Showing papers on "Majority opinion published in 1994"

The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments

Abstract: "The Supreme Court Compendium is the only reference that presents historical and statistical information on every important aspect of the U.S. Supreme Court, including its history, development as an institution, the justices' backgrounds, nominations, and confirmations, and the Court's relationship with the public and other governmental and judicial bodies. The newest edition of this comprehensive reference includes important new perspective on the legacy of the Rehnquist court." Readers will also find: An institutional overview of the Court's history including a chronology of important events from 1787-2006, important Congressional legislation relating to the Supreme Court, internet sites relating to law and courts, and much more; background information on all the justices such as family backgrounds, childhood environments, marital status, educational and employment histories, political experiences and trends in voting agreement; and the political and legal environment of the Court is presented including the success rate of the United States as a party before the Supreme Court, the rates of success of various administrative agencies, and state participation in court litigation with success rates. "This new edition includes more than 180 tables and charts and is updated to cover Supreme Court events through the 2005-2006 term. This reference is an invaluable resource to judicial scholars, students, and those interested in the history of the Supreme Court."

Congress, Social Movements and Public Opinion: Multiple Origins of Women's Rights Legislation:

Abstract: Scholars often characterize congressional response to public opinion as either reflecting opinion and legislating accordingly or manipulating opinion for political ends. When the wider political en...

Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions

Abstract: This research examines what factors are likely to cause the Congress to attempt to reverse Supreme Court decisions that hold federal laws unconstitutional during the Warren, Burger, and early years of the Rehnquist courts. First, we outline a general theory of congressional motivation to reverse Supreme Court decisions that looks to both electoral considerations and the need to safeguard congressional power as the primary motivating factors. Using a data set consisting of 65 Court decisions that reversed all or part of some federal statute(s), we test our hypotheses using a probit model to predict when the Congress will take counteraction. We find that the electoral considerations of public opinion and interest group pressure are likely to lead to a congressional response, while the institutional considerations of court unanimity and the age of the legislation struck down are also important. The congress, however, is most likely not to take any decision reversal action.

Explaining and Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making: The Burger Court's Establishment Clause Decisions

Abstract: The United States Supreme Court in the last fifty years has been asked repeatedly to interpret and then reinterpret the two clauses of the First Amendment which deal with the area of religion. The amendment mandates that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." While these clauses may appear to be straightforward at first glance, upon further reflection one realizes that they allow for numerous inter pretations and at times may conflict with one another. These differing interpretations have led to a number of bitter disputes over the years. As Martha McCarthy has noted, "The relationship between religion and government has created extensive controversy in the history of this nation."1

It's Not What You Ask, It's the Way That You Ask It: Question Form and Public Opinion on the Death Penalty

Abstract: For all their faults, public opinion polls are of great importance to public policymaking, especially on issues that are highly visible and controversial. In the context of capital punishment, rese...

The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory, 1953-1993

Abstract: Ronald Kahn greatly revises our understanding of Supreme Court decision making and its relation to constitutional theory in the eras of chief justices Earl Warren, Warren Burger, and William Rehnquist. In the process, he refutes the longstanding stereotypes of an activist Warren Court trying to legislate individual rights and of a visionless Burger Court hiding in its predecessor's shadows. Kahn contends that the dominant view of the Supreme Court as just another political institution is incorrect. That view depicts an unprincipled court wavering before external politics and public opinion or bending to the political agendas of individual justices. Kahn counters that justices throughout the postwar epoch, while well aware of the political environment, have consistently relied upon legal precedent and constitutional principles-especially in cases relating to individual rights and popular sovereignty. The Burger Court in particular, Kahn argues, had both a coherent vision and a highly complex understanding of malfunctions in the American polity and of fundamental rights in the Constitution. He cites as salient examples the Burger Court's controversial decision in Roe v. Wade and its decisions regarding gender equality, religious freedom, and the right to education of all children, even illegal aliens. He suggests that this same sensitivity, despite enormous popular and political pressures, has been demonstrated by the Rehnquist Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). Kahn effectively reveals how the Supreme Court is influenced by its ongoing dialogue with scholars, judges, journalists, and others who debate the connections between constitutional law and democratic government. His critique of works by such prominent theorists as Robert Dahl, Martin Shapiro, Vincent Blasi, Anthony Lewis, Archibald Cox, Alexander Bickel, Herbert Wechsler, John Hart Ely, and Laurence Tribe, among others, provides valuable insights into this exchange between the court and its "interpretive community." His chapter on the new civic republicans like Michael Perry, Mark Tushnet, and Sanford Levinson, is especially provocative in its analysis of a potentially more productive guide for jurisprudence in the 1990s. Combining theoretical sophistication with a fundamental comprehension of our nation's political institutions, Kahn's study should help demystify for scholars and students alike the workings of the Court and its place in our democracy.

