Showing papers on "Majority opinion published in 1982"

Law, legislation, and liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy

Abstract: Foreword to the Routledge Classics Edition Consolidated Preface Introduction Volume I Rules and Order 1.Reason and Evolution 2. Cosmos and Taxis 3. Principles and Expediency 4. The Changing Concept of Law 5. Nomos: The Law of Liberty 6. Thesis: The Law of Legislation Notes Volume 2 The Mirage of Social Justice 7. General Welfare and Particular Purposes 8. The Quest for Justice 9. 'Social' or Distributive Justice 10. The Market Order or Catallaxy 11. The Discipline of Abstract Rules and the Emotions of the Tribal Society Notes Volume 3 The Political Order of a Free People 12. Majority Opinion and Contemporary Democracy 13. The Division of Democratic Powers 14. The Public Sector and the Private Sector 15. Government Policy and the Market 16. The Miscarriage of the Democratic Ideal: A Recapitualation 17. A Model Constitution 18. The Containment of Power and the Dethronement of Politics Epilogue: The Three Sources of Human Values Notes Index of Authors cited in Volumes 1-3 Subject index to Volumes 1-3

Opinion Leaders: Is Anyone Following?

Abstract: ARE there opinion leaders in the sense that some individuals within the general public change their opinions earlier than others? Are there followers in the sense of a lagging public, or are "opinion leaders" the only people discussing and making up their minds on the major issues of the day? The General Electric Company has been conducting interviews with national samples of adults by telephone every quarter since 1964. One purpose of these studies is to alert management to changes in public opinion, providing an early indication of new influences that may affect the company. Beginning in 1972 questions were included to identify respondents whose opinions might be expected to change earlier than the total sample. The Katz/Lazarsfeld opinion leadership questions reported in Personal Influence (1955) were adapted to this purpose. Two basic assumptions about how opinions are formed were implicit in this attempt. First, it was assumed that the process of opinion formation is social. When faced with an unclear situation which requires some

Public Support for the Supreme Court in the 1970s

Abstract: In the 1960s, Murphy and Tanenhaus examined the linkages between public opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court. This article represents a new look at that question within the context of the 1970s, using national survey data. Four clusters of explanations are developed, based upon the previous literature, and tested, using trust in the Court as the dependent vanable. The two most important explanatory variables found are race and education, but race is declining as an explanation for variations in support for the Court.

Strategic Choice and Opinion Assignment On the U. S. Supreme Court: a Reexamination

Abstract: UPREME COURT scholars are interested in opinion assignment on the Court because the justice who writes the Court's opinion has substantial control over its content. Four different researchers (Danelski, 1960; Ulmer, 1970; McLauchlan, 1972; and Rohde, 1972) examined four different data sets and found that some opinion assigners, in some kinds of cases overassigned the opinion to some categories of justices close to the dissenters (see Table 1). The most ambitious of the opinion assignment studies was the one conducted by Rohde. Rohde inspected the five-member decision coalitions in the orally argued civil liberties cases on the Warren Court and found that the marginal and pivotal justice was chosen to write a significantly greater share of the opinions of the Court than can be expected by chance. The marginal justice in a five-person decision coalition is the justice in the coalition who is ideologically closest to the minority, while a pivotal justice is the justice furthest away ideologically from the opinion assigner. Why is the pivotal and marginal justice favored in opinion assignment? We learn from Rohde that in civil liberties cases the opinion assigner seeks an opinion that conforms to his own ideological views and to achieve this end he usually assigns the opinion to himself or to a justice ideologically close to him. Therefore, when the opinion assigner designates the marginal and pivotal justice to author the Court's opinion he is depriving himself of a benefit. What might the opinion assigner get in return for giving up this

Winning in Small Claims Courts: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract: Small claims courts provide consumers with a potentially effective method for complaint resolution. Little is known, however, about the factors which influence the probability of consumers winning their cases in court or of successfully settling their cases out of court. This study estimated these probabilities using 1975–76 data from the Syracuse, New York Small Claims Court. A major goal of the research was to determine if plaintiffs' demographic characteristics, the amount and type of advice sought by plaintiffs and the specific characteristics of the cases differentially affected the probability of successful consumer outcomes. Major findings were that economic variables such as the amount of the claim and the amount offered by way of settlement of the claim primarily determined the probability of settling out of court. Neither sex nor race had any impact on the probability of winning in court. Advice from the small claims court staff and from lawyers both were found to lower the probability that the consumer would win in court. The results point to the need for more empirical analyses of small claims court cases and may aid educators in advising consumers on the use of the institution and policy makers concerned with court reform.

