identity of objects. Our proposal is developmental without denying innate structure and elevates the power of perception and representation while being cautious about attributing complex concepts to young infants.

Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo‐Ottomanism

Abstract: (1998). Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo‐Ottomanism. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 7, No. 12, pp. 19-41.

Energy identity of harmonic map flows from surfaces at finite singular time

Abstract: whereA is the 2nd fundamental form of N in RK (for simplicity we will omit g henceforth). Letu : M ×(0,∞) → N be a global weak solution to (1.1), which is smooth away from a finite number of singular points {(xi , ti )} ⊂ M ×(0,∞). The existence of such a u was obtained by Struwe [St], which was a natural extension of [SaU]. Let (x0,T0) be a singular point of u andB be a small neighborhood of x0, it is easy to show that, as t ↑ T0, u(·, t) → u(·,T0) in H 1 ∩C∞(B \\ {x0},N ) locally, but not in H 1(B,N ). Moreover, nearx0, by suitably rescalingu(·, ti ) for ti ↑ T0, one can show there are finite many nonconstant harmonic maps ωi : S2 → N (1 ≤ i ≤ m), referred asbubbles, associated withu(·, ti ). It is clear that

Memory, Identity and the (Im)possibility of Reconciliation: The Work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa

Abstract: APARTHEID – . . . May it thus remain, but may a day come when it will only be for the memory of man. A memory in advance. . . very close to silence, and the rear-view vision of a future for which apartheid will be the name of something abolished. Confined and abandoned to this silence of memory, the name will resonate all by itself. . . . The thing it names today will no longer be. Jacques Derrida Without the truth, there can be no reconciliation. G. Werle

Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, pretense, and reference

Abstract: In "On Sense and Reference," surrounding his discussion of how we describe what people say and think, identity is Frege's first stop and his last. We will follow Frege's plan here, but we will stop also in the land of make-believe. Identity challenges reflection, says Frege. By identity Frege intends whatever it is we attribute when we say, for instance, that Hesperus is the same thing as Phosphorus. It can seem odd, he says, to think of identity as a relation between things, for, what interest could attach to a thing's being itself? It is odd, too, to think of identity as the relation that holds between different names of a thing, for then the statement that Hesperus is Phosphorus would be held to concern neither Hesperus nor Phosphorus, but only the name 'Hesperus' and the name 'Phosphorus' (and this would alienate the identity statement from such apparent kin as the statement that Hesperus is the same size as Phosphorus). Frege's resolution of the dilemma is well known: intermediate between a name and the thing named is a mode of presentation of the thing; the name expresses that way of thinking about the thing. A true identity statement like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is not trivial because the entity that in the statement is said to be identical to itself is conceived differently under the two names: the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' express different modes of presentation of a single object. Russell, too, finds his reflection challenged by identity. In "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" he writes:

There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time

Abstract: Soulignant l'evidence des criteres informatifs de l'identite dans le temps, l'A rejette la these criterialiste qui consiste a affirmer l'existence de tels criteres Denoncant la confusion entre l'expression critere d'identite dans le temps et l'evidence des faits qui justifient nos jugements sur l'identite, l'A critique l'analogie etablie entre l'identite dans le temps et les criteres epistemologiques de la connaissance, d'une part, ainsi que l'analogie etablie avec l'analyse de l'appartenance a une espece, d'autre part

Second Natures: Is the State Identical with Itself?

Abstract: This article analyses existing assumptions about state identity within contemporary International Relations theory, arguing that the quest for the identity of the state leads to either circularity ...

Animalism versus lockeanism : A current controversy

Abstract: My purpose is to explore the possible lines of reply available to a defender of the neo-Lockean position on personal identity in response to the recently popular ‘animalist’ objection. I compare the animalist objection with an objection made to Locke by Bishop Butler, Thomas Reid and, in our own day, Sydney Shoemaker. I argue that the only possible response available to a defender of Locke against the Butler–Reid–Shoemaker objection is to reject Locke's official definition of a person as a thinking, intelligent thing and replace it with the concept of the self– the object of self-reference – and that this response is equally obligatory for the neo-Lockean in replying to the animalist. I explore other possibilities, including the position that there is no sense in talking about personal identity at all.

On the notion of gyrogroup

Abstract: It is shown that the gyrogroup [1] is just the well known left Bol loop with Bruck identity. This result has been announced in [12]. The other constructions of [1] are also discussed.

Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness

Abstract: Contents. Preface. 1. The problem and its place in philosophy 2. Animalism and reductionism 3. Criteria of personal identity 4. Fission 5. Identity and vagueness 6. Parfit and 'what matters' 7. Anscombe on 'I' 8. Wittgenstein on 'I' Bibliography.

A preamble to the Kurdish question: the politics of Kurdish identity

Abstract: (1998). A preamble to the Kurdish question: the politics of Kurdish identity. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs: Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 9-18.

