Showing papers on "Majority opinion published in 1996"

Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective

Abstract: Recent aggregate-level research on the United States Supreme Court suggests that shifting tides of public opinion can have important effects on Supreme Court decisions. Moreover, these effects can be both direct (i.e., unmediated by other institutions) and indirect (i.e., mediated through presidential elections and subsequent judicial appointments). This research extends this inquiry by examining the influence of public opinion on individual members of the Supreme Court during the period 1953-1992. Although the majority of justices during this period show little or no evidence of public opinion effects, a significant minority of justices show substantial effects. As predicted by social psychological theories, the impact of public opinion is greatest among moderate justices who are likely to hold critical swing positions on the Court. The effects of public opinion are in addition to significant agenda effects and suggest important refinements in the standard attitudinal model of judicial decision making.

The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact

Abstract: Theorv: Government bureaucracies are strategic and implement Supreme Court opinions based upon the costs and benefits of alternative policy choices. Agencies develop these expectations from prevailing resource environments and bureaucracies are more likely to establish larger policy change when resources favor the Court because the costs of not changing their policies appear larger. Hypotheses: The amount of bureaucratic policy change due to Court opinions is a function of: (1) attributes of Supreme Court opinions-specificity of Court-ordered policy change, basis of opinions, remands, and dissents; (2) agency characteristics-policy preferences, type of proceedings, and time preferences; and (3) external actors-amicus curiae, opposing litigants, Congress, and presidents. Methods: An Ordered Probit analysis tests a multivariate model of the impact of every Supreme Court opinion reversing or remanding a federal agency decision from the 1953 through 1990 terms. Results: Agency policy change after Court opinions is influenced by the specificity of Supreme Court opinions, agency policy preferences, agency age, and amicus curiae support.

The shepherding of local public opinion: The Supreme Court and Lamb's Chapel

Abstract: We argue that the standard methodology for assessing the impact of Supreme Court decisions on public opinion, which relies on national surveys to measure public attitudes before and after relevant Court decisions, fails, among other grounds, to account for the fact that the overwhelming majority of Court decisions speak to particular constituencies only. We assess the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches on the geographic constituencies involved in the case. We interviewed a random sample of residents in the town of Center Moriches and in the surrounding county of Suffolk, New York, before and after the decision. Consistent with the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), we find that high levels of information about the decision increases support for the Court's decision among those for whom the decision is relatively less salient.

Not the whole story: The impact of justices' values on supreme court decision making

Abstract: A half century of empirical scholarship has now firmly established that the ideological values and the policy preferences of Supreme Court justices have a profound impact on their decisions in many cases. The prior work of Segal and Spaeth (both collaborative and independent) has made important contributions to our understanding of the linkages between these preferences and the justices' decisions (Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal 1984; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1993). Their most recent work (Segal and Spaeth 1996) provides additional evidence that for the set of important policy making cases they examine, the policy preferences of the justices have a significant effect on judicial votes. While this research makes it clear that preferences play an important role in the justices' decision making process, it does not establish that preferences eclipse precedent and legal doctrine completely. Segal and Spaeth (1996) argue that there has been no systematic empirical evidence of the role of legal factors, including precedent, at the Supreme Court level. Several studies, nevertheless, have provided bits of evidence that, when considered together, suggest that legal factors do matter. For example, Epstein and Koblyka's 1992 study of death penalty and abortion decisions indicates that the substantive legal arguments presented to the Court play an important role in doctrinal development and alteration. Similarly, H.W. Perry's 1991 study of the Court's agenda-setting process, which demonstrated the justices' concern for the jurisprudential, as well as the policy implications of cases selected for review, further reinforces the view that law and precedent matter in the Supreme Court. Although Perry did not investigate decisions on the merits, justices who place cases on the docket for jurisprudential reasons should be attentive to those same jurisprudential concerns at the merits stage. These studies may not provide a systematic assessment of precedent and the justices' decisions. But they do suggest that it matters. Regardless of this evidence in support of the legal model, Segal and Spaeth continue to adhere to their position that precedent has virtually no impact on the

May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court

Abstract: Theory: Majority opinion assignments made by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court can be accounted for with both organizational and attitudinal models of behavior. Hypotheses: The likelihood that the Chief assigns an opinion to a justice depends upon the importance of each case, the size of the initial majority coalition, the timing of the decision, and each justice's expertise, efficiency, workload, and policy preferences. Method: A discrete choice model is used to test a multivariate model of the assignments made by Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Results: Chief Justice Rehnquist's assignments are determined by the Court's organizational needs, rather than the Chief's policy preferences.