Getting Serious About An International Criminal Court

Abstract: The purpose of Part I of this article is to shed light (to the extent possible without violating post-government employment privileges) on the evolution of the U.S. Governments' position from one of cautious skepticism to qualified support for the establishment of an ICC. Part II of this article analyzes and suggests revisions to the proposed statue for an ICC recently prepared by the UN International Law Commission ("ILC").

That Godless Court? : Supreme Court Decisions on Church-State Relationships

Abstract: The religion clauses of the First Amendment, which seem simple and clear, have been and continue to be controversial in their application. Church-state issues have never been more complex, controversial, and divisive than they are today. In this helpful and instructive book, Ronald B. Flowers explains clearly and concisely the intricacies and implications of Supreme Court decisions in the volatile area of church-state relations. This is an ideal primer for those Americans who have listened to the debates about what the Supreme Court has and has not said about the relationship between church and state, and where the boundaries between the two have been eroded. It is also ideal for use in the classroom, specifically in undergraduate courses in religion and the court, introductions to U.S. constitutional law, constitutional law and politics, and the Supreme Court. The book is also a helpful tool for pastors, clarifying contemporary church-state issues that impact their churches and parishioners directly and indirectly.

The Impact of Permissive Judicial Policies: The U.S. Supreme Court and the Right to Die:

Abstract: Little research has examined the effects of permissive Supreme Court decisions that give lower courts, legislatures, and others very wide discretion in implementation. This research presents two main hypotheses that link the content of state policy before and after a permissive Supreme Court decision: (1) institutions whose previous policies exceed the scope of a new permissive Supreme Court decision will ignore the new policy and maintain their original course; (2) institutions whose previous policies lag a permissive Supreme Court ruling will innovate by altering their policies to meet but not exceed the new Supreme Court decision. A sub-hypothesis applicable to both of these hypotheses is: state political institutions that previously had no applicable policies, but adopt them following a permissive Supreme Court decision, will follow the main policy innovations chosen by their counterpart state institutions. Focusing on the right to die and the Supreme Court's Cruzan decision, the reserach confirms the...

Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multilateral Treaties

Abstract: Acceptance of and objections to reservations to general multilateral treaties raise many complex issues of international law. Traditionally a reservation made subsequent to the conclusion of a treaty required the unanimous acceptance of all other treaty parties, unless the treaty otherwise provided. If any State entitled to object to the reservation did so, either the reservation was withdrawn or the reserving State was not regarded as a party to the treaty. On 18 May 1951 the International Court of Justice rendered its opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Notwithstanding considerable criticism of the majority opinion in the Genocide case, support for the unanimity principle waned. There is no clear consensus in the doctrine as to the legal effect under the Vienna Convention of an impermissible reservation. In practice the flexible system of the Vienna Convention is viewed as working reasonably well.

