Showing papers on "Inefficiency published in 1977"

Alternative theories of sharecropping: Some tests using evidence from northeast India

Abstract: The recent debate concerning the efficiency of sharecropping contracts yields a number of testable hypotheses, four of which can be examined in the light of some primary data for a group of sharecroppers in northeast Bihar. The salient feature of the empirical analysis is the comparison of the resource allocation patterns on owned and rented land cultivated by the same farmer, which provides a more powerful test of inefficiency than those advocated previously. Broadly speaking, the findings support the ‘Marshallian’ position that such contracts do involve inefficiency—in the Bihar context, at least.

Sources of Technical Efficiency: The Roles of Modernization and Information

Abstract: Leibenstein has suggested that losses from Xor technical inefficiency may be far more important than losses from allocative inefficiency., Several recent studies have attempted to measure the magnitude of these former losses, while Timmer and Miiller2 have noted that invocation of the term "technical efficiency" may imply an admission of the analyst's incomplete understanding of the production process. Improved specification of the model may relate interfirm productivity variability to input variability, rather than to the somewhat enigmatic technical efficiency. This improved specification may be extremely helpful to policymakers in developing nations, where the list of proposed programs often includes many that aim at improving management. For example, in the area of agricultural development there are frequent proposals related to extension services, farmer training centers, model farmer programs, best-farmer awards, field days, mass-media programs, and the like. The specific content of such programs may vary considerably: teaching specific farm skills, teaching general skills such as literacy and arithmetic, exhorting farmers to work harder, stimulating demand for cash goods, and attempting to develop a generally more modern, change-oriented outlook. If policymakers know why some farmers are better managers (i.e., why there are technical efficiency differentials), they might have firmer grounds for

Power, Expertise and the "Tecnico": Suggestions from a Mexican Case Study

Abstract: E XCORIATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES has a long tradition in literature which describes the political systems of Latin America. Inefficiency, corruption, partisanship, conservatism, lack of responsiveness to public demands, and vested interests have all been attributed to the personnel staffing the administrative agencies of government.' Similarly, throughout Latin America, in spite of the large number of individuals who work for the government, public employees are frequently held in at least mild disapprobation, if

Conditional Inference is not Inefficient

Abstract: A paper of Welch (1939) is often referred to as demonstrating the inefficiency of conditional confidence intervals. It is the object of this note to show that such a notion arises from a misunderstanding.

Diverse constituencies and the public human service organization.

Abstract: Clients, donors, and professionals are identified as three constituencies directly involved in public human service organizations. Each of these groups has different expectations from human service organizations, and these expectations reflect different needs. Concomitantly, each of these groups represents a different ideological perspective. Furthermore, the products or outcomes of human service organizations are generally only vaguely defined. Taken together, the combination of different needs, varying ideologies, and unclear goals renders many human service organizations prone to considerable conflict and inefficiency.

Optimal use of existing technology versus new technology

Abstract: I. INEFFICIENCY AND THE NEED FOR TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS The relative efficiency of various production sectors may be measured in terms either of the average value productivity of the resources used by them or of the unit prices paid for these resources.1 Each reflects technical efficiency (i.e. physical production coefficients) within existing price relationships. Thus a finding of higher efficiency for a sector may in fact be due to the higher relative prices obtained through the use of market power. Given this measure of relative efficiency levels, a large number of industrial sectors fall below the average efficiency levels of given economies and may thus be designated as relatively inefficient.2 Accordingly, two questions arise: What factors account for such relative inefficiencies? And what remedies

Constraints to Welfare Gains under Extended Jurisdiction Fisheries Management: Discussion

