Showing papers on "Legislature published in 1970"

The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970

Abstract: These three essays deal with public policy with respect to the business corporation in the United States from 1780 into the 1960's. They trace the development of the business corporation from the time it was treated as a matter of special privilege to the end of the nineteenth century when corporation became available to all qualified applicants under general legislative and simple administrative procedures. After public and legislative acceptance of the corporation, the twentieth century was faced with the task of adjusting the corporation to the general demands of public policy. This study develops in great detail the tenet that the corporation must be legitimate, that is, that it must be both useful and responsible. To this end, specialized bodies of regulatory law have been created outside the law of corporate structure. These essays reflect almost two hundred years of public policy concentrated on making the corporation a ""legitimate instrument of business energy and ambition."" They include full documentation with detailed references to all relevant legal materials. Their examination of the legitimacy of privately organized power is the most complete study of this important force available.

The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians

Abstract: This study is based on data collected by the City Council Research Project, Stanford University. The project was concerned with decision making in small, natural-state legislative groups, legislative behavior within the city council, the kinds of people who become members of the city council, how they are chosen, how they learn their jobs, and the many problems they have to deal with.

The assessment of technology

Abstract: IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE CONSIDERING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD, A PANEL WAS CONVENED BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES TO EXAMINE THE PROCESSES OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE. ALTHOUGH THE PANEL PROCEEDED WITH THE BELIEF THAT THE BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS VASTLY OUTWEIGHED THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL INJURIES, ITS MISSION WAS TO EXPLORE HOW THE BENEFITS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITH LESS INJURY. IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT SOME PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED AS UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT COULD HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF FAILURE TO DEVELOP OR APPLY OTHER TECHNOLOGIES. ALSO, THE TWO IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ARE EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO THE SAME END AND A COMPARISON OF THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS. CHOICES BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES ARE PARTY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DECISIONS AND NO EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO CIRCUMVENT POLITICAL PROCESSES OR THE CONFLICTS OF THE MARKETPLACE. THREE GENERAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF ASSESSING TECHNOLOGIES ARE CONSIDERED: (1) COMPUTING NET SOCIAL BENEFITS (USEFUL ONLY AS A ROUGH FIRST EFFORT SINCE ALMOST ALL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT SOME BENEFICIALLY AND OTHERS ADVERSELY); (2) MAINTAINING LATITUDE FOR FUTURE CHANGES (EVEN REVERSALS) AND PRESERVING OF OPTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIONS; AND (3) CONSIDERING WHERE THE BURDEN OF UNCERTAINTY SHOULD FALL (SHOULD THE PROPONENT OF THE INNOVATION OR THE AFFECTED GROUPS PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE EFFECTS). EXISTING PROCESSES OF TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ARE DIFFUSED THROUGHOUT PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT SECTORS OF SOCIETY. BOTH ARE OFTEN PREVENTED FROM CONSIDERING THE COMPLETE PROBLEM BY LIMITATIONS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM, AND WITH BOTH, THE ASSESSMENT OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES IS NORMALLY UNDERTAKEN BY THOSE WHO SEEK TO EXPLOIT THEM. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL MECHANISMS FOR RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE; (2) THIS GROUP SHOULD NOT HAVE POLICY-MAKING AUTHORITY, REGULATORY POWERS, OR ANY TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY; (3) IT MUST BE ALBE TO EVALUATE BUT NOT TO SPONSOR OR PREVENT; AND (4) IT MUST BE LINKED WITH BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THE RECOMMENDED LINK IS THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND FOR THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE). MILITARY TECHNOLOGY WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE PANEL.