Editorial: Fuzzy Law from the High Court

Abstract: Since the 1950s, a great deal of American public administrative practice has been "constitutionalized," or regulated directly by constitutional law (Rosenbloom, 1983). Concomitantly, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct" and has ruled that almost all public administrators can be held personally liable for conduct that violates clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" (Harlow v. Fitzgerald 1982; 818). In recent years, however, the quest for clear constitutional principles in public administration has been frustrated by the Supreme Court's own fragmentation. In some cases, the justices, efforts to paper over the divisions in their ranks with general terms have led to decisions that dissenting justices have found devoid of any principles which will either instruct or endure" (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 1985; 562, Chief Justice Rehnquist), "ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law" (Morrison v. Olson, 1988; 733, Justice Scalia), and "so devoid of content" as to "produce[] rather than eliminate[] uncertainty" (O'Connor v. Ortega, 1987; 73; Justice Scalia). Some of the Court's holdings have also been obscured by a plethora of separate opinions and partial concurrences and dissents. Consider, for example, the following headnote: O'Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-B, and IV, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part II, in which Rehnquist, C,J., and White, J., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A and V, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J.,...and Kennedy, J.,... filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.... Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined.... Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined ... (City of Richmond v. Croson, 1989). Key decisions during the October 1993 term illustrate the Court's tendency to couple constitutionalization with turbidity. The Court handed down groundbreaking decisions on the Fifth Amendment's protection of real property rights and on public employees' freedom of speech. But it articulated new standards that are too fuzzy to be used effectively as a guide to administrative action. Further, based on the justices' voting, it appears that narrow majorities used the Fifth Amendment as a device to outlaw administrative action to which they are opposed without displaying a serious commitment to property rights per se. Although some ambiguity is inevitable and has always been present, vague constitutional standards and values are bound to be problematic when the administrative emphasis is on employee empowerment and public entrepreneurship. The Fifth Amendment: Take It or Leave It? Dating from the 1950s, the constitutionalization of "new property, such as welfare benefits, public employment, and occupational and other licenses, has revolutionized American public administration (Reich, 1964; Rosenbloom, 1983). It is anomalous that new property has sometimes enjoyed greater constitutional protection than traditional, or real property. During the 1993 term, the Supreme Court moved to restrain constitutionally administrative action in civil forfeitures and individual zoning decisions, thereby affording more protection to landowners in seizure and "takings" cases. However, the Court's standard with regard to takings is inherently unclear and openly invites litigation. Its divisions also reveal less interest in property owners rights than in constraining administrative action found objectionable by one or another line-up of justices. Consequently, its decisions do not clearly signal to public administrators that real property rights are to be highly valued. …

The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Bad Journalism

Abstract: The First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of the press and freedom of speech do not purport to set standards for the news media. In interpreting the First Amendment, however, the Supreme Court has played a significant role in setting the legal framework for journalistic practice. Everything from the reporter's use of confidential sources to the protection of her files from police search, from her access to government proceedings and institutions to her potential iability for infringing upon rights of privacy and reputation have been the subject of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court's decisions have covered much of the full range of the journalistic enterprise. Despite this extensive involvement, the Court generally has not considered how its decisions affect the standards of journalistic practice. At one level, this is perfectly understandable-the Court

Supreme Court Decision Making: An Individual-Level Analysis of the Establishment Clause Cases During the Burger and Rehnquist Court Years

Abstract: In the first Establishment Clause case decided by the Burger Court, the U.S. Supreme Court laid down a new constitutional test. With this addition, the Court now had in place the third prong of a three-part Establishment Clause test. However, this three-part test has not settled what is allowable in church-state relations for many scholars. In fact, it is often complained that constitutional law in this area is confused and conflicting. This study attempts to show that the votes of the justices are not as uncertain or unpredictable as previously has been claimed. It also endeavors to contribute to explaining Supreme Court decision making in general. A fact-attitudinal model is derived from judicial behavior theory, cognitive-cybernetic decision-making theory, and the writings of the justices themselves. The results suggest that the model has explanatory as well as predictive value during both the Burger and early Rehnquist Court years.

Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases

Abstract: The Slaughter-House Cases are simultaneously unremarkable and extraordinary. They are unremarkable because the matter at issue - whether butchers can be required to ply their trade at a central, state-franchised facility - has long since ceased to be a matter of concern. They are extraordinary because in spite of the fact that three of the Court's significant legal conclusions have been rejected and “everyone” agrees the Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had no meaningful place in our constitutional scheme continues to live on. Even those who have a narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment conclude that beyond due process and equal protection, the Fourteenth Amendment was “meant to establish some substantial rights” and that “these were the ‘privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”’ Yet almost all sources agree that Justice Miller's majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, or at least its dicta, “virtually scratched [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] from the constitution.” This Article argues that Justice Miller's majority opinion was indeed based on an incorrect reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, and then explores why Justice Miller, as well as the other Justices in the majority and the dissents, reached the conclusions they did. Part I sketches the basis for the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect substantive rights, primarily the Bill of Rights, from state abridgement. Part II examines the Slaughter-House decision, summarizing the arguments presented by counsel and analyzing the opinions written by Justices Miller, Field, Bradley, and Swayne. Part III critiques Justice Miller's opinion. Part IV seeks to explain the positions of the Justices by examining the political background of each of the Justices and, where available, their personal reactions to the adoption of the Amendment. Part V tests this analysis of the opinions and background of the Justices against the popular and professional commentary on the Slaughter-House opinion from 1873 to 1949.

Judicial Review, Nationalism, and the Commerce Clause: Contrasting Antebellum and Postbellum Supreme Court Decision Making

Abstract: The still-influential progressive interpretation of American constitutional history conceives the property-oriented judicial activism of the Supreme Court in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (the era of laissez faire) to have been a natural and logical outgrowth of similar orientations on the Marshall and Taney Courts It is contended here that the progressive theory is rooted in a serious misinterpretation of the early Supreme Court's constitutional decision making Far from extending the lines of development laid down by its predecessors, the turn-of-the-century Court in fact uprooted the most important traditions of the antebellum era on the issues of national power, commercial regulation, and the scope of the judicial function

Nine Scorpions in a Bottle: Great Judges and Cases of the Supreme Court

Abstract: One of America's great legal scholars and most respected journalists shares half a century of observating and writing about the Supreme Court. This life's work covers the Court from its beginnings to its recent moments of crisis. Lerner has written about the judicial process for over 50 years.

Supreme Court decision affects bargaining rights of nurses.

Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court, in ruling that nurses who direct lower-level employees are supervisors, has redefined the relationship of staff nurses with management. Nurses who make assignments for and supervise the work of lower-level employees may not be entitled to National Labor Relations Board protection because of this decision.

The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity Than Ever

Abstract: Time and again the Rehnquist Court has favored antitrust certainty. When faced with a choice between achieving individualized justice and adhering to relatively clear, generalized rules, it has usually chosen the latter. The certainty of objective evidence has been preferred to the more customized resort to subjective evidence.' This pattern continued during the 1992-93 term. Perceived objectivity through generalized rules triumphed in the term's four antitrust cases, This article will discuss each case in turn. It will be seen that especially in terms of the litigation process at the Court and the quality of the decisions, it was an unsatisfying antitrust year. for sharing briefs and transcripts; Faye R. Morrison and Patricia A. Peters for research assistance; and many friends and colleagues for invaluable discussions. Responsibility for what follows lies exclusively with the author. protection of certain petitioning for government action. 6 Before Profes-sionalRealEstate (PRE), plaintiffs had to satisfy a subjective test to establish that litigation was sham (and therefore unprotected from the antitrust laws). In PRE, the Court supplemented that subjective test with an objective test-and required plaintiffs to satisfy both. Unfortunately, the Court's opinion, by Justice Thomas, 7 failed to achieve the clarity it sought. The litigation in PRE featured a shootout between subjective and objective standards. Even with the Solicitor General joining petitioners in preferring subjectivity, it was not a fair fight. Perhaps it was because the odds were so against them that petitioners kept changing strategy right up until oral argument. Petitioners were in trouble from the beginning. The suit concerned videodiscs, an ill-fated home-entertainment technology. When a resort hotel operator started renting videodiscs to patrons for in-room viewing without payment of royalties, eight movie studios filed a single, apparently reasonable lawsuit alleging copyright infringement.' The movie studios lost in a controversial copyright decision," and then had to confront the antitrust counterclaim that had been filed with the answer to their original lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment on the counterclaim. 1 0 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects a" 'legitimate effort to influence government action,'" it explained." That the suit in question was a legitimate effort was clear because the original plaintiffs 2 had sought and expected a favorable outcome, the merits had been difficult to re-6 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its sham exception are discussed in Calkins, 7 All nine Justices voted to affirm the court of appeals. Justice Souter concurred and filed an opinion. …