Strategies for self-government: The campaigns for a Scottish Parliament

Abstract: James Mitchell reviews the range of strategies and tactics used by different parties, groups and organisations to achieve self-government over the past ninety years and asks: how does a movement with the potential or actual support of majority opinion translate this into an effective political force?

The Claim of Issue Creation on the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: W T Ze argue that a variant of the sua sponte doctrine, namely, the practice disfavoring the creation of issues not raised in the legal record, is a norm with substantial consequences for the U.S. Supreme Court. Without it, justices would act considerably more like legislators, who are free to engage in "issue creation, " and less like jurists, who must wait for issues to come to them. Yet, McGuire and Palmer claim that justices engage in issue creation in a "significant minority" of their cases. We dispute this finding because we think it is an artifact of the way McGuire and Palmer collected their data. Indeed, for virtually every case in which they found evidence of issue creation, we show that the issue was actually present in at least one of the litigants' briefs. This suggests that justices may be policy seekers, but they are not policy entrepreneurs; and that briefs filed by third parties (such as amici curiae) are generally not a source of important issues considered by the Court.

The International Court as a world court

Abstract: Having had the privilege of being the pupil of Professor R. Y. Jennings, as he then was, and the beneficiary of his guidance and friendship for over a third of a century, and the even rarer privilege of serving beside him as counsel before the International Court of Justice, then as judge ad hoc during his presidency of the Court, I was intrigued by his occasional use of ‘World Court’ to refer to the ICJ. Indeed, this reference to the ICJ (and the Permanent Court of International Justice before it) as ‘the World Court’, which probably goes back to Judge Manley O. Hudson and which is current in legal literature in English, is unknown in other languages such as French, Italian, Spanish or for that matter Arabic. It raises in the mind of the non-common law jurist the following query: in what sense and what ways can the International Court be considered a ‘World Court’? THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AS A WORLD-WIDE COURT The first meaning that suggests itself is that it is a court of and for the whole world. As such, it is expected to be universalist in its composition, outlook and vocation, truly representing and at the service of the international community in its entirety, and not dominated by the legal or social culture or special interests of any segment thereof. This in turn would ensure that the Court and its judgments command the confidence of all the nations of the world.

Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court

Abstract: The relationship between the fairness and accuracy of political journalism and the health of electoral politics in the United States has been the subject of frequent study and comment. Both scholars and journalists have expressed alarm at the corrosive effect that cynical, adversarial, or sensationalistic reporting has had on the process of running for office and governing the country.1 But the relationship between the quality of legal journalism and the vitality of our judicial institutions has received much less attention, with perhaps the sole exception of the continuing debate over permitting live television coverage of proceedings such as the O.J. Simpson murder trial.2

A Judgment for Solomon: The d'Hauteville Case and Legal Experience in Antebellum America

Abstract: A Judgment for Solomon tells the story of the d'Hauteville case, a controversial child custody battle fought in 1840. It uses the story of one couple's bitter fight over their son to explore some timebound and timeless features of American legal culture. In a narrative analysis, it recounts how marital woes led Ellen and Gonzalve d'Hauteville into what Alexis de Tocqueville called the 'shadow of the law'. Their multiple legal experiences culminated in an eagerly followed Philadelphia trial that sparked a national debate over the legal rights and duties of mothers and fathers, and husbands and wives. The story of the d'Hauteville case explains why popular trials become 'precedents of legal experience' - mediums for debates about highly contested social issues. It also demonstrates the ability of individual women and men to contribute to legal change by turning to the law to fight for what they want.