Congress as Policy-Maker: A Necessary Reappraisal

Abstract: The literature of discontent with legislatures in general and Congress in particular has reached immense proportions in recent years. While few will argue that the power of the twentiethcentury American Congress has declined in an absolute sense, most would agree that the position of Congress relative to that of the president has declined.' Congressional critics maintain that this shift in the balance of power is most apparent in the declining role of Congress as an initiator of legislation and as a force for innovation. This decline, generally regarded to have begun around the turn of the century and to have been subsequently accelerated by the New Deal, the Second World War, and, more recently, the technological revolution, they attribute to the fragmented institutional power of Congress. Critics and defenders alike tend to agree Congress is congenitally incapable of formulating and pushing through a coherent legislative program except under the most unusual cir-

The Role of the M.P. in Tanzania

Abstract: The study of politics in “developing” countries has tended to focus on the less formal organs of government, such as political parties, the military, the bureaucracy, and even the educational system. National legislatures have often been ignored or rated of little significance in the political processes of these states. This practice contrasts markedly with the attention paid to legislatures in Western states. The most obvious explanation for it is that legislatures in new states tend to have little influence. Important decisions and shifts in power are usually made or recorded elsewhere in the political system. The Bunge, or National Assembly, of Tanzania is no exception to this general phenomenon. Nevertheless, an examination of the role of M.P.'s in Tanzania can be illuminating. The Bunge contains most of the major political leaders and has, at least constitutionally, broad authority. As a consequence, if the Assembly is to be only a weak political body, then informal norms limiting the powers of the M.P.'s role must exist. Moreover, these norms should prescribe authority relationships between the legislature and other policy shaping bodies in the political system, particularly the Party. Thus, an analysis of the roles of these men can provide important insights not only into the functions of the Bunge, but also into the elite political culture of Tanzania and the pattern of politics which this culture supports.

The Intelligence of Congress: Information and Public-Policy Patterns

Abstract: Proposals for improved information systems for legislatures have become a standard feature of the literature on legislative systems. Most of these proposals, however, either fail to take account of political realities or have a centralizing bias which is likely to prove incongenial to most legislators. Given the functionally fragmented structure of American politics, the methods that congressmen use to gather information are essentially rational, and likely, therefore, to prove highly resilient to change. But the form of rationality which the legislative intelligence system now favors is ill-suited to the policy needs of the society, particularly in those instances where the need for establishing orders of priority is most urgent. It may, thus, be particularly important to develop new intelligence systems in the executive branch, and in the private sector, to supplement, challenge, and engage the entrenched system of legislative intelligence.

The Rules of the Game: Political Fact or Academic Fancy?

Abstract: TJ raditionally, political scientists have concentrated most of I their attention upon the formal elements of power in governmental institutions. Legislative research has customarily dealt with topics such as legislative leaders, parliamentary procedure, standing committees, party caucuses, or the intricacies of bill passage.1 However, another approach is now beginning to be explored-the study of informal aspects of the legislative process. For example, legislatures like all other organized groups have precise legal codes that formally define the relations between members. But, like other organized groups, legislatures have certain informal norms, the socalled unwritten rules of the game to which members are supposed to adhere if they want to get along. These unwritten "Rules of the Game" are frequently considered to be as significant as the official bylaws governing groups. For example, in describing the United States Senate, Donald R. Matthews describes its unwritten rules as folkways:

Local Government and Traditional Authorities in Concert: Towards a More Productive Relationship

Abstract: Ghana embarked on decentralisation in 1988 as a way of bringing decision making closer to the people. Since then, there have several reforms with a view to strengthening local governance. This article identifies a major challenge still facing Ghana’s decentralisation: Partnership between local government and traditional authorities. The paper discusses the fuzzy relationship between local governments and traditional authorities as a result of constitutional and legislative ambiguity on their relationship. Traditional Authorities perform important functions in the country, albeit their roles have waned since independence. Yet current legal provisions on local government have not sufficiently clarified their role in local administration. This has led to a murky and competing relationship between traditional authorities and local governments. In localities where mutual relationship exists, it is mainly as a result of the personalities involved and this has had a positive effect on the development of the area. The paper concludes by advocating for measures which among others include a re-enactment of legislation which will define the working relationship between traditional authorities and local government.