A Critique of the Supreme Court’s 1982 Agenda: Alternatives to the NYU Legal Model

Abstract: A model adopted to understand the agenda setting and decision making of the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly contains a standard of case significance. The NYU Project used the legal model to draw its conclusion that the Court included cases of low priority on its 1982 agenda. This study uses three additional models—policy, market, and statist—to show that the Court selects cases that are of significance to different constituencies. In setting its agenda, the Court serves its own collegial needs as well as external demands. The Court responds most fully at the agenda stage to its legal and political reference groups; economic and regime interests reinforce those preferences. In its selective response to external pressures to influence its agenda, the Court has maintained its own independence; no external reform of its agenda process is indicated.

Style and the Supreme Court's Educational Role in Government.

Abstract: The Supreme Court, we are told, is-or at least could be-a republican schoolmaster,t an educative institution.2 Through its decisions and, even more, the written opinions that provide the rationales for its decisions, the Court leads the people of the United States to a deeper understanding of our constitutional commitments. As our understanding improves, the policies we pursue improve as well. This picture of the Court's role is undeniably attractive.3 Its outlines need filling in, though. Claims for the Court as educator face an immediate difficulty. Surveys indicate rather low levels of public knowledge about the Court's work in general, and even lower levels of knowledge about particular decisions.4 How, then, could the Court educate the public about the true meaning of the Constitution? One possibility is that it can do so by imposing its vision on the society, hoping that people will adjust their understandings to the reality they face. As Felix Cohen put it, the Court could edu-

The Young Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States

Abstract: Here is an encyclopedia of the Supreme Court--exactly the kind of sourcebook that students, teachers, and librarians need to comlplement the available material about the history and current operations of the Court. This authoritative and comprehensive treatment includes: * biographical sketches of all 107 justices * detailed discussions of 100 landmark Supreme Court cases * concepts of constitutional law * legal terms and phrases associated with the Court's operations * procedures and practices in the daily operations of the Court * essays on key topics and issues in American constitutional law * excerpts from notable Supreme Court opinions * tables of terms of Supreme Court justices The essay on current constitutional issues (abortion rights, affirmative action, censorship, school prayer, libel, and employment discrimination) and essays that illuminate procedural topics (the right to a trial, the right to counsel, and protection against self-incrimination) demonstrate the relationships of the Court to the lives and concerns of individuals in American society. A complete index and table of justices are included. In an easy-to-use alphabetical format, with extensive cross-referencing, suggestions for further reading, and many photographs and other illustrations, The Young Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States is an invaluable and ready reference for students, teachers, and librarians.

Spanning Ideological Chasms: The Response to Conceptual Segregation in "Bowers v. Hardwick.".