Abstract: Huppert has presented a good discussion of the constraints to welfare gains under extended jurisdiction fisheries management. While I certainly do not have any serious qualms with his presentation, one definitional point should be made at the outset. As used in the paper, at least as I interpret it, welfare gains really mean potential welfare gains or, more properly, the attainment of economic efficiency. In fact, phrases like "constraining the potential achievement of economic efficiency" and "retard progress toward economic efficiency" are used interchangeably with others like "constraints on the achievement of welfare gains." The former are superior in the context of this discussion because not achieving economic efficiency does not preclude welfare gains to at least some groups. In my comments I use the more straightforward term-economic efficiency. Huppert began by making the very basic, but still quite often neglected, point that an unregulated fishery can result in economic inefficiency as well as biological depletion. He then touches on the distribution issue and points out that there are three possible accounting frameworks. In my view, the fishing industry, including harvesters, processors, etc., are receiving the most attention, as opposed to the nation as a whole or the rest of the world. In his comments on using a worldwide accounting framework, Huppert touches on the issue of joint fishing arrangements between foreign interests and domestic companies. Depending upon the exact regulations concerning joint ventures that are promulgated, there may be serious problems in the interpretation of surplus yield (i.e., the difference between optimal yield, as defined in the law, and domestic capacity), and this may require some modification in the law. The distribution of the gains will depend critically upon the final resolution of this issue. Five potential barriers to economic efficiency are discussed. They are (a) overlapping authority (from the different states below and other nations above); (b) certain provisions of the act, especially restrictions on the use of taxes as a regulation tool; (c) the regional orientation of the councils; (d) the industry domination of the councils; and (e) the inadequate knowledge of recreational fishing, which may cause it to be neglected in decision analysis. I definitely think provisions exist in the act that retard progress toward achieving economic efficiency, one of which may be more serious than the constraint on the use of taxes. The provision that bothers me is national standard 5, which states: "Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, promote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose" (U.S. Congress, PL 94-265, sec. 301(a)(5)). If the last part was not included, this would be a useful national standard. However, if the term "economic allocation" is to be interpreted in the sense of an "efficient allocation of resources," the last phrase essentially negates the first one. Using this definition, this standard says that we should strive for economic efficiency except that we should not strive for economic efficiency. If this interpretation is used, the fact that taxes cannot be used becomes relatively unimportant. Not being able to use an economically useful regulation tool does not really matter if an economically rational management program is precluded. If the term "economic allocation" is to be interpreted as distribution, the prospects for Lee G. Anderson is an associate professor of economics and marine studies, University of Delaware.

On the sensitivity of charge-coupled device transversal filter response to charge-transfer inefficiency

Abstract: The design of charge-coupled device (CCD) transversal discrete-time filters with approximately linear phase and satisfying general magnitude constraints is considered. The charge-transfer inefficiency of the CCD is included in the problem formulation and an effective sensitivity analysis procedure is given for the charge-transfer inefficiency parameter.

Production inefficiency in the peak-load pricing model

Abstract: The implications of pricing electricity on the basis of peak-load demand are examined in a model which introduces the factors of scale economies and periods of unequal duration. The author points out that new technologies to replace fossil-fueled steam generation with nuclear, photovoltaic or other energy sources will introduce new opportunities for scale economies. The impact of regulatory bias on peak-load prices indicates that there is benefit only to the peak users unless ex ante substitution allows prices to be reduced for non-peak periods. More capital-intensive techniques are also induced by ex ante substitution. The model examines the effects of a range of regulatory constraints on production efficiency and the capital-labor ratio. 18 references. (DCK)

Redistribution through Social Security: A Lesson from Italy

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that social security in Italy is marked by large inefficiencies in resource distribution and allocation. Vertical redistribution is quite limited, mainly because of, first, the regressive effects of financing based on salary-geared contributions, and, second, the fact that pensions and family allowances are exempt from personal income tax. Most redistribution is horizontal, but there are also serious maldistributions, which go against vertical and horizontal equity. On the whole, the amount and the direction of redistribution seems often to have been determined by chance or by pressure groups. Inefficiency in allocation is serious in the health sector, where there is waste and where there are privileges for certain groups of citizens. Maldistribution, waste and privileges use up a considerable amount of social security finance. This amount could be used to meet the community’s strong and growing demand for more benefits for the poorer groups, especially for increases in the currently insufficient minimum pensions, and for better and more complete health services.