Senate Voting and Constituency Stake in Defense Spending

Abstract: ( ongressmen's party allegiance usually is a major determinant A of roll-call behavior, and their personal characteristics often play a part, but research in legislative behavior has shown that certain demographic and political characteristics of congressmen's constituencies may also have significant independent influence on congressional voting.1 The "military-industrial complex" literature stresses the importance, in congressional support for the Defense Department budget and related military measures, of the constituency's dependence on defense spending. It is suggested that congressmen are motivated to vote for defense spending because of the economic benefits to be derived by their constituents.2 Although, as former Representative Carl Vinson once said of a defense budget, "There is something in this bill for everyone," defense funds are not dispersed evenly around the country.3 The hypothesis to be tested here is: Legislators from states that depend heavily on defense spending will be more likely to support legislation to increase or to maintain defense spending levels than legislators from states that do not. Senate voting data are taken from the 1969 session; in earlier years, weapons systems occasionally were subject to criticism, but this was the first time since the Second World War that a number

Historical and Political Background of Federal Health Care Legislation

Abstract: The concept of a right to health, to some extent guaranteed to citizens by government, has within it heavy political as well as social overtones. The demand to "keep politics out of health" is a futile one, and it is now heard with less and less frequency. The politics of health have evolved in the United States by fits and starts. The concern of government has gradually moved from the general health of millions"public" health-to a growing and increasingly pressing awareness of the unmet health needs of individuals.1 Specific political settings have of course always conditioned the content and effect of health legislation, especially at the federal level, and the organized health professions, notably the AMA, have availed themselves of those settings as well as they were able to support their own point of view before legislators and voters. The legislative end results have been determined by a mix of pragmatism, political opportunism, the pressure of special interest groups, health crises, technologic factors, and genuine concern for the public good.

The Governance of Education in Australia: Centralization and Politics

Abstract: The centralization of power in the state and federal legislatures and in their associated professional bureaucracies is a notable feature of both educational and general political decision making in Australia. In this paper “governance” refers to the process of exercising authoritative control, “politics” to public policy making and its resolution. Formal public participation in Australian educational decision making is shown to be minimal, being limited to representation by elected members in the state and federal legislatures. There is no local governmental structure or tax for education. The existing structures and their origins are explained. Two hypotheses derived from the work of Iannaccone are tested. The first states that the longer educational issues remain unsolved in the extra‐legal social networks and lower level legal areas the more likely it is that decisions on these questions will be made by central government departments and agencies. The second states that the more that questions of educational policy are resolved by central departments and agencies the more likely it is that educational policies will become undifferentiated from other kinds of politics or from politics as relating to other policy areas of government. An examination of political developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries supports both hypotheses.

The Role of British Backbenchers in the Modification of Government Policy

Abstract: ARLIAMENT no longer exists."' This charge, angrily thrown forth in the House of Commons by Dame Irene Ward, exemplifies the concern of politicians and scholars alike in recent years over the role of the British legislature. The problem, by no means limited to Great Britain, is that if legislators fail to contribute meaningfully to the decision-making process in a representative democracy, if they are unable to check and modify the decisions of the executive, then the existing political arrangements are clearly inconsistent with the concept of representative government. The British have been especially sensitive to the issue. Many writers claim that Britain's representative chamber, the House of Commons, is involved in the rule-making process in only the most peripheral manner. Such critics argue that the development of a stable two-party system, capable of sending a well-disciplined majority to the House of Commons, has led to a system of government in which the cabinet rules with largely unchecked decision-making powers. The backbenchers, the individual members of Parliament who are part of neither the establishment nor the opposition's shadow government, have, in the view of such critics, lost their raison d'etre. Indeed, backbenchers have been likened to a flock of mindless sheep, ready to be driven routinely through the division lobbies whenever the House is asked to put some matter to a vote.2 The purpose of this paper is to suggest that although there may be some question about the effectiveness of opposition backbenchers in the House of Commons, government backbenchers have influenced government policy more than most observers seem willing to admit. By tradition members of the opposition are granted the role of government critic, but criticism and pressure from the opposition is routine, and the government accepts it as simply a necessary ingredient in the parliamentary game. This is particularly true since the opposition, no matter how intense their feelings on an issue, cannot change the fact that the government with rare exceptions remains secure behind its majority support in the House, and accordingly is little moved by criticism from across the aisle. When the government is confident that its policy is correct, it is indeed unlikely that threats or pleas from the opposition will cause the government to amend that policy. Criticism from backbenchers of the government party, on the other hand, commands special attention in spite of the much discussed party discipline in