Sameness without identity : An aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution

Abstract: In this paper, I present an Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution. The problem of material constitution arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same parts and yet are essentially related to their parts in different ways. (A familiar example: A lump of bronze constitutes a statue of Athena. The lump and the statue share all of the same parts, but it appears that the lump can, whereas the statue cannot, survive radical rearrangements of those parts.) I argue that if we are prepared to follow Aristotle in making a distinction between numerical sameness and identity, we can solve the problem of material constitution without recourse to co-location or contingent identity and without repudiating any of the familiar objects of common sense (such as lumps and statues) or denying that these objects have the essential properties we ordinarily think that they have.

The Many Faces of Mathematics: Do Mathematicians and Researchers in Mathematics Education Speak about the Same Thing?

Abstract: If a mathematics educator studies mathematics, is it the same object for him or her as it is for a mathematician who studies mathematics?, ask the authors of the Discussion Document. The very fact that the problem was raised is the first indication of a difference between the mathematician’s and the mathematics education researcher’s approaches to mathematics. Indeed, while the question imposes itself on the latter, it is not very likely to be asked by the former. Mathematicians seem to have little doubts as to the nature and the identity of the subject they deal with on a daily basis. Most of them would claim that there is only one object that can be called Mathematics and anything that differs from this unique exemplar cannot be given the same name. More often than not, the working mathematician is a Platonist, even if only tacitly: his or her mathematics has an appearance of an ideal, well-defined body of knowledge, faithfully mirroring a certain mind-independent reality of abstract ideas.

Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief and the Theistic Problem of Evil

Abstract: John Ayorunde (Tunde) Isola Bewaji is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy in the department of Language, Linguistics, and Philosophy at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His recent publications include, "The Certain, the Evident, and the Problem of Criterion: Perspectives in Roderick M. Chisholm's Response to Sceptical Epistemology" in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 25, edited by Lewis E. Hahn, and "The self as the locus of identity A preliminary philosophical analysis of Professor Nettleford's discussion of individuality in the Caribbean" in Caribbean Quarterly (December 1997.

Between hegemony and dormant Kulturkampf in Israel

Abstract: (1998) Between hegemony and dormant Kulturkampf in Israel Israel Affairs: Vol 4, In Search of Identity: Jewish Aspects in Israeli Culture, pp 49-72

Daphne du Maurier: Writing, Identity and the Gothic Imagination

Abstract: Acknowledgements - A 'Disembodied Spirit': Writing, Identity and the Gothic Imagination - Family Gothic - Cornish Gothic - The Secrets of Manderley - Foreign Affairs - Murdering (M)others - Endword - Notes - Index

Architecture and the burdens of linearity

Abstract: In this suggestive inquiry into the operations of linearity in architectural theory and practice, Catherine Ingraham investigates the line as both a conceptual and literal force in architecture. She approaches her subject from philosophical, theoretical, practical, and historical points of view, finding the following points of convergence: architecture's relation to property, politics, and economy; architecture's relation to propriety and the need to keep things "in line"; and architecture's relation to the proper name, human identity, object identity, and spatial location and demarcation. In this engaging discussion, Ingraham considers maps, architectural plans, the laws of geometry, systems of architectural knowledge, and mythologies of architectural origin in work by Le Corbusier, Vitruvius, Alberti, Tafuri, Derrida, Levi-Strauss, Shakespeare, Lacan, Deleuze, Rilke, and Stendhal. Entering the current complex debates about the relation between theory and practice in architecture, the author also addresses themes in psychoanalytic criticism, poststructural theory, and feminist criticism. Her examination thus moves beyond architecture and its literal structures to the notion of epistemological structure that architecture as a discipline and practice upholds and promotes.

Carving a Moldavian Identity out of History

Abstract: “For what we all are, really, is elegant scarecrows on fields of words.” Gabriel Liiceanu's metaphor of “discourse” is particularly revealing for the case of the Moldavian nation. When the field is already covered with scarecrows, a new one will have trouble finding a free spot and functioning properly. Rivaling nationalist and communist interpretations of Moldavian history have left little free space for an original view: historical facts have been interpreted and reinterpreted time and time again, so it has become increasingly difficult to create new meanings and to find fresh words.

Proper Names and the Necessity of Identity Statements

Abstract: An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if it's true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like

Emily Dickinson's Vision: Illness and Identity in Her Poetry

Abstract: In this contribution to Emily Dickinson biography and criticism, the author demonstrates how the poet's optical disease - strabismus, a deviation of the cornea - directly affected her subject matter, her poetic method, and indeed her sense of her own identity.

Aomoto’s machine and the Dyson constant term identity

Abstract: Aomoto has used the fundamental theorem of calculus to give an elegant proof of an extension of Selberg's integral. A constant term formulation of Aomoto's argument is based upon the fact that for 1 < s < n, the constant term in ts d/dts f(ti,... ,*n) is zero provided that /(£i,...,in) has a Laurent expansion around ti = • • • = tn = 0. We use this as the engine for a simple proof of an Aomoto-type extension of the Dyson constant term identity. We outline the use of Good's proof to evaluate the coefficients of ti/tn, ti^/tn-i^n? and t^/t^ i Tli