Abstract: I On July 13, 1986, the United States Supreme Court released a 5-4 decision in the case of Bowers v. Hardwick in favor of the state of Georgia, rejecting Michael Hardwick's claim that the state law prohibiting consensual sodomy violated the constitutional right to privacy that had overturned similar state laws against contraception, abortion, and interracial marriage. From the beginning, the decision departed from standard Court practice. Justice Powell initially voted to overturn the law, resulting in a 5-4 decision for Hardwick, but then changed his vote and affirmed the law's permissibility (Taylor, 1993). At the decision's announcement, Justice White, author of the majority opinion, and Justice Blackmun, author of an angry dissent, both took the unusual steps of reading portions of their opinions aloud from the bench (Taylor, 1986). While conservative religious groups applauded the ruling, an editorial in the New York Times called it "unreal, frightening, and an unimaginable reversal of our previous impression of the judiciary as a protector of individual freedom against parochial intolerance" (Smith, 1986). Eight years later, Bowers v. Hardwick has yet to fade into the law books. At the time of the decision, many observers warned that it signalled the beginning of the end for judicial protection of the right to privacy, the right to make decisions that concerned intimate relationships and procreation, without government interference (Marcus, 1986). Four years later, a study by the Alliance for Justice cited one hundred references to Bowers in state and federal court decisions which curtailed the right to privacy (Greenhouse, 1990). Bowers continues to play a significant role in shaping American jurisprudence. One constitutional law professor referred to the justices' framing of the issues as "a methodological dispute which is of great importance, indeed as important as the outcome of the case itself" (Agneshwar, 1990, p. 3). Another legal commentator elaborated: Legal arguments, method, or analogical reasoning may mean little to the committed, both on the left and on the right of the legal-political spectrum. But Justice Powell's change of mind is credible evidence that, for less doctrinaire jurists, cogent legal argumentation and sound analogical reasoning are indeed "outcome determinative." For this reason, it is now important to reread Bowers v. Hardwick; and to analyze closely the legal method and arguments of the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions. (Wishingrad, 1990, p. 2) II Ross (1991) has suggested that each person who reads an opinion authored by a Supreme Court justice assumes the responsibility of critic: After reading the opinion, no morally neutral position is available to us. If we speak about the case, we take on the role and responsibility of the critic. The discourse of the critic is the discourse of normative analysis. In one way or another, we speak of what ought to be. Our membership within the community of law makes even silence a morally charged position. Several authors have written that the Court's authority stems from the cogency of reasons and arguments that bolster its decisions and are explained in its opinions (Chemerinsky, 1987; Smith, 1991; Wardle, 1980). Alternatively, Choper (1980) argues that the mystique of the Supreme Court, the pomp and ceremony surrounding its operations, serves to create awe in the minds of its audience, which in turn serves as the basis of the Court's legitimacy. Zeppos (1991) draws upon this idea to explain the Court's delicate, and occasionally impenetrable, treatment of controversial issues. According to Zeppos, the Court's majority opinions are intended not to reflect accurately the Court's reasoning in rendering a decision, but rather to bolster the decision, to address the sources of controversy and attempt to quell them before an outcry can be raised. This preemptive strategy builds a degree of dishonesty into the system: The point of formalist reasoning is to legitimate judicial power by not disturbing the complacency held by most people. …

The Voluntary School Prayer Debate: A Separationist Perspective

Abstract: Since 1962 when the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Engel v. Vitale1 that teacher-led and state-composed prayers in public schools are unconstitutional, many attempts have been made to over turn that ruling.2 Those persons supporting the restoration of prayer to public schools have included former President George Bush and Sena tor Jesse Helms (R-NC). During his administration, Bush endorsed a constitutional amendment restoring the "right for a kid to pray volunta rily in the school."3 Helms likewise has been a vociferous advocate of restoring voluntary prayer to the public schools. On 22 January 1992 during a debate concerning the Neighborhood Schools Improvement Act, Helms submitted an amendment to the act that called on the United States Supreme Court to use Lee v. Weisman4 to overturn both Engel and Abington School District v. Schempp.5 The views of these two prominent politicians concerning voluntary school prayer reflect the majority opinion of the American public. In a 1991 Time/CNN poll, 78 percent of American adults favored allowing children to say prayers in public schools, and 89 percent favored a mo