Integrative Factors in the Malaysian and Philippine Legislatures

Abstract: It seems trite to assert that conflict is endemic to political systems and that the organized response of a system to conflict determines its stability and capacity. Yet in the study of development these factors are often ignored. For some years we have concentrated on socioeconomic variables as explanations of particular political organization and activity. In part this was a natural reaction to the failure of more traditional European oriented frameworks of political analysis when applied to Asia and Africa. In part, also, it was a natural response of the political scientist to the charm of the exotic in Asia and Africa. Although this type of analysis has led to some fruitful revelations about the relationships between social, cultural, and psychological phenomena and political life, it has been less useful as a base for building empirical theory. The consistent ignoring of the more traditional organizational factors of political analysis has been sharply criticized in recent years.' It is not necessary to repeat the criticisms here but only to emphasize that, in addition to all the other failings, frameworks which treat political structures and their actions solely as dependent variables are of little use for comparative purposes. By trying to link one of the key processes of change in political development to a particular institution, this article concentrates on a comparison of the way that institution responds to conflict in two different systems. The question posed is, "In what way do legislatures contribute to integration?" Considering legislatures as differentiated structures which stand in particular relationship to executives, bureaucracies, and populace.

The Domestic Origins of Peace

Abstract: A variety of pressures is felt by the policy- makers of a belligerent actor impelling them to make peace. Internal pressures originate with the legislature, the elites, public opinion, advisers of the policy-makers and the ministries of the government. History provides us with the examples from which we can generalize when peace moves are con strained or permitted by forces within the polity of a belligerent.

Party Discipline in War-Time: The Downfall of the Chamberlain Government

Abstract: The remarkably high level of unified party-line voting in the British House of Commons is so well known that contrasting behavior has been little studied. Analysis of deviant cases, however, is very likely to further our understanding of legislative behavior that is extraordinary by American, and even European, standards. In what circumstances does party cohesion break down in Britain? What pressures or factors work against voting solidarity? Answering such questions should help explain why the normal pattern of British legislative behavior exhibits such great unity. Despite these considerations, no one has attempted to study thoroughly the most significant deviant case of British Parliamentary voting behavior in the twentieth century-the division of 8 May 1940. The fact that Britain was at war enhances this division as a research site. When even the breath of dissent could be made to appear unpatriotic, the bonds of party unity would seem to be maximized. One of those who was a Member of Parliament at the time termed the vote, in discussing it 25 years later, "the most fateful division in parliamentary history."' For two days the Commons debated the Chamberlain Government's conduct of the Norwegian campaign. Fearful that under the circumstances a direct challenge to Chamberlain might rally even the dissident Conservatives to his defense, the Labour party leaders hesitated to demand

The Politics of Impounded Funds

Abstract: This article explores the political factors which give rise to disputes over impounded funds: prevention of budget deficiencies; wartime diversion of human and material resources from domestic public works; presidential restraints on interservice rivalries over procurement; and fiscal measures to reduce inflationary pressures. The question of whether impoundment is justified or not requires close attention to specific cases and the complex interplay of politics, economics, and legislative procedures.

The Politics of Defection: The Changing Contours of the Political Power Structure in State Politics in India

Abstract: he Fourth General Elections held in February 1967 constitute a watershed in the post-independence political history of India. The monolithic Congress regime and its haloed leadership had concealed both the many operational weaknesses and the basic inner strength and resilience of the Indian system. While strongly reaffirming the people's deep involvement in the democratic process, the electoral verdict shattered the Congress Party's virtual monopoly of political power. It also exposed the artificiality of the political stability, democratic maturity and parliamentary sophistication at which the system had appeared to be operating. Results of the fresh elections held in five of the seventeen States in February 1969 only carried the process a stage further. The most important developments in the post-1967 political and parliamentary scene in India were the formation of coalition governments of widely heterogeneous elements in several States and the numerous defections on the floor of the State legislatures which affected the fate of ministries and the course of politics. This phenomenon, the politics of defection as it is commonly called now, has several psychological and socionomic dimensions and is closely related to the dynamics of human relations and leadership processes. In the present paper, an endeavor has been made to study it objectively, as a psycho-sociological reality, in terms of simple political legitimacy and constitutional legality and in the context of some of the more identifiable legal, political and psychological variables in order to understand its motivations, implications and consequences and more particularly its impact on the problems, processes and prospects of parliamentary democracy in India. Of the sixteen States of the Union that went to the polls in 1967 (there were no elections in Nagaland) the Congress Party did not gain an absolute majority in eight and failed to form the government in seven. Even in those States in which the Congress retained control, its strength was much depleted and in several cases defection by a few members changed the Party's legislative majority into a minority. In seven of the eight States where Congress failed to win an absolute majority, however, no single party took its