Issues, Agendas, and Decision Making on the Supreme Court

Abstract: In the process of agenda setting, the U.S. Supreme Court is limited to selecting from among only those cases brought before it. Despite this limitation, the justices possess considerable discretion and can reshape the issues in a case as a means of advancing their policy preferences. With data drawn from the Court's opinions, we find that, over the past twenty-five years, the justices have evinced a frequent willingness to expand the issues on their plenary docket and resolve questions not formally presented by the parties. We conclude that, notwithstanding informal norms that disapprove of this practice, issue fluidity is an important component in a continuous program of agenda building.

Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Flag:

Abstract: Congress frequently seeks to reverse the policies of the U.S. Supreme Court. Much is known about the circumstances in which lawmakers confront the Court and whether they are likely to succeed. Still, we do not know how individual members of Congress make these decisions. Why do some mem bers defer to judicial policymaking, while others openly oppose it? The case of the Flag Protection Amendment of 1990, considered in response to the Court's decisions on the issue of flag burning, provides an illustrative setting in which to examine this question. Despite evidence that congres sional reaction to judicial policy is distinctive, our model of the vote sug gests that the nature of institutional conflict does not shape the decision. Rather, members largely reflect ideological and constituent preferences when deciding whether to reverse the Court.

The Position of Shari'a Within the Uae Constitution and the Federal Supreme Court's Application of the Constitutional Clause Concerning Shari'a

Abstract: The preceding Supreme Court decisions led to the following conclusions: firstly, although the Supreme Court in these decisions repeatedly insists that recourse to Islamic Shari'a is a matter of policy to be left entirely to the federal legislature, the Court repeatedly announced that all federal legislation should be derived from Islamic Shari'a. The Court thus adopted the Islamists position according to which any legislation violating the Shari'a dictates should be considered unconstitutional.66 Secondly, although, as mentioned, there was strong evidence of an apparent conflict between the Constitution and the laws dealt with by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments, the Court was reluctant to declare the laws unconstitutional. This is accounted for by the Court's insistence on creating uniformity among these judgments. Greater conflict occurred between the Constitution and Articles 61 and 62 of Abu Dhabi Law than occurred between the Constitution and the Alcoholic Drinks Laws of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah. The fact that there was seen to be no conflict between the Constitution and Articles 61 and 62 naturally led the Supreme Court (for the purpose of creating uniformity among its judgments) to deny the existence of conflict between the Alcoholic Drinks Laws and the Constitution. Thirdly, the Supreme Court in interpreting and applying Article 7 of the Constitution in the judgments mentioned above, distinguished between civil and criminal matters. In answering the question of the legality of bank interest, the Court considered the application of the Shari'a as a matter of policy to be left to the legislature, and not for the judiciary to decide. Concerning the application of the Shari'a in criminal matters, the Court declared that the lower federal courts should apply the punishments prescribed by the Shari'a in Hudud offences. Indeed, practice in the UAE shows the application of Shari'a in the sphere of criminal matters only; it does not apply to commercial matters, especially in the case of applying interest in commercial law as proven by the Supreme Court in the Junatta Bank case. The roots of such a distinction can be found in the answer to the question, why was the application of Shari'a rules regarding Hudud offences made obligatory by the Supreme Court, while the application of the Shari'a rules affecting bank interest was not? The probable answer is that the Supreme Court has shied away from applying the Shari'a where it would threaten orderly economic development and the modernisation of its institutions.67 The application of Hudud punishments, by comparison, threatens no such disruption.

Decision: How the Supreme Court Decides Cases

Abstract: Based upon confidential conference notes, draft opinions, memoranda, letters, and interviews, Schwartz presents a unique examination of the Supreme Court's decision process. This behind-the-scenes look at the Supreme Court shows the Court in action as it has never been shown before.