Generic tendencies in majority and non‐majority supreme court opinions: The case of justice Douglas

Abstract: Using a sample of Supreme Court Justice William O Douglas' Supreme Court opinons as the data base, this study investigated the question of whether majority or non‐majority status constitutes a variable sufficiently strong to predict the rhetorical quality of the opinion The three traditional schools of legal philosophy, Natural Law, Legal Positivism, and Legal Realism, provided the basis of three hypothetical rhetorical genres which were found to be present in statistically similar frequencies in all opinion types These findings (1) call into question the conventional wisdom that majority and dissenting opinions represent different rhetorical sub‐species, and (2) suggest that a more fruitful avenue of analysis looks to the generic architechtonics of Supreme Court opinions rather than to the relatively more superficial dimension of stylistics

Marketing and the United States Supreme Court, 1975–1981

Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court conditions the legal environment of marketing, and over the past six years, its decisions have both limited and expanded the constraints on marketers. Constraints have been imposed on marketing operations, particularly pricing and channels of distribution, on marketing organizations, and on the relevant regulatory procedures. Indications are that future changes may be imminent, particularly in allowing greater marketing autonomy within a private enterprise system.

Supreme Court Decisions on Mental Health: A Review

Abstract: Since the late 1960s mental health advocates have filed numerous lawsuits against mental health institutions in an effort to narrow the standards for civil commitment, improve the care of patients, and define patients' rights. While many of the lawsuits were successful in attaining these goals at the district and appellate court levels, review by the Supreme Court generally has resulted in decisions blunting the lower court rulings. The high court has rejected broadly worded lower court decisions on commitment laws, standards of proof in commitment hearings, and patients' rights. The court also has upheld the traditional reliance on decision-making by medical professionals. The author describes a number of these cases and their decisions and concludes that cases now before the Supreme Court very likely will result in decisions that strike a balance between the needs of the patients and those of treatment staff.

The United States Supreme Court on libel

Abstract: This essay surveys key decisions on libel handed down by the United States Supreme Court and the resulting distinction between private persons and public officials/public figures. A corresponding distinction in treatment of the two categories with respect to proof of defamation is also examined. Criticism of the Court's position is offered and a change in policy is recommended.

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan: the Supreme Court rules on female-only nursing school.

Abstract: o n lulv 1.1982. the United States . , . Supreme Court issued its opinion in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,’ ruling that the “female only” admission policy of a state-supported nursing school violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The case has political and legal implications not only for nursing education, but for the nursing profession as well. Joe Hogan, a registered nurse, worked as a nursing supervisor in a medical center in Columbus, Mississippi. In 1979, he applied for admission to the baccalaureate program at Mississippi University for Women (MUW) School of Nursing, located in Columbus.z Although he met all of the school’s substantive admission criteria, Hogan was denied admission solely because M U W has, since its inception, admitted only females. The school’s policies would, however, permit him to audit nursing courses and to attend continuing ed,ucation courses. Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory damages, Hogan filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, claiming that M U W School of Nursing’s single-sex admission policy violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court entered summary judgment for the state, because it found that the single-sex policy was ra-

The Rowley Decision: How the Supreme Court Views the Education of Handicapped Children:

Abstract: This review of the U.S. Supreme Court's first interpretation of Public Law 94-142 details the national economic environment in which the decision took place, provides a history of the Rowley case i...

On the need for a philosophical investigation of capital punishment by the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: The Supreme Court needs to clearly articulate the legal-political philosophy underlying its decisions so that consistency can be sought. Decisions involving life-and-death issued, such as capital punishment, should be based on sound, articulated philosophy rather than public opinion polls and the perceived mood of the public. Supreme Court justices, like everyone else, bring their own biases to their decisionmaking, but too often cases appear to be decided on “technical” due process issues rather than philosophic grounds. Of course, the “due process” interpretations used actually reflect inarticulated political philosophy.

The Scope of Individual Opinions in the World Court

Abstract: The 1966 decision of the International Court of Justice setting aside the applications of Ethiopia and Liberia, and consequently dealing a mortal blow to efforts which had sought a judicial resolution of the Namibia dispute, has come to be viewed as a watershed in the history of the Court. From the standpoint of the Court's procedure, the South West Africa decision was noteworthy because it produced some strongly-worded individual opinions that appeared to deal with questions which had been before the Court but had not been dealt with by the Court's Judgment. The publication of these opinions sparked a controversy over the proper scope of expression available to individual judges — a controversy that still remains to be resolved. The Court probably discussed this issue in its private deliberations on the 1966 Judgment but did not take any public position on the subject. The only indication of the Court's concern was a “declaration” by President Spender in which he analyzed the limits that individual opinions ought to observe. Spender concluded that the scope of individual opinions must be determined by the fact that they are “directly connected with and dependent upon the judgment;” that the judgment is the “focal point of the different judicial views expressed;” that “in principle (individual) opinions should not purport to deal with matters that fall entirely outside the range of the Court's decision;” and, finally, that “there must exist a close direct link between individual opinions and the judgment of the Court”.