Political Careers: Recruitment Through the Legislature

Abstract: Using New York State legislators as case material and data from newspapers, questionnaires, interviews, census reports, and biographical directories, the author helps the reader grasp the interrelatedness of ethnicity, social status, constituency, and party variables that influence lawmakers.

Thailand: The Politics of Continuity

Abstract: Since the 1932 revolution when constitutional rule replaced the absolute monarchy, Thailand has intermittently experimented with democratic government. The Kingdom's most recent attempt began in June 1968 with the promulgation of the eighth post-revolution Constitution. The Constitution called for national elections, held on February 10, 1969, for the House of Representatives, the lower house in the bicameral legislature.' Under the leadership of Prime Minister Thanom Kittakachorn, the Thai government mobilized some 250,000 rural and urban officials and spent approximately 102 million baht ($5,100,000) in order to carry out the elections. The massive organizational effort resulted in elections which were considered by spokesmen for both government and opposition parties to be the most orderly and least corrupt in Thai history. Isolated incidents of double voting by military units, bribery, and ballot box stuffing were reported informally, yet only twelve nullification suits, a very small number of protests in comparison with past elections, were filed officially with the Minister of Interior. Although political parties had been banned since 1958, thirteen parties managed to organize, register and engage in campaigning. Of these, the pro-government United Thai People's Party (UTPP) and the opposition Democrat Party merit particular attention. The organizers of the UTPP were comprised of the persons in the most powerful political institutions of Thailand. In addition to the Prime Minister, Party leaders included the most prominent civilian and military cabinet members and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Commanders-in-Chief. At election rallies in the Kingdom's 71 provincial constituencies, the UTPP candidates stressed: 1) the need for strong centralized leadership to ensure continued stability in the Kingdom; 2) the ability of the existing military regime to meet the dangers of Communism; 3) the success of the government's economic development program; and 4) the advantages UTPP candidates would have in terms of access to government funds for local development projects. The Democrat Party, the oldest and most influential of the opposition parties, was led by former Prime Minister Seni Pramoj. In contrast to the UTPP which was able to field a full slate of 219 candidates, the Democrat

Medicare deadlock in Quebec.

Abstract: The present state of deadlock between the government of the province of Quebec and the medical specialists in the province has followed a series of maneuvers that not only have been complex and difficult to follow in themselves, but also have most recently been intertwined with a serious political crisis. Yet the issues are of fundamental importance to the medical profession, and for this reason merit the attention of anyone interested in the changing interface between the profession and the government. With the passage of "Bill 8" through the provincial legislature in June, 1970, the provincial government sought to establish . . .

Linear Algebra and Legislative Voting Behavior: Rice's Indices

Abstract: L legislative voting behavior has been extensively researched by behavioral scientists using a variety of quantitative indices and mathematical techniques. Some of these indices and techniques have been used for decades, but their essentially mathematical properties have been subjects of debate or have not been thoroughly explored. Stuart Rice's index of cohesion and index of likeness, for example, have been used continuously since the 1920s but have rarely been investigated from a mathematical point of view.' Despite continuous use since the 1920s, Rice's indices suffer from a well-known flaw, viz., legislators who neither vote aye nor vote nay are omitted. This shortcoming hardly needs elaboration, but two aspects deserve notice. (i) Empirically, the number of omitted legislators may be rather large in relation to the total size of the party or other subset of legislators being studied. An extreme example is furnished by the 1910 British House of Commons. During the session of July 18, on division number 106, the vote was 49 ayes, 1 nay, and approximately 620 MPs did not vote. (There were 670 seats in the House of Commons, but a few were vacant as a result of deaths, resignations, etc.) The low turnout may be amusingly explained by the fact that the division occurred at 3 A.M. in the morning of July 19. During the 1910 Parliament, however,