The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court

Abstract: The United States Supreme Court's connection to the ideal of the rule of law is often taken to be the principal basis of the Court's political legitimacy.1 In the Supreme Court's practices, however, the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's political legitimacy do not always coincide. This Note argues that the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's legitimacy part company with respect to the Court's practice of dissent. Specifically, this Note aims to demonstrate that the practice of dissent?the tradition of Justices publishing their differences with the judgment or the reasoning of their peers2?cannot be justified on the basis of an appeal to the ideal of the rule of law, but that other bases ofthe Court's political legitimacy provide a justification for this practice. The Note thus has two aspirations. First, it seeks to provide a justification for the practice of dissent in the Supreme Court. Second, in pursuit of that

The International Court of Justice:Its Future Role after Fifty Years

Abstract: List of Abbreviations. Preface H.E. Mohammed Bedjaoui. Editorial Introduction A.S. Muller, et al. Part I: The Position of the Court. The World Court at the Turn of the Century M. Shahabuddeen. Part II: The Roles of the Court. The Proper Work and Purposes of the International Court of Justice R.Y. Jennings. Judicial Settlement in Perspective A.O. Adede. The Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice in the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes Ph. Couvreur. The Judicial Function of the International Court of Justice with Respect to Disputes Involving Highly Political Issues T. Sugihara. International Organizations as Parties to Contentious Proceeding before the International Court of Justice? J. Sztucki. Granting International Organizations Ius Standi in the International Court of Justice P.C. Szasz. Access of International Organizations to the International Court of Justice I. Seidl-Hohenveldern. Individuals and the International Court M.W. Janis. The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial Function M.N. Shaw. The International Court of Justice in Relation to Other Courts H.G. Schermers. The Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice and Its `Judicial' Character: Past and Future Prisms M. Pomerance. Judicial Insights into the Fundamental Values and Interests of the International Community V. Gowlland- Debbas. The International Court of Justice and the Formulation of General International Law: The Law of Maritime Delimitation as an Example J.J. Quintana. Part III: Concluding Remarks. The International Court of Justice at Fifty D.P. Forsythe. The International Court of Justice: Where Does it Stand? P.H. Kooijmans. Index.

The European Court of Justice as a Federator

Abstract: Analyzing the role of the European Court ofJustice (ECJ) in federating the European Community is a challenging enterprise. It raises a number of fundamental questions, each of which is a source of considerable debate. First, there is a serious gap between the formal role of the European Court of Justice as outlined by the treaties establishing the European Communities' and the much more active defacto role the ECJ has played over the last decades. The literature about whether this judicial activism was justified in legal terms has been abundant. Second, there is disagreement about the importance of this activism. Was the Court, through its rulings, responsible for many steps toward a more federal Europe since the 1950s? Or, did the Court somehow operate within a certain margin of maneuver set out by other centers of power within the European Community? In other words, was the Court active or rather reactive? Third, how far can the Court go in its pursuit of a federal Europe, and is it likely to do so in the future?

Against the Imperial Judiciary: The Supreme Court vs. the Sovereignty of the People

Abstract: In this fresh and provocative critique of judicial power, Matthew Franck argues for a Supreme Court that is newly mindful of constitutionalism's basis in the sovereign will of the people and of the distinctly limited scope of judicial authority that is permitted by that constitutional sovereignty. Neither activism nor restraint, but a lively sense of the fundamental constraints that deprive the Court of any legitimate choice between those two options, is at the heart of Franck's model of appropriate judicial modesty Franck challenges three propositions central to current debates over the Supreme Court's role in American life: that the Court has the final word in interpreting the Constitution above competing views from other government branches; that it may legitimately initiate actions to correct political or social dysfunctions left uncorrected by those branches; and that constitutional decisions may be grounded in natural law or a "higher law" located beyond the text of the Constitution. Franck claims that these erroneous propositions have allowed the Court's power to grow well beyond its constitutional mandate. He persuasively argues that a more accurate and responsible view of judicial power can be revived by reexamining the Framers' thought, the writings of liberal philosophers (especially Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone), and the early opinions of the Supreme Court. His reasoned critique provides illuminating new perspectives on the jurisprudence of John Marshall; on the origins and practices of "judicial statesmanship" (presumed to have begun with Marshall); on McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)-which was not, Franck argues, a ruling in pursuit of a nationalist political agenda but conformed to a modest vision of the judicial power; and on the mangled roots of substantive due process. In addition, he reviews recent Supreme Court confirmation hearings to demonstrate the large influence of historical misconceptions on our understanding of the proper scope of judicial power in a constitutional democracy.

Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant--Reflections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law

Abstract: Federal environmental law is over a quarter century old, dating from the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969 and the Clean Air Act (CAA)2 in 1970. Since then, the Supreme Court has decided roughly two or three environmental law cases per year-or somewhere between fifty and one hundred cases altogether.3 To assess the Court's relevance, imagine that all those cases were wiped off the books. If the Court had never granted certiorari in a single environmental case, would the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or other federal agencies operate any differently? Would firms be subject to different federal regulations? In short, how different would environmental protection be today? The answer, according to my thesis, is \"not much.\" During the past twenty years, the Court's decisions have not substan-

Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness

Abstract: Call me silly. In fact, call me terminally silly. For despite Justice Scalia's remarkably confident claim, I believe, and shall try to prove below, that the Romer Court majority opinion invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2 was right both in form and in substance, both logically and sociologically. I stress "form" and "logic" at the outset because I share Justice Scalia's belief in the importance of these things in constitutional adjudication. I also share his commitment to constitutional text, history, and structure, and his suspicion of "free-form" constitutionalism.2 And so I shall highlight the text, history, and spirit of a constitutional clause that though not explicitly invoked by the Romer majority clarifies and supports the majority's theory: the Article I, section 10 Attainder Clause.3 My claim is not that the Equal Protection Clause, relied upon by the Romer Court, was incapable of doing the work; but that the sociology and principles underlying the Attainder Clause

The Sounds of Silence: Law Clerks, Policy-Making and the Supreme Court of Canada

Abstract: It is no longer controversial to refer to the Supreme Court of Canada as a policy-making institution. In large part, this flows from significant policy-making power being delegated to the judiciary since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Though policy-making by means of Charter jurisprudence has often been criticized as incoherent and undemocratic, few observers dispute that this shift in political responsibility has occurred and is continuing. The Supreme Court has historically had an important impact on public policy because it adjudicates division of power disputes between the federal government and the provinces.Just as the decisions of the prime minister and cabinet ministers are shaped, to some extent, by their institutional relationship with the PMO and PCO, so, I suggest in this paper, the Justices of the Supreme Court make decisions shaped, to some extent, by their institutional links with law clerks. However, while the PMO is typically staffed by political appointees and the PCO is typically staffed by career bureaucrats, the position of law clerk is staffed by inexperienced neophytes fresh out of law school. Indeed, law clerks have received such scant coverage in the literature on the Supreme Court that few people outside legal circles are even aware that they exist. In this paper, I explore the largely unpublicized role that law clerks play in the decision-making process at the Supreme Court of Canada.This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I offer a critical appraisal of how clerks are selected and what functions clerks perform in the Supreme Court of Canada. Rather than presenting this information descriptively, I attempt to analyze it in light of the extent and limits of clerks’ influence on the process and outcome of Supreme Court policy-making. In the second part, I consider the nature of the law clerk’s influence in the Supreme Court and why it has traditionally been downplayed both within and outside the Court.

More on the Origins of the Fuller Court's Jurisprudence: Reexamining the Scope of Federal Power Over Commerce and Manufacturing in Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Law

Abstract: Recent scholarship calls into question the traditional realist-behavioralist interpretation of the justices of the Fuller Court as motivated by a desire to promote their policy preferences for laissez-faire economics This essay extends the assault on what might be referred to as the Holmesian para digm of the tum-of-the-century Court by exploring the jurisprudential origins of that Court's decision in the infamous Knight case, in which the justices ruled that Congress had no authority under the commerce clause to regulate production By demonstrating that the Court's distinction be tween commerce and manufacturing was a commonplace of nineteenth- century constitutional law and not an "activist" innovation, I hope to underscore the advantages of situating Supreme Court decision making in the context of distinctive jurisprudential traditions Revisiting this earlier commerce clause jurisprudence also sheds light on the contemporary Court's dramatic resurrection of this contentious pre-New Deal tradition in

Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: A guide to the US Supreme Court. It covers the Court's history; operations; power in relation to other branches of government; major decisions; and biographies of the justices. This edition includes decisions, changes, controversies, appointments and retirements through the July 1996 term.

Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials

Abstract: The 14th edition continues the tradition of careful scholarship and attention to educational objectives begun with the first edition in 1936. The conflict of laws has experienced vast changes in the seventy seven years since the first edition of this book. The new edition joins its predecessors' attention to the needs of both teacher and student. Foreign law not only is of growing importance in a global economy but also holds important lessons for us as we reconsider our own law. With its extensive comparative materials the book facilitates appraisal of both domestic and foreign approaches. The new edition retains the order of presentation in the 13th edition, which has proven to be an important aid in mastering the materials. Choice-of-law issues take on added meaning after the student understands when and why a court may proceed against a nonresident defendant, appreciates that a court with jurisdiction over the defendant may nevertheless defer to a more appropriate forum, and has studied the requirements imposed by the United States Constitution on interstate recognition of judgments and on choice of law. Important features include an emphasis on comparative coverage and extensive notes and comments to guide study and provide background for class discussion. The Documentary Appendix greatly facilitates comparative study. The Appendix contains the major European Union Council Regulations on procedural and substantive issues that are the focus of the book. Detailed commentary accompanies each Regulation. The choice of-law materials contain many excerpts from and references to the laws of other countries. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the student to the major issues that subsequent chapters explore in detail. Chapter 3 explores judicial jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 decisions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown are both included as principal cases. A new state case on Internet libel is also included as a way to introduce the growing issues presented by bringing the ""minimum contacts"" test into the virtual world. At an early point in the choice-of-law materials (chapter 7), the book explores the meaning of "procedural" in the context of the conflict of laws. This prepares the student for discussion of court opinions throughout the choice-of-law chapters that affix the procedural label to an issue. Chapter 8 then focuses on development of choice-of-law theory and its application, with attention to issues of great current importance, such as choice of law in national class actions. Chapter 8 includes an easily-accessible discussion of the rising influence of law and economics in choice of law. Chapter 8 also includes as a principal case the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Co., in which New York's high court attempted to clarify the implications of its controversial decision in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America. Chapter 9 covers the special problems of conflicts in federal and international settings and contains a section on the extraterritorial application of constitutional rights and includes as a principal case the Supreme Court's decision extending habeas corpus rights to the Guantanamo detainees. This chapter also includes as a principal case the U.S. Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, in which the Court held, in a major break with a long line of lower court cases, that the Securities Exchange Act did not apply to securities traded on foreign exchanges. The fast evolving area of same-sex marriage and the conflicts problems presented are covered extensively in Chapter 11, which surveys the multitude of conflicts problems in family law.

The Future of the Juvenile Court: A Theoretical Framework That Fits

Abstract: The juvenile court has been subject to increasing criticism over the years, particularly with regard to its handling of delinquency cases. This is in part the result of an inaccurate view of the court as primarily a criminal court that adjudicates crimes committed by children. This article proposes an alternative model for the court, one that encompasses its jurisdiction over dependency and status offense cases, as well as delinquency cases. In describing this new conception of the juvenile court, an analogy is made to a "bankruptcy" court that intervenes when family members violate the laws regulating their relationships to one another. This new juvenile court would not take direct responsibility for the rehabilitation of child or family. Instead, it would use its power to hold private and public caretakers accountable for fulfilling their roles as supervisors and habilitators of children. The article concludes by exploring the advantages and potential disadvantages of this new vision of the juvenile court.

The Juvenile Court: A View from the Bench

Abstract: This article describes the changing role of the juvenile court from the perspective of an urban juvenile court judge. The author’s experiences as the administrative judge for Baltimore City’s juvenile court address typical current juvenile court dilemmas such as lack of funding, physical space that is inadequate for the needs of the court and those it serves, and limited dispositional options for juvenile offenders. Examples of effective judicial advocacy are presented, as are suggestions for positive court reform.