The European Defense Community in the French National Assembly: A Roll Call Analysis

Abstract: Introduction In late 1950, Prime Minister Rene Pleven of France proposed the "Pleven Plan" for an integrated European Army, incorporating the armies of six nations, including Germany and Italy. In May 1952, the French representative signed the treaty creating the European Defense Community (EDC), the culmination of the Pleven Plan. By late 1954, France, the originator of the concept, was the only participating power which had not yet ratified the treaty. On August 30, 1954, the French National Assembly defeated the European Defense Community. Less than four months later, the French National Assembly approved the Western European Union (WEU), which provided for joint military actions by the same six nations which were to participate in EDC. The history and fate of the EDC in the National Assembly appear to be yet another example of the inconsistent and chaotic politics of France's Fourth Republic. Explanations of the behavior of the legislature in this important case can be separated into two general classes: (a) the ideological commitments of the deputies and the ideological quarrels between them underlay their parliamentary behavior,1 and (b) the deputies were motivated by personal concerns and individual ambition, with the result that considerations

The Group Life of a State Delegation in the House of Representatives

Abstract: THE INFORMAL structuring of interactions and influence within formal organizations is generally recognized as having profound consequences for institutional integration and functioning. Manifestly or latently, informal structures serve as supplements to and sometimes substitutes for formally prescribed role interactions, sometimes facilitating, sometimes impeding the realization of organizational goals. Students of legislatures have seriously begun to incorporate systematically the relevant concepts and data into their attempts at explanation. David Truman, probably more than anyone else, stimulated conceptualization and research on legislatures using this orientation. In 1951, he articulated the general perspective as follows:

Progressive Reform of the St. Louis School Board, 1897.

Abstract: THE PROGRESSIVE IDEA of reform developed through years of experimentation in St. Louis and achieved success in the 1897 School Board reorganization. (i) As early as 1877 the tendency to treat the city as a separate entity became apparent when a new charter separating the city from the county was effected. Previously there had been both a city and a county government in the same area, each with two legislative houses and the power to tax. The "dual double-headed system then in force," one critic argued, "was anomalous and absurd." The two bodies, both of which levied taxes, did not really represent the people, since neither was elected at large. (2) The new charter, although retaining the two-house City Council, required one house to be elected at large; efficiency was increased through extended terms for most officials and an increase of administrative powers for the mayor. (3) Reform intentions were stated in a series of editorials in the Missouri Republican, which argued that the charter ensured a representative council because the upper house was to be elected at large. It also ensured "a better class of men in the council, for who will assert that our ordinary type of alderman could be elected by the general vote of the city?" It would abolish "the execrable system of ruling the city by ward representatives" and reduce city expenses by substituting a compact economical system in place of the previous bungling caused by a lack of central authority. (4) Not everyone liked the new charter. Although the Republican said it was framed in the interests of all taxpayers, others said it discriminated in favor of the rich. (5) An interesting feature of the discussion

The Application Clause of Article Five

Abstract: Article Five of the United States Constitution provides that amendments may be proposed either by a two-thirds vote of each house of Congress or by a national convention which can be assembled when Congress receives applications from twothirds of the state legislatures. To date Congress has proposed all twenty-five amendments to the Constitution, the application clause serving only to stimulate congressional formulation of the Seventeenth Amendment.' Nevertheless, the House of Representatives has reported that between 1789 and 1961 the states have submitted 226 applications for a constitutional convention. These applications cover: direct election of senators, limitation on federal taxing power, prohibition of polygamy, general revision of the Constitution, world federal government, repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, presidential tenure, treatymaking, taxation of federal and state securities, protective tariff, wages and hours, gasoline tax, tidelands problem, control of trusts, grants-in-aid, popular ratification of amendments, revision of Article